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ABSTRACT 
 
Remedy for Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Transitional Justice Contexts 
Irene Pietropaoli 
 
Corporations and other business enterprises often operate in countries affected by conflict 
or repressive regimes and commit human rights violations and crimes under international 
law, either as the main perpetrator or as accomplices by aiding and abetting government 
forces. In transitional justice contexts, the trials, truth commissions, and reparations 
typically included within the set of remedy mechanisms have focused primarily on abuses 
by state authorities’ or by non-state actors directly connected to the state, such as 
paramilitary groups or death squads. Innovative uses of transitional justice mechanisms 
across the world, however, have started to address, even if still only in a marginal way, 
corporate accountability for human rights abuses and crimes under international law and 
have attempted to provide redress for victims. This research analyses this development. 
 
This research provides an original contribution to the field on business and human rights 
and the little-researched link with transitional justice by assessing how remedies for 
corporate human rights abuses and crimes under international law can be achieved in 
transitional justice contexts. To answer this question this research first analyses how 
different mechanisms (judicial processes at the international and domestic level, truth-
seeking initiatives, and reparations programmes) have dealt, or failed to deal, with remedy 
for victims of corporate human rights abuses. It then examines their outcomes, the results 
those processes have achieved and the obstacles they have faced. The research takes a 
victim-oriented approach by analysing the tools, instruments and institutions available for 
victims (the bearers of rights) in transitional justice contexts (i.e. in countries emerging 
from conflict or authoritarian regimes) to remedy violations when those are committed by 
corporations.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION                                                                                                                 5	
I. NUREMBERG AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW                                       27	
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 27	
I.1 Nuremberg and Subsequent Trials ............................................................................. 28	
The International Military Tribunal ............................................................................ 28	
Industrial Cases ........................................................................................................... 31	
The Ministries Case ..................................................................................................... 35	
Lesson from Nuremberg ............................................................................................... 38	
I.2 The International Criminal Court ............................................................................... 42	
Thematic Prosecutions ................................................................................................. 46	
I.3 The ad hoc Tribunals ................................................................................................. 50	
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 54	
II. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS                                                                  60	
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 60	
II.1 The Inter-American System ...................................................................................... 61	
II.2 The African System .................................................................................................. 67	
II.3 The European System ............................................................................................... 73	
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 74	
III. DOMESTIC CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY                                                     76	
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 76	
III.1 Criminal liability ..................................................................................................... 77	
The Prosecution of Corporations ................................................................................ 78	
Universal Jurisdiction .................................................................................................. 86	
The Prosecution of Businesspeople ............................................................................. 88	
III.2 Civil Litigation ........................................................................................................ 94	
The Alien Tort Statute .................................................................................................. 96	
Financial Complicity ................................................................................................. 114	
Out-of-court Financial Settlements ........................................................................... 129	
 
 
 4 
Civil Litigation in other Jurisdictions ........................................................................ 132	
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 137	
IV. TRUTH SEEKING PROCESSES                                                                               143	
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 143	
IV.1 South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission ......................................... 145	
The Business Hearing ................................................................................................ 146	
The TRC’s Findings on Business ............................................................................... 152	
The TRC’s Recommendations on Reparations .......................................................... 155	
Limitations of the TRC in relation to Corporate Accountability and Reparations ... 156	
IV.2 Other Truth and Reconciliations Commission and Truth-seeking Bodies ............ 166	
Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission .......................................................... 166	
East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation ............................ 170	
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission ................................................. 172	
UN Experts Panel on the Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo ................................................................................................ 174	
Brazil National Truth Commission ............................................................................ 176	
On the Horizon: New Truth Commission in Argentina ............................................. 177	
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 179	
V. ADMINISTRATIVE REPARATION PROGRAMMES                                             184	
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 184	
V.1 Land Restitution Programmes ................................................................................ 187	
Colombia’s Victims and Land Restitution Law ......................................................... 187	
South Africa’s Land Restitution Programme ............................................................. 195	
Land Restitution Efforts in Myanmar ........................................................................ 197	
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 199	
CONCLUSION                                                                                                                  202	
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                                              215	
 
 
 
 
 5 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporations and other business enterprises1 often operate in countries affected by conflict 
or repressive regimes and their involvement in human rights violations and crimes under 
international law, as the main perpetrator or as accomplices by aiding and abetting 
government forces, has been well documented.2 In the words of the former UN Special 
Representative on business and human rights: ‘The most egregious business-related human 
rights abuses take place in conflict-affected areas and other situations of widespread 
violence’.3 A report for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
highlights a number of cases where business enterprises were complicit in gross human 
rights abuses, the majority of which committed in conflict-affected areas.4  
 
In transitional justice contexts, the trials, truth commissions, and reparations typically 
included within the set of remedy mechanisms have focused primarily on abuses by state 
authorities’ or by non-state actors directly connected to the state, such as paramilitary 
groups or death squads.5 Innovative uses of transitional justice mechanisms across the 
world, however, have started to address, even if still only in a marginal way, corporate 
accountability for human rights abuses and crimes under international law and have 
                                                
1 For the purposes of this research, business activities include all activities of business entities, whether they 
operate transnationally or whether their activities are purely domestic, whether fully privately owned or 
State-owned, regardless of size, sector, location, ownership and structure. Transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises’ is the way the UN refers to this issue, see UN Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General on human rights and translational corporations and other business enterprises. For short, 
often this research uses the term ‘business enterprises’ or ‘business’ or ‘corporations’. 
2 eg, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Business and International Humanitarian Law: An 
Introduction in the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises under International Humanitarian Law 
(ICRC 2006); P Collier, A Hoeffler and D Rohner, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War’ 
(2009) 61 Oxford Economic Papers 1; Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO), 
Multinationals and Conflict: International Principles and Guidelines for Corporate Responsibility in 
Conflict-Affected Areas (SOMO 2014);  JP Bohoslavsky and M Rulli, “Corporate Complicity and Finance as 
a ‘Killing Agent’ The Relevance of the Chilean Case” (2010) 8 JICJ 829; S Tripathi, ‘Business in Armed 
Conflict Zones: How to Avoid Complicity and Comply with International Standards’ (2010) 50 Politorbis 
131; J Zerk, ‘Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses. Towards a fairer and more effective system 
of domestic law remedies’ (2013), report prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.   
3 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, ‘Business and 
human rights in conflict-affected regions: challenges and options towards State responses’ (2011, 
A/HRC/17/32). 
4 Zerk (n 2) 17-23. 
5 UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Analytical Study on Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice, A/HRC/ 12/18, 2009; P de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’ in M Williams, R 
Nagy, and J Elster (eds.), Transitional Justice (New York University Press 2012); P Hayner, Unspeakable 
Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (Routledge 2001); G Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: 
The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press 2000); N Kritz (ed.), Transitional Justice: 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (US Institute of Peace Press 1995). 
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attempted to provide redress for victims. 6 This research analyses this development. It 
seeks to provide an original contribution to the field of business and human rights by 
assessing how remedies for corporate human rights abuses and crimes under international 
law can be achieved in transitional justice contexts. As backdrop to addressing this 
question, this introduction first assesses the scholarship and practical developments in the 
fields of business and human rights and transitional justice. It then elaborates on the 
research question and the nature of the original contribution to the field; it ends by 
presenting the structure and methodology of the work.  
 
Early debates on business and human rights focused on the applicability of obligations to 
business enterprises under international human rights law. Starting in the late 1990s, 
international law scholars and practitioners argued for the expansion of international 
human rights law obligations to corporations. In 2000, Saman Zia-Zarifi, then Secretary-
General of the International Commission of Jurists, and Menno Kamminga, argued that 
multinational corporations could be held liable under international law. 7 In the realm of 
core human rights norms, they asserted that multinational corporations ‘are bound by those 
few rules applicable to all international actors’.8 Andrew Clapham was among the first to 
argue that corporations have the capacity to acquire rights and obligations under 
international law.9 This early exchange generated a typology that envisaged a division 
between binding and voluntary approaches in relation to the regulation of corporations 
when they impact human rights.10 Whereas proponents of the binding approach, such as 
                                                
6 A Clapham, ‘Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed 
Opposition Groups’ (2008) 6 JICJ 899; E Duruigbo, ‘Corporate Accountability and Liability for International 
Human Rights Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges’ (2008) 6 Northwestern JIHR 222; S 
Beale, ‘A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2009) 46 American Crim LR (2009) 
1481; D Stoitchkova, ‘Towards Corporate Liability in International Criminal Law’ (2010) 38 Intersentia; A 
Batesmith, ‘Corporate criminal responsibility for war crimes and other violations of international 
humanitarian law: the impact of the business and human rights movement’, in C Harvey, J Summers, and N 
White (eds.), Contemporary Challenges to the Laws of War: Essays in Honour of Professor Peter Rowe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014), 285; LA Payne and G Pereira, ‘Corporate Complicity in 
Dictatorships’ (Saïd Business School and University of Oxford). 
7 MT Kamminga and S Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2000). 
8 Ibid, 8. 
9 A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (OUP 2006), ‘Extending International Criminal 
Law Beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups’ (2008) 6(5) JIJC, 899. 
10  eg, Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi (n 7); Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (n 9); S 
Deva, ‘Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law: Where from Here?’ 
(2003) 19 Connecticut JIL 1; N Jägers, (2002) Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In Search of 
Accountability (Intersentia 2002); R McCorquodale, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility 
for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70 Modern Law 
Review 559; M Addo, Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 
(Kluwer Law International 1999); DM Chirwa, ‘The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential Means of 
Holding Private Actors Accountable for Human Rights’ (2004) 5 Melb JIL 1; JM Woods, ‘A Human Rights 
Framework for Corporate Accountability’ (2010) 17 ILSA J Intl Comp L 321; L van den Herik and J Letnar 
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David Bilchitz and Surya Deva argue for the imposition of binding human rights 
obligations on corporations so they can be directly accountable for human rights at both 
domestic and international levels,11 advocates of the voluntary approach maintain that the 
protection of human rights remains exclusively the responsibility of states, and that 
business can only assist in their advancement through voluntary means.12 This academic 
debate followed the attempts to create a framework of human rights obligations and 
responsibilities for business enterprises, which, has discussed below, has proved 
challenging.  
 
International law regulates human rights violations by corporations indirectly, through 
states.13 International human rights bodies have affirmed the duty of states to regulate non-
state actors, including corporations, in order to ensure that they do not interfere with 
                                                                                                                                              
Černič, ‘Regulating Corporations under International Law From Human Rights to International Criminal 
Law and Back Again’ (2010) 8 JICJ 725;  JP Bohoslavsky and V Opgenhaffen, ‘The Past and Present of 
Corporate Complicity: Financing the Argentinean Dictatorship’ (2010) 23 Harvard HRLJ 157; JW Pitts, 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution’ (2009)6 Rutgers JLPP 348; JH 
Dunning (ed), Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism (OUP 2003); LC 
Backer, ‘The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond Asset 
Partitioning and Legal Personality’ (2006) 41 TULSA LJ 541; DG Arnold, ‘Corporations and Human Rights 
Obligations’ (2016) 1(2) BHRJ 255; J Letnar Černič and T van Ho (eds.), Human Rights and Business: 
Direct Corporate Accountability for Human Rights (Wolf Legal Publisher 2015) RM Bratspies, “Organs of 
Society”: A Plea for Human Rights Accountability for Transnational Enterprises and Other Business Entities” 
(2005) 13 Michigan State JIL 9. 
11 S Deva and D Bilchitz (eds.), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility 
to Respect (Cambridge University Press 2013); S Deva, ‘Treating Human Rights Lightly: A Critique of the 
Consensus Rhetoric and Language Employed by the Guiding Principles’ in S Deva and D Bilchitz (eds.), 
ibid., 78-104, Deva, ‘Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law’ (n. 10). 
See also, C Lopez, “The ‘Ruggie Process’: from Legal Obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility, in S 
Deva and D Bilchitz (eds)., Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect (Cambridge University Press 2013); Letnar Černič and van Ho (n 10); J Letnar Černič, Human 
Rights Law and Business (Europa Law Publishing 2010) and ‘Corporate Human Rights Obligations at the 
International Level’ (2008) 16 Willamette J Intl L 130; Jägers, Corporate Human Rights Obligations (n 10); 
SR Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale LJ; PT 
Muchilinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (OUP 2007); Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-state Actors (n 7); G Chandler, “The Curse of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility” (2003) 2 New 
Academy Review 1; D Kinley and J Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law’ 44 (2004) Va J Intl L 931; CM Vasquez, ‘Direct vs. 
Indirect Obligations of Corporations under International Law’ 43 (2005) Columbia J Transnatl L 927; 
International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the 
Developing International Legal Obligations of Companies (ICHRP 2002).  
12 eg, JG Ruggie, ‘Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International 
Legalization’ in C Rodriguez-Garavito (ed.), Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning 
(Cambridge University Press 2013); R Mayne, ‘Regulating TNCs: The Role of Voluntary and Governmental 
Approaches’ in S Picciotto and R Mayne (eds.), Regulating International Business: Beyond Liberalization 
(Mcmillan Press 1999); F Williams, ‘Company Norms “Must be on UN Rights Agenda”’ (8 April 2004) 
Financial Times, 9; DJ Karp, Responsibility for Human Rights, Transnational Corporations in Imperfect 
States (Cambridge University Press 2014); JE Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ 
(2011) 9(1) Santa Clara JIL 1. 
13 Deva, ‘Human Rights Violations By Multinational Corporations And International Law’ (n 10) 48; C Baez 
and others, ‘Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights’ (1999) 8 U. Miami Intl Comp L Rev 183, 220; D 
Bilchitz, ‘A Chasm Between “Is” and “Ought”? A Critique of the Normative Foundations of the SRSG’s 
Framework and Guiding Principles’, in Deva and Bilchitz (n 11). 
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human rights.14 For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
clarified that protecting rights means that states parties  
 
effectively safeguard rights holders against infringements of their economic, social 
and cultural rights involving corporate actors, by establishing appropriate laws, 
regulations, as well as monitoring, investigation and accountability procedures to 
set and enforce standards for the performance of corporations.15  
 
The regional human rights systems have also affirmed this duty, and established similar 
correlative state requirements to regulate and adjudicate corporate actions.16 Some UN 
Special Rapporteurs have interpreted their mandate so as to make recommendations to 
private actors as well.17 In 2001, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed:  
 
Even though states retain the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection of 
human rights under the human rights treaties, there is a new awareness that such 
responsibility entails ensuring that companies operating from or within their 
jurisdiction must not undermine existing human rights obligations or the 
international rule of law.18  
 
The debate did not stagnate over the technical issue of international legal personality. 
Businesses are participants in international life, able to be recipients of international legal 
                                                
14 eg, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2004) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, which states ‘The positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights 
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant 
rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights.’, para 8; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR), 
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (1999) E/C.12/1999/5, para 20, General Comment 
No. 13: The Right to Education (1999) E/C.12/199/10, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (2000) E/C.12/2000/4, General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities 
(2017) E/C.12/GC/2, and Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector and 
economic, social and cultural rights (2011) E/C.12/2011/1, para. 1; Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
General Comment No. 16 on State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector on children’s 
rights (2013) CRC/C/GC/16, para 53. 
15 Committee ESCR, Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector (n. 14), 
paras 5, 7.  
16 eg, European Court of Human Rights, Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) ser A 178, para. 47; Inter-
American Court on Human Rights, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras (1988) ser. C No. 4, 172. 
17 eg, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food Olivier de Schutter, 
Agribusiness and the Right to Food (22 December 2009) A/HRC/13/33; Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health Paul Hunt, Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to Access to 
Medicines (2008).  
18 D Weissbrodt and PL Parker, Report of the Seminar to Discuss UN Human Rights Guidelines for 
Companies (29-31 March 2001) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/WG.2/WP.1/Add.3, paras 11-12. 
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norms, without the need to be classed as subjects with full international legal personality.19 
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights already embodied this spirit 
stating that ‘every individual and every organ of society…shall strive…to promote respect 
for these rights and freedoms’. 20  As Louis Henkin emphasized, ‘[E]very individual 
includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no 
company, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all’.21 In 
some specific areas treaties define international legal obligations that specifically apply to 
corporations. Earliest among these was the Apartheid Convention, which established the 
international crime of apartheid and declared it a crime when committed by ‘organizations, 
institutions and individuals.’22 The UN Convention Against Corruption is an example of an 
international treaty that binds corporations with respect to their transnational conduct and 
the harms they cause.23 While the claim that corporations have direct human rights 
obligations remains contentious and there are not yet international treaties that impose 
direct human rights obligations on corporations, international law in this field is 
developing.  
 
UN efforts to directly regulate multinational corporations go back to the Code of Conduct 
negotiations that started in the mid-1970s and were abandoned a decade later.24 The next 
attempt came in 2003 when experts the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights drafted a treaty-like document called the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
                                                
19 O Martin-Ortega, ‘Business and Human Rights in Conflict’ (2008) Carnegie Council for Ethics in Intl 
Affairs 279. 
20 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) (10 December 1948) GA Res 217A (III) A/810, 
Preamble 
21 L Henkin, ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets’ (1999) 25 Brook JIL 17, 
25. 
22 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (entered into force 
18 July 1976) A/2645, art. 1(2) The Apartheid Convention was accompanied by a proposal-never 
implemented-for an international court to prosecute criminal violations of the treaty. According to the 
proposal, persons, legal entities, groups and organizations would all have been subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court, Draft Convention on the Establishment of an International Penal Tribunal for the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and Other International Crimes, reproduced in MC Bassiouni, The 
Statute of The International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (Transnational Publisher1998). The UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature in 2000, defined the international 
crimes of participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption, and obstruction of 
justice, all of which applied to corporations as well as natural persons.  
23  UN Convention Against Corruption (entered into force 14 December 2005) 2340 UNTS 41. For 
commentary see, A Ramasastry, ‘Closing The Governance Gap in the Business and Human Rights Arena: 
Lessons from the Anti-Corruption Movement’, in Deva and Bilchitz (n 11), 162-190. 
24  UN Economic and Social Commission, Development and International Economic Cooperation: 
Transnational Corporations (1990) E/1990/94. See, B Stephens, ‘The Amorality of Profit: Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights’ (2002) 20 Berkeley JIL 45, 69; SD Murphy, ‘Taking Multinational Codes 
of Conduct to the Next Level’ (2005) 43 Colum J Transnatl L 403. 
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Regard to Human Rights (the Norms).25 Intended to become binding, the Norms attributed 
to companies the ‘obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of 
and protect’ human rights.26 This approach faced strong opposition from businesses and 
was criticised by member states, especially Western countries, which opposed holding 
corporations directly accountable for human rights violations.27 When the Norms were 
submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission in 2004, they were rejected. 
 
In 2005, the UN Secretary-General appointed John Ruggie as the ‘Special Representative 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ 
with a mandate to clarify the existing standards and elaborate on the role of states in 
regulating businesses. 28 Ruggie was reluctant towards the idea that companies could have 
direct obligations under international human rights law and criticized the Norms.29 He 
observed:  
 
If the Norms merely restate established international legal principles then they 
cannot also directly bind business because, with the possible exception of certain 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, there are no generally accepted 
international legal principles that do so. 30   
 
Ruggie did, however, identified ‘governance gaps’ - highlighting that while companies’ 
operations and their economic and political influence reach across borders, international 
                                                
25 Sub-commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [hereinafter Draft Norms]. 
26 Draft Norms, Preamble. 
27 JG Ruggie, ‘Global governance and “new governance theory”: Lessons from business and human rights’ 
(2014), 20 Global Governance 5, 6; LC Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United 
Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social 
Responsibility as International Law’ (2006) 37 Columbia HRLR 287, ‘Rights and Accountability in 
Development (“RAID”) v Das Air and Global Witness v Afrimex: Small Steps Toward an Autonomous 
Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations’ (2009) 10 Melbourne JIL 258; 
15; K Lucke, ‘States’ and Private Actors’ Obligations Under International Human Rights Law and the Draft 
UN Norms’, in T Cottier, J Pauwelyn and E Burgi (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (OUP 
2005), 148, 159-160; D Kinley and R Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The 
Private Implications of Public International Law’ (2006) HRLR 1; Amnesty International, The UN Human 
Rights Norms for Business: Towards Legal Accountability (AI 2004).  
28 UN press release, ‘Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special Representative on 
Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises’ (28 July 2005). 
29 Interim Report of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises John Ruggie, submitted to the Economic and 
Social Council (2006) E/CN.4/2006/97 [hereinafter Ruggie Interim Report], para 59, 69. Ruggie, ‘Global 
governance and “new governance theory”’ (n. 27), 7, 13; JG Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The 
Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) AJIL 101, 125; Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations’ (n 27), 169-170. 
30 Ruggie Interim Report (n. 29), para 60. 
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human rights law did not seem able to address them.31 Ruggie acknowledged that his 
mandate went beyond the legal realm, and included a ‘full range of governmental 
responsibilities and policy options in relation to business and human rights’.32 He labelled 
this approach one of ‘principled pragmatism’.33 By 2008, Ruggie submitted a Framework 
for Business and Human Rights to the UN on the ‘different but complementary’ 
responsibilities of states and corporations.34 The Framework is based upon the ‘protect-
respect-remedy’ three principles, or ‘pillars’: the duty of the state to protect their citizens 
against human rights abuses, including those perpetrated by third parties, such as 
corporations; the responsibility of businesses to respect human rights; and the obligation to 
provide a more effective remedy for human rights abuses. 35  
 
In 2011, the Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on 
business and human rights (the Guiding Principles), which explain how states and 
corporate entities should implement the Framework.36 The Guiding Principles provided 
‘for the first time a global standard for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse 
impacts on human rights linked to business activity’.37 The principles however remain of a 
persuasive rather than binding nature. Companies are not bound by the principles, which 
have no provisions for implementation, monitoring or proper enforcement mechanisms. 
Transitional justice is not mentioned, neither are the specific issues related to post-conflict 
and transitional contexts, and little research has been done in relation to whether the 
                                                
31 Report of the Special Representative to the Secretary General on the issue of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises John Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: framework for Business and 
Human Rights’ (2008) A/HRC/8/5 [hereinafter ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework]. B Fasterling and 
G Demuijnck, ‘Human Rights in the Void? Due Diligence in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights’ (2013) 116 J Business Ethics, 799. 
32 Ruggie Interim Report (n. 29); Ruggie, ‘Business and human rights: The evolving agenda’ (n. 29). For a 
discussion see LC Backer, ‘From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The 
Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nation’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ and the 
Construction of Inter-systemic Global Governance’ (2011) Pacific McGeorge Global Business and 
Development LJ, and ‘On the Evolution of the United Nations’ ‘Protect-Respect-Remedy’ Project: The State, 
the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context’ (2011) 9 Santa Clara J Intl L 37, 46-48; 
Fasterling and Demuijnck (n. 30), 800. For opposite view, see D Weissbrodt, ‘International Standard-Setting 
on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses’ (2008) 26 Berkeley J Intl. L 373 (2008). 
33 Ruggie Interim Report (n. 28), para 70. 
34 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework (n. 31). 
35 Ibid., paras. 54, 63. 
36 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework, annexed to Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 
A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. UN Doc. A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1. The UN 
Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles with Resolution A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011).  
37 UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/17/4 (n. 35). After the adoption of the UN Guiding 
Principles, the UN Human Rights Council appointed a five-member Working Group. 
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Guiding Principles could be relevant in transitional justice situations.38 The Guiding 
Principles briefly mention the issue of business activities in conflict-affected areas giving 
some recommendations to states to support business operating in such contexts:  
 
Because the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in conflict-affected areas, 
States should help ensure that business enterprises operating in those contexts are not 
involved with such abuses.39  
 
With the adoption of the Guiding Principles a wealth of literature has been generated 
relating to whether they adequately address the complexities of international law in this 
area.40 A significant amount of debate has been dedicated to either defending Ruggie for 
his pragmatic approach,41 or criticizing him and the Guiding Principles, for not going far 
enough.42 In particular, the principles have been criticised for providing limited provisions 
related to the role, responsibilities and requirements for companies in conflict, post-conflict 
and transitional contexts. 43  Some commentators have been critical of the Guiding 
Principles’ remedy ‘pillar’ due to its strong emphasis on non-judicial and company-based 
grievance mechanisms - as opposed to judicial mechanisms and impartial administration of 
                                                
38 G Paul and J Schönsteiner, ‘Transitional Justice and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights’ in S Michalowski (ed.), Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice (Routledge 
2013), 77, 92. 
39 Guiding Principles (n. 36), principle 7. 
40 Deva and Bilchitz (n 11); D Bilchitz, ‘The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate Human 
Rights Obligations?’ (2010) 12 IJHR 199; JM Amerson, ‘“The End of the Beginning?’: A Comprehensive 
Look at the Business and Human Rights Agenda from a Bystander Perspective’ (2012) 17 Fordham J 
Corporate Finance L 871. 
41  SA Aaronson and I Higham, “‘Re-righting Business’: John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop 
International Human Rights Standards for Transnational Firms’ (2013) 35 HRQ 333. For Ruggie’s own 
defence, see eg, JG Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (W.W. Norton & 
Co. 2013), ‘Business and human rights: The evolving agenda’ (n. 29).  
42 S Deva, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy? A Critique of the SRSG’s Framework for Business and Human 
Rights’ in K Buhmann, L Roseberry and M Morsing (eds.) Corporate Social and Human Rights 
Responsibilities. Global Legal and Management Perspectives (Palgrave 2011), 108, 121; RC Blitt, ‘Beyond 
Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate 
Human Rights Compliance’ (2012) 48 Texas Intl L J 33; N Jägers, ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business And 
Human Rights: Making Headway Towards Real Corporate Accountability?’ (2011) 29 Netherlands QHR 159, 
160-163; D Weissbrodt, ‘U.N. Perspectives on “Business and Humanitarian and Human Rights Obligations” 
(2006) 100 American Society Intl L Proceedings 135, 138-139; Paul and Schönsteiner (n. 38); DG Arnold, 
‘Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights’ (2010) 20(3) Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 371; W Cragg, ‘Ethics, Enlightened Self-interest, and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
Human Rights: A critical Look at the Justificatory Foundations of the UN Framework’ (2012) 22(1) Business 
Ethics Quarterly, 9; P Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: 
Implications for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation’ (2012) 22(1) Business Ethics Quarterly, 145; 
JD Bishop, ‘The Limits of Corporate Human Rights Obligations and the Rights of For-profit Corporations’ 
(2012) 22(1) Business Ethics Quarterly, 119; Fasterling and Demuijnck (n. 31), 799-800; D Leader, 
‘Business and Human Rights: Time to Hold Companies to Account’ (2008) 8 Intl Criminal LR 447. 
43 Paul and Schönsteiner (n. 39), 75-84; S Michalowski, ‘Due Diligence and Complicity - a Relationship in 
Need of Clarification’ in Deva and Bilchitz (n 11); M Baleza, ‘Corporate Complicity in Human Rights 
Violations. When is it Time to Leave a Country?’ (2011) 8 Información Filosófica, 55, 65. 
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justice by independent third parties. According to Geneviève Paul and Judith Schönsteiner, 
for example, the third pillar’s over-emphasis on company-based grievance mechanisms 
pose particular challenges in contexts of transitional justice as it overlooks the complexity 
of reparations issues, which often take place in large-scale situations and are manageable 
only on a case-by-case basis.44 Within the critical discourse on the Guiding Principles part 
of the scholarship pushed for the creation of a binding treaty on business and human 
rights.45 
 
On 26 June 2014, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution establishing an 
open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to elaborate an 
international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights.46 An intergovernmental working group was 
established to draft the treaty and from 6 to 10 July 2015 it held its first session in Geneva, 
officially launching the negotiations at the UN towards a binding treaty on business and 
human rights.47 Supporters of and opponents to such treaty were involved in heated 
debates before, during and after the adoption of the resolution and during the first two 
sessions of the working group.48 Opponents included Ruggie, who radically concluded that 
the treaty negotiations ‘would represent another dead end, delivering nothing to individuals 
and communities adversely affected by corporate conduct’.49 Many scholars, hundreds of 
civil society organizations and a group of states, however, support this initiative due to 
their concerns of a lack of balance of rights and obligations of corporations ‘within the 
current framework.’50 The working group is due to present a first draft of the treaty during 
its third session on 23-27 October 2017.  
 
Part of the debate on corporate legal accountability focuses on assessing the definition and 
nature of ‘complicity’ under international law to determine when a corporation could be 
                                                
44 Paul and Schönsteiner (n. 39), 74, 85-91. 
45 Martin-Ortega (n. 19), 282-83; DM Chirwa, ‘The Long March to Binding Obligations of Transnational 
Corporations in International Human Rights Law’ (2006) South African J Human Rights 76. 
46 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights, 26 June 2014, Res 26/1.  
47 First session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights, 6 to 10 July 2015, Geneva.  
48 N Bernaz and I Pietropaoli, ‘The role of NGOs in the business and human rights treaty negotiations’ (2017) 
Oxford J Human Rights Practice 1. 
49 JG Ruggie, ‘A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?’ (28 January 2014), ‘International Legalization in 
Business and Human Rights (11 June 2014). 
50 Bernaz and Pietropaoli (n. 48); International Commission of Jurists, ‘Need and Options for a New 
International Instrument in the Field of Business and Human Rights’ (June 2014), 2-8. 
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held responsible for the actions of a state.51 Corporate complicity is not a clearly defined 
notion.52 In a 2007 report, Ruggie defined corporate complicity as ‘an umbrella term for a 
range of ways in which companies may be liable for their participation in criminal or civil 
wrong’.53 The 2008 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework elaborates that complicity 
‘refers to indirect involvement by companies in human rights abuses – where the actual 
harm is committed by another party, including governments and non-State actors’.54 An 
expert panel of the International Commission of Jurists identified three elements that can 
indicate corporate complicity: causation or contribution; knowledge and foreseeability; and 
proximity.55  
 
Accusations of direct commission of international crimes or human rights violations 
against companies as principal perpetrators are rare.56 Most often corporations are accused 
of complicity through their assistance in the commission of violations by the principal 
perpetrator – for example local police or the armed forces.57 Complicity can take different 
forms. Corporations can facilitate the commission of violations by providing logistical 
support and by passing on certain information.58 Talisman Energy, for example, was 
charged with aiding and abetting human rights abuses and international crimes in Sudan 
for providing logistical support to the military.59 Another form of direct involvement is 
providing a regime or armed faction with products and services that are necessary for the 
execution or the organization of the crimes. The current investigations into allegations of 
complicity in war crimes against French companies Amesys and Qosmos over the provision 
                                                
51 S Michalowski, ‘No Complicity Liability for Funding Gross Human Rights Violations’ (2012) 30 Berkeley 
J Intl L 451; CI Keitner, ‘Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases’ (2008) 60 Hastings LJ 61; LJ 
Dhooge, ‘A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide Guidance to Transnational 
Corporations’ (2007) 13 U.C. Davis J Intl L & Policy 119. 
52 S Michalowski, ‘Due diligence and Complicity: A Relationship in Need of Clarification’ in Deva and 
Bilchitz (n 11), 218, 220. 
53  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises John Ruggie to the UN Human Rights Council, ‘Business and 
human rights: Mapping international standards of responsibility and accountability of corporate acts’ 
(February 2007), A/HRC/4/035 [hereinafter Ruggie 2007 report], para 31. 
54 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework (n. 31), para 73. 
55 Report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert Panel on Corporate Complicity and International 
Crimes, Corporate Complicty and Legal Accountabilty (International Commission of Jurists 2008) Vol 1-25. 
56 An example is the lawsuit against Blackwater charged with war crimes committed against civilians in Iraq 
(eg, case filed on 10 June 2009 in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia: Estate of Husain 
Salih Rabea and Ali Kareem Fakhri v. Erik Prince, et al., civil action no. 1:09 cv 645). 
57 Fafo, Business and International Crimes. Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations 
of International Law (Fafo 2005), 29; International Commission of Jurists (n 55), Vol 1, 1–9; JP 
Bohoslavsky and MD Torelly, ‘Financial Complicity: The Brazilian Dictatorship Under the “Macroscope” in 
DN Sharp (ed.), Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (Springer Science Business Media 2014), 233-
259; C Sandoval, L Filippini and R Vidal, ‘Linking Transitional Justice and Corporate Accountability’ in S 
Michalowski (ed.), Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice (Routledge 2013). 
58 International Commission of Jurists (n 55), 19–20. 
59 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc (582 5F.3 244, 259). See also Chapter III.2.  
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of surveillance systems to Gaddafi’s Libya and Assad’s Syria respectively are examples of 
this type of complicity.60 A more indirect form of involvement occurs when a corporation 
benefits from the commission of abuses and crimes, without being directly involved in the 
execution stage of violations.61 The violent repression of protests against Chiquita’s 
activities by security forces in Colombia is an example. 62 An even more detached form of 
involvement is that of ‘silent’ approval: continuing to do business with dictatorial regimes 
and thus contributing to the political legitimization and economic viability of such regimes. 
The South-African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), for instance, concluded 
that the Apartheid regime would not have survived without the business support of certain 
companies, such as IBM and Ford.63  
 
The global civil society movement calling for greater corporate accountability and redress 
for victims could be arguably traced to the aftermath of the Bhopal disaster, a gas leak 
incident that occurred on the night of 2-3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide pesticide 
plant in Bhopal, India. It resulted in the death of at least 4,000 people, and the permanent 
injuries for thousands more. 64  But its causes and responsibilities were never fully 
established. Roughly in parallel with the development of this global movement and of the 
business and human rights field at the UN level, the field of transitional justice too 
expanded and gained impetus from political transitions taking place against repressive 
regimes around the world.  
 
Transitional justice is not uniformly defined. The UN Secretary-General describes 
transitional justice as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.65 The International Center 
for Transitional Justice, an NGO, defines it as a response to systematic or widespread 
violations of human rights seeking recognition for victims and the promotion of peace, 
reconciliation and democracy.66 The classic scholarly definition of transitional justice 
                                                
60 See Chapter III.2. 
61 A Clapham and S Jerbi, ‘Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses’, paper presented at 
the University of California’ conference on Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible under 
International Law (23-24 February 2001); W Huisman and E van Sliedregt, ‘Rogue Traders: Dutch 
Businessmen, International Crimes and Corporate Complicity’ (2010) 8 J. Intl. Criminal Justice 803, 817. 
62 See Chapter III.2. 
63 South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report (1998), Vol. 4, Chap. 2. See also Chapter 
IV.1. 
64 DR Varma, ‘The Bhopal Disaster of 1984’ (2005) Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society. 
65 Guidance Note of the Secretary General, United Nations approach to transitional justice (March 2010). 
66 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), What is transitional justice? 
 <https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice> (accessed 23 August 2017).  
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proposed by Ruti Teitel is ‘the conception of justice associated with periods of political 
change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes’.67 Naomi Roht-Arriaza provides another common definition: the ‘set 
of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife 
or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with the past 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law’.68 
 
Since the 1980s, when the phrase ‘transitional justice’ was first used, the field has been 
extensively researched, with many academic outputs, while also encompassing significant 
change and evolution through practice.69 This evolution of transitional justice can be 
divided into three phases. An initial phase beginning in 1945 with the post World War II 
trials of Nazi war criminals at the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, after 
which the justice discourse changed to take into account new issues on human rights, war 
crimes, and the possibility of justice through international interventions.70 A second phase 
is discernible in the late 1980s, wherein transitional justice emerged as a field of scholarly 
inquiry in response to dramatic political changes occurring as the Soviet Union collapsed, 
Eastern Europe underwent shifts in political and economic arrangements, and Latin 
American democratic regimes replaced authoritarian ones.71 The third contemporary phase 
                                                
67 RG Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP 2000); see also ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard 
Human Rights J 69. 
68 N Roht-Arriaza, ‘The New Landscape of Transitional Justice’ in N Roht-Arriaza and J Mariezcurrena 
(eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 2. For other definitions see, D Grey, ‘An Escuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice’ 
(2006) 74(5) Fordham LR 3, 2621, and ‘Devilry, Complicity and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious 
Debt’ (2007) 70 L Contemporary Problems 137; F Haldemann, ‘Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice 
as Recognition’ (2008) 41 Cornell Intl LJ 675. 
69 Y Farah, ‘Toward a Multi-Directional Approach to Corporate Accountability’, in Michalowski (ed.) (n 39); 
T Olsen, L Payne and A Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance (US Institute for Peace Press 2010); P Arthur, 
‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’ (2009) 31 HRQ 
321; F Megret, ‘Of Shrines, Memorials and Museums: Using the International Criminal Court’s Victim 
Reparation and Assistance Regime to Promote Transitional Justice’ (2010) 16 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 1; Z 
Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility’ (2008) 2 Intl J Transitional Justice 266; UN Secretary General, Report of the 
Secretary General, ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post conflict societies’ (August 
2004) S/2004/616; C Lekha Sriram, ‘Transitional Justice Comes of Age: Enduring Lessons and Challenges’ 
(2005) 23(2) Berkeley J Intl L 506; AM Gross, ‘The Constitution, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: 
Lessons from South Africa and Israel’ (2004) 40(1) Stanford J Intl L 47; BA Leebaw, ‘The Irreconcilable 
Goals of Transitional Justice’ (2008) 30(1) HRQ 95; J Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
70 Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (n 67); Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena (eds.) (n 68), 202; R Nagy, 
‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 29(2) ThirdWorld Quarterly, 276; Elster 
(n 69); G Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University 
Press 2000). 
71 P de Greiff, ‘Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights Violations’ in P de Greiff 
(ed.), The Handbook of Reparations (OUP 2006), 1; E Andreevska, ‘Transitional Justice And Democratic 
Change: Key Concepts’ (2013) 20 Lex et Scientia Intl J 54, 55; Arthur (n 69), 324, 326. Searching in law and 
political science databases, the first official appearance of the term is in a Boston Herald’s article about the 
‘Justice in Times of Transition’, an international conference held in 1992 in Salzburg: MJ Palumbo, ‘New 
Democracies Debate How to Punish Dictators of Past’ (5 April 1992) Boston Herald, 16. In 1995, Neil Kritz, 
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marks the ‘expansion and normalization of transitional justice’, which moved ‘from the 
exception to the norm’.72  
 
Interest in and support for the inclusion of ‘economic and social dimensions of transitional 
justice’ has grown over the years. It started with a number of voices calling for transitional 
justice measures to engage economic, social, and cultural rights.73 In 2006, during a speech 
at New York University, the then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise 
Arbour argued for integrating economic, social, and cultural rights into the transitional 
justice framework, thereby making ‘the gigantic leap that would allow justice, in its full 
sense, to make the contribution that it should to societies in transition’.74 In 2010, the UN 
Secretary-General released a Guidance Note on the United Nations Approach to 
Transitional Justice calling on the UN to ‘ensure transitional justice processes and 
mechanisms take account of the root causes of conflict and repressive rule, and address 
violations of all rights, including economic, social and cultural rights’.75  
 
Later research showed that in an increasing number of conflicts, alongside atrocities 
perpetrated on civilians - the traditional subject of transitional justice - a pattern of war 
economies had emerged, particularly around the exploitation of natural and mineral 
resources. 76  Rama Mani argued that transitional justice ‘will lose credibility in the 
                                                                                                                                              
the vice-president of the Transitional Justice project at the US Institute of Peace, provided a comprehensive 
analysis in the three volumes book Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
Regimes (US Institute of Peace Press 1995). 
72 Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (n 67), 71-2, 89. See also, K McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: 
Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 34(4) J Law Society 412; Andreevska (n 
70), 55; D Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (First Image Books 1999); Arthur (n 69), 322–64; Elster (n 
69); P Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocities (Routledge 2000); M Mutua, 
‘What Is the Future of Transitional Justice?’ (2015) 9 Intl J Transitional Justice, 1; Sharp (n 56), 165-201. 
73 The earliest such critique came from South African NGOs that regretted the decision of the South African 
TRC to focus on politically motivated killings, torture and detention and its failure to engage with the 
widespread socioeconomic aspects of apartheid: University of the Western Cape’s Community Law Centre 
and others, ‘Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Concerning the Relevance of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights to the Commission’s Mandate (18 March 1997); R Duthie, ‘Toward a 
Development-sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice’ (2008) 2 Intl J Transitional Justice 292; P Gready, 
The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa 
and Beyond (Routledge 2010); LJ Laplante, ‘On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, 
Reparations, and the Right to Development’ (2007) 10 Yale Human Rights Development LJ 141; Miller (n 
69), 270-72; I Muvingi, ‘Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies’ (2009) 3 
Intl J Transitional Justice 163; Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena (n 68); E Schmid, Taking Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Seriously in International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2005); A Boraine, 
‘Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation’ (2006) 60 J Intl Affairs 18; McEvoy (n 72); R Mani, 
‘Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional Justice and 
Development’ (2008) 2 Intl J Transitional Justice 253, 257. 
74 L Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (2007-2008) 40 Intl JL and Politics, 1. 
75 Guidance Note of the Secretary General (n 65).   
76 R Carranza, ‘Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage With Corruption and Economic 
Crimes?’ (2008) 2 Intl J Transitional Justice 310; J Cavallaro and S Albuja, ‘The Lost Agenda: Economic 
Crimes and Truth Commissions in Latin America and Beyond’ in K McEvoy and L McGregor (eds.), 
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predominantly impoverished and devastated societies where it operates’ if it does not 
tackle social injustice, corruption, and resource exploitation.77 Ruben Carranza, a director 
at the International Center for Transitional Justice, contended that an impunity gap results 
when transitional justice measures ignore accountability for large-scale corruption and 
economic crimes, pointing to the strategic role that such crimes play in maintaining 
systems of abuse, as well as use of the assets from such crimes to avoid accountability.78 
Sabine Michalowski and Lisa Hecht observe that practitioners often ‘call for holding 
responsible those who deliberately contributed to perpetuating a state of mass poverty’ and 
for recovering assets that were wrongly acquired.79 Transitional justice practitioners had 
been initially reluctant to include economic crimes within its scope. This related to 
legitimate concerns about transitional justice mechanisms, which are often underfunded, 
facing too ambitious aspirations and extensive mandates. As such, expanding the mandate 
of truth commissions or tribunals to include economic crimes may raise unrealistic 
expectations and make the successful completion of mandates impossible. Contemporary 
truth commissions, however, established for example in Liberia and East Timor, have 
included economic, social and cultural rights in their investigation mandates.80   
 
In parallel to the calls for integration of violations of economic, social and cultural rights, 
transitional justice practice and scholarship have started to address the role of companies. 
In 1998, the South Africa TRC found that business had a fundamental role to maintain the 
status quo of the apartheid society.81 The Liberian TRC dedicated a chapter of its 2009 
final report to the impact of economic activities in prolonging and intensifying the civil 
war, and urged the aggressive pursuit of proceedings against corporations found to be 
implicated in the violence. 82  In 2015, the government of Argentina passed a law 
establishing a new truth commission mandated to investigate economic complicities in the 
                                                                                                                                              
Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart 2008), 121; 
Bohoslavsky and Opgenhaffen (n 9), 197-201; K Andrieu, ‘Dealing with a ‘New’ Grievance: Should 
Anticorruption Be Part of the Transitional Justice Agenda?’ (2012) 11(4) J Human Rights 537–557; I 
Robinson, ‘Truth Commissions and Anti-Corruption: Towards a Complementary Framework?’ (2015) 9(1) 
Intl J Transitional Justice, 33; N Roht-Arriaza ‘Why Was the Economic Dimension Missing for so Long in 
Transitional Justice? An Exploratory Essay’ in H Verbitsky and JP Bohoslavsky (eds.), The Economic 
Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship (Cambridge University Press 2015), 19. 
77 Mani (n 73), 235. 
78 Carranza (n 76), 314-29. 
79 L Hecht and S Michalowski, ‘The Economic and Social Dimensions of Transitional Justice’ (2012) ETJN 
Concept Paper, 2. 
80 eg, Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Economics Crimes and the Conflict, 
Exploitation and Abuse (2009), Vol 3. See also Chapter IV.2. 
81 South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission (n 63). See also Chapter IV.2.  
82 Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission (n 80). 
 
 
 19 
dictatorship.83  Corporate accountability is part of a broader debate within transitional 
justice and international criminal law about how economic crimes should be addressed.84 
This research uses the term ‘economic crime’ referring to embezzlement, fraud, tax crimes, 
corruption, as well as the plunder of natural resources.85 Economic crimes are deeply 
intertwined into the narrative of many modern conflicts, as both drivers and sustainers.86 
But transitional justice mechanisms have traditionally focused on acts of physical violence 
and other civil and political rights violations.87 
 
While there are a large number of sources on the legal accountability on corporations for 
human rights abuses under national and international law, as well as on transitional justice 
in general, there is little literature that links the two areas. There is only one book, edited 
by Sabine Michalowski titled Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional 
Justice, that compiles different cases, but there is, to date, no monograph on the subject 
that sets out a clear hypothesis.88 Scholarship in this area has mostly focused on the 
analysis of one specific country (mostly South Africa, and more recently Argentina and 
Colombia), one specific mechanism (in particular the Nuremberg trial against German 
industrialists, and the South Africa TRC), one type of rights violation (for example, the 
corporate exploitation of natural resources), or one specific issue (for example financial 
complicity).89 For example, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, the UN independent expert on the 
effects of foreign debt, has extensively researched the issue of financial complicity in Latin 
American countries and, with Horacio Verbitsky, has published a book on economic 
complicity in Argentina.90 Ruben Carranza has published a number of articles arguing that 
transitional justice should engage with the exploitation of natural resources, and other 
‘economic crimes’.91 The role of corporations has been occasionally mentioned as one of 
                                                
83 Government of Argentina, Ley de Creación de la Comision Bicameral de la Verdad, la Memoria, la 
Justicia, la Reparación e el Fortalecimiento de las Instituciones de la Democracia (2015).  
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for Transitional Justice’ (2012) 35 Fordham Intl LJ Journal 780.  
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90 JP Bohoslavsky and H Verbitsky, Cuentas Pendientes (Siglo Ventiuno Editores 2015). 
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the topics to consider in the context of transitional justice92 or the issue of transitional 
justice mentioned in discussions on corporate complicity.93 Some research has been done 
in relation to restorative justice and corporate accountability, with some authors proposing 
that a restorative justice approach to business can be effective in regulating and punishing 
corporate entities.94 The scholar most active in articulating the links between corporate 
accountability and restorative justice is John Braithwaite. He has developed theories on 
‘reintegrative shaming’ and on ‘responsive regulation’, which rely on the moral agency of 
a corporation in order to activate a response to shame and ultimately to change corporate 
behaviour.95  
 
This research provides an original contribution to the field on business and human rights 
and the little-researched link with transitional justice by assessing how remedies for 
corporate human rights abuses and crimes under international law can be achieved in 
transitional justice contexts. To answer this question this research first analyses how 
different mechanisms (judicial processes at the international and domestic level, truth-
seeking initiatives, and reparations programmes) have dealt, or failed to deal, with remedy 
for victims of corporate human rights abuses. It then examines their outcomes, the results 
those processes have achieved and the obstacles they have faced. The research takes a 
victim-oriented approach by analysing the tools, instruments and institutions available for 
victims (the bearers of rights) in transitional justice contexts (i.e. in countries emerging 
from conflict or authoritarian regimes) to remedy violations when those are committed by 
corporations.  
 
Remedies for corporate human rights abuses include both corporate accountability and 
reparations for victims. Corporate accountability is a broad concept, not limited to 
corporate liability (the consequences of the breach of a legal obligation), but referring to 
responsibilities for the consequences of a conduct.96 In the context of this research it 
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Butterfield, ‘Extending the Horizon of Business Ethics: Restorative Justice and the Aftermath of Unethical 
Behaviour’ (2010), 20(3) Business Ethics Quarterly 453. 
95 J Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (Cambridge University Press 1989), 126-27, Restorative 
Justice and Responsive Regulation (OUP 2002), 30-31; J Braithwaite and B Fisse, Corporations, Crime, and 
Accountability (Cambridge University Press 1993), 141-45. 
96 N Bernaz, ‘Enhancing Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations: Is Extraterritoriality the 
Magic Potion?’ (2013) 117 J Business Ethics 494. 
 
 
 21 
includes measures to hold corporations and other business enterprises legally liable, or 
otherwise accountable, for violations of human rights they may have committed, 97 either 
directly on in complicity with the state. 
 
Reparation is one of the processes through which rights violations may be remedied, and it 
is a key component of transitional justice.98 The 2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (the Basic 
Principles) define reparations as including five forms: restitution; compensation; 
rehabilitation; satisfaction; and guarantees of non-repetition.99 The right to reparations is 
primarily a right that can be claimed against the state under international human rights law, 
against the state and non-state actors under international humanitarian law, and against 
individual perpetrators under international criminal law.100 While international law is silent 
in relation to corporations having such obligation, there are some non-binding principles 
stating that corporations have the ‘responsibility’ to provide redress to victims of human 
                                                
97 In this chapter the phrases ‘corporate human rights abuses’ and ‘corporate human rights violations’ are 
used interchangeably and are intended to mean the same thing: business negative impacts on human rights. In 
international law literature and practice the term ‘human rights violations’ is often restricted to the actions of 
states, while the actions of businesses are usually described as ‘human rights abuses’ or as ‘having an adverse 
human rights impact’. This practice is based on the argument that international law does not impose direct 
human rights obligations on corporations and thus they cannot legally commit violations against human 
rights. 
98 de Greiff (ed.) (n 71); Hayner (n 72); Bass (n 70); M Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: 
Facing History after Genocide and Mass Atrocity (Beacon Press 1998); Kritz (n 71); M Osiel, Mass Atrocity, 
Collective Memory, and the Law (Transaction Publishers 1999); Miller (n 69), 268; Guidance Note of the 
Secretary General (n 65), 8,9; N Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in 
Sharp (ed.) (n 57), 109-38. 
99 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by 
UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005 [hereinafter Basic Principles], principles 
19-22. 
100 Most of the law applicable to state responsibility and reparations has become customary international law 
and codified in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (International 
Law Commission 2001 A/56/10). The leading opinion in this regard is set out in the judgment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case: ‘It is a principle of international law 
that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make a reparation in an adequate form’ (1927, 
P.C.I.J. ser. A no. 9, 21). International humanitarian law contemplates the obligation of parties to armed 
conflict to pay compensation for violations of provisions: Hague Convention respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land (art. 3), Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (art. 91). Individual criminal responsibility for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide and aggression is in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(arts. 68 and 75). See also, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for 
victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8); M du Plessis, ‘Reparations And International Law: How Are Reparations To Be 
Determined (Past Wrong or Current Effects), Against Whom, and What Form Should They Take?’ (2003) 22 
Windsor YB Access Just 61, C Sandoval and G Surfleet, ‘Corporations and Redress in Transitional Justice 
Processes’ in Michalowski (ed.) (n 38), 93-97; Boraine (n 73); de Greiff (n 71); NL Rosenblum, Breaking the 
Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair (ed.) (Princeton University Press 2002); R Falk, ‘Reparations, 
International Law and Global Justice: A New Frontier’ in de Greiff (ed.) (n 71), 451-77.   
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rights violations.101 The Guiding Principles, for example, highlight the responsibility of 
corporations to address adverse human rights impacts, in addition to the state’s obligation 
to provide redress to victims of corporate-related human rights abuses.102 The issue of 
responsibility of non-state actors was also raised in the discussions and negotiations of the 
Basic Principles, with regard to groups that exercise effective control over a territory, but 
also with regard to business enterprises exercising economic power. 103  The Basic 
Principles provide for equal and effective access to justice, ‘irrespective of who may 
ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation’.104 Theo Van Boven, whose 
work was central to the drafting of the Basic Principles, noted that these were meant to 
apply also ‘to business enterprises exercising economic power’.105 It was considered, from 
a victim-oriented perspective, that non-state actors are to be held responsible for their 
policies and practices, allowing victims to seek redress and reparations.106 Under principle 
IX.15,  
 
In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation 
to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the 
State if the State has already provided reparation to the victim.107  
 
Despite differences in definitions, transitional justice necessarily implies a particular set of 
measures to deal with legacies of violations that occurred during armed conflicts or under 
authoritarian regimes.108 It deals with the legacy of past atrocities by applying four 
different branches of international law: international human rights law; international 
humanitarian law; international refugee law; and international criminal law.109 These four 
                                                
101 The final version of the draft UN Norms included this paragraph: ‘Transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises shall provide prompt, effective and adequate reparation to those persons, entities and 
communities that have been adversely affected by failures to comply with these Norms through, inter alia, 
reparations, restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for any damage done or property taken’. Draft 
Norms (n 24), para 18. See also, D Weissbrodt and M Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 97 AJIL 901. 
102 Basic Principles (n 98), principle 11. 
103 T van Boven, The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, 2010. See also Sandoval and Surfleet (n 100), 93, 99 
104 Basic Principles (n 98), principle 3(c). 
105 van Boven (n 102). 
106 Ibid, 1-3.  
107 Basic Principles (n 98), principle IX.15. 
108 P de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’ in M Williams, R Nagy, and J Elster (eds.), Transitional 
Justice (New York University Press 2012); DN Sharp, ‘Economic Violence in the Practice of African Truth 
Commissions and Beyond’ (n 90), 165-201; Kritz (n 71); Andreevska (n 71), 55; C Sandoval, ‘Linking 
Transitional Justice and Corporate Accountability’ in Michalowski (ed.) (n 39), 11; Hayner (n 72). 
109 Guidance Note of the Secretary General (n 65); P de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, A/HRC/21/46 (9 August 2012); 
van Boven (n 102).  
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sub-fields of international law have framed transitional justice. First, by emphasizing the 
state obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of gross violations of 
human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, and to punish those 
found guilty.110 Second, by creating the legitimate expectation to uncover the truth about 
past abuses.111 Third, by establishing, through state practice, the right to reparations for 
victims of gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.112 Fourth, 
in reiterating the state obligation to prevent the recurrence of such violations in the 
future.113 On the operational level, four processes, based on the above principles, constitute 
the core of transitional justice: i) justice processes, which aim to bring perpetrators of 
abuses to justice and to punish them for the crimes committed; ii) truth-seeking initiatives, 
                                                
110 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Art 8; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), Art 2, 6; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), Art 4, 5, 7, 12; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICPPED), Art 3, 6, 7, 11; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), Art 6; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Art 39; American Convention 
on Human Rights, Art 25, 63; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art 7; European Convention 
on Human Rights, Art 5, 13, 41. See also, UN Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of 
human rights through action to combat impunity, 2005 E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 [hereinafter Principles to 
combat impunity], principles 1, 19. For violations of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has stressed 
the need for judicial remedies in cases of serious violations of the Covenant: views of the Human Rights 
Committee under Art. 5, para. 4, of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (Bithashwiwa and Mulumba v. Zaire), 
UN CCPR, Com. No. 241/1987, 14, CCPR/C/37/D/241/1987 (1989). Regional human rights systems have 
further codified and interpreted those obligations. For example, Article 1.1 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (as interpreted) by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in the Velásquez-Rodriguez v. 
Honduras (ser. C) No. 1, 91 (1987) and in Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, (2006) Series C No. 148; the 
European Court of Human Rights in the procedural objections as interpreted, for example, in Timurtas v. 
Turkey ECHR 221 App. No. 23531/94 (2000), Turkey, Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (1996), 
Mentes v. Turkey, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2689 (1997), Conka v. Belgium (App. No. 51564/99) (2002). See also, N 
Roht-Arriaza, ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in 
International Law’ (1990) 78 Calif L Rev 451.  
111 The right of victims and their families to know the truth in relation to past human rights abuses as such is 
not explicitly recognised as a substantive right in the UDHR or other human rights treaties with the exception 
of the Convention on Enforced Disappearances (art 24) and in the Geneva Conventions (art 32). Other UN 
treaties imply the right to truth. See eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 2. See 
also Principles to combat impunity, Principles 2-5; Basic Principles, art. 22. The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has traced the contours of the truth as the first step and an essential component of an effective 
remedy, in the wake of enforced disappearances, starting with the seminal Velásquez Rodriguez case (n 110). 
See also, T Antkowiak, ‘Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience’ (2002) 23 
Mich J Intl L 977, 995; Hayner (n 72), 24 
112 UDHR, Art 8; ICCPR, Art 2(3); CERD, Art 6; CAT, Art 6, 13, 14; ICPPED, Art 23; CRC Art 39; Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts elaborated by the International Law 
Commission, A/RES/56/83, article 31 (1). See also, General comment No. 31 of the Human Rights 
Committee reaffirms the central importance of the right to reparation, and its integral relationship with the 
right to an effective remedy, paras. 15-16; Basic Principles, art. 24. See also, D Shelton, ‘The United Nations 
Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents’ in KS De Feyter and others (eds.), Out of 
the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Intersentia, 2006), 11–
33); P de Greiff, ‘Truth Telling and the Rule of Law’ in TA Borer (ed.), Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and 
Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Societies (University of Notre Dame Press 2006).. 
113 ICCPR, Art 2; CAT, Art 2; ICPPED, Art 23. See also, Principles to combat impunity, principle 35. See 
also, MB Ndulo and R Duthie, ‘The Role of Judicial Reform in Transitional Justice and Development’ in 
ICTJ Research Unit, Transitional Justice and Development; Duthie (n 89), 176; Hayner (n 72), 102-06; B 
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(2014) 8 Intl J Transitional Justice, 187; DJ Scheffer, ‘The Tool Box, Past and Present, of Justice and 
Reconciliation for Atrocities’ (2001) 95(4) AJIL 970.  
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to investigate past violations and establish the facts; iii) reparation processes, to redress 
victims for the harm suffered; and iv) institutional reform processes, to transform the 
military, police, and judiciary to ensure that violations do not happen again.114 Effective 
transitional justice programmes use comprehensive approaches that integrate the full range 
of these judicial and non-judicial processes or a combination of them.115 Each mechanism 
can simultaneously achieve the aim of other processes: for example, litigation can also 
help providing reparations for victims and establishing facts related to past abuses, and 
truth-seeking initiatives can recommend reparations for victims and prosecution of 
corporations.    
 
This research focuses on three main processes to achieve justice in times of transition: i) 
judicial mechanisms (prosecution initiatives and civil claims both at the international and 
national levels); ii) truth-seeking initiatives, such as TRCs; and iii) reparations 
programmes. Institutional reforms, the other mainstay of transitional justice processes, is 
not addressed specifically because it refers to the prevention of future abuses, while this 
research is restricted to focussing on accountability and reparations for past abuses. With 
this aim as a framework, this thesis is divided into six chapters, each assessing how 
different mechanisms have achieved, or failed to achieve, corporate accountability and 
reparations for victims in transitional justice contexts.   
 
The first three chapters focus on judicial processes, at the international (Chapter I), 
regional (Chapter II) and domestic levels (Chapter III). Judicial processes are key 
mechanisms to achieving justice in times of transition, are an instrument for ensuring 
corporate legal accountability, and are, equally, a key aspect of the right to remedy for 
victims of corporate human rights abuses. The Guiding Principles state that ‘effective 
judicial mechanisms are at the core of ensuring access to remedy’116 and that ‘States 
should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms 
when addressing human rights-related claims against business’.117 Chapters I, II, and III 
explore how different judicial remedies at the international, regional and national level 
have addressed, or failed to address, violations of human rights and crimes under 
                                                
114 UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Analytical Study on Human Rights 
and Transitional Justice (2009) A/HRC/12/18; Pablo de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’ (n 108); 
Hayner (n 72); Bass (n 70); Minow (n 97); Kritz (n 71); Osiel (n 97). 
115 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (2004) S/2004/616, 8. See also, E Lutz, ‘Transitional Justice: Lessons 
Learned and the Road Ahead’ in Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena (eds.) (n 68), 325-326; Teitel, Transitional 
Justice (n 67), 224. 
116 Guiding Principles (n 36), commentary to principle 26. 
117 Ibid., principle 26. 
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international criminal law committed by corporations during times of conflict or repression, 
and whether they have achieved reparations for victims. The aim of these chapters is to 
analyse the normative and practical challenges often resulting in corporate impunity and 
lack of remedy for victims, and to present options for future development.  
 
Chapter I explores both the limitations and the potential of international criminal law in 
this area, through the assessment of historical and contemporary cases, from Nuremburg to 
the International Criminal Court. Chapter II aims to contribute to the research on 
transitional justice and corporate accountability by analysing mechanisms that are rarely 
associated with the two areas: the regional systems for human rights protection. While 
these are not transitional justice mechanisms per se and cannot directly adjudicate the 
responsibility of companies, this chapter aims to demonstrate how regional systems, and in 
particular the Inter-American and African systems, have, and could further, indirectly 
provide remedies for victims of corporate abuses and shape national reparation 
programmes in transitional justice contexts. The analysis in Chapter III turns to assessing 
the efforts to achieve corporate legal accountability and reparation at the domestic level, 
through criminal prosecutions, and civil litigation, which focuses of cases litigated under 
the United States’ Alien Tort Statute alleging corporate abuses committed during times of 
conflict or repressive regimes. 
 
After the analysis of judicial processes, the research moves to a different mechanism to 
achieve justice in times of transition: truth-seeking initiatives. The search for the truth 
about past human rights abuses is the cornerstone of almost every transitional or post-
conflict process established across the world. Parallel to the evolution of the right to truth 
as remedy in international tribunals, TRCs, commissions of inquiry, or other truth-seeking 
bodies have become an increasingly common mechanism for societies seeking to move 
forward as they emerge from a period conflict or repression.118 Chapter IV analyses how 
different truth-seeking initiatives (TRCs as well as other investigative bodies, such as UN-
mandated fact-finding missions and expert panels) have addressed the responsibility of 
corporations for human rights violations or international crimes committed during times of 
conflict or repression, and have recommended reparations from business. This chapter 
focuses on the South African TRC, but also offers commentary on truth commissions 
established in other countries (Liberia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Argentina, and Brazil). It 
examines the outcomes of these findings, and assesses whether or not they have achieved 
                                                
118 S Ratner, ‘New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law’ (1999) 87 Geo LJ 707. 
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corporate accountability and reparations for victims. The aim of this chapter is to present 
the limitations of truth-seeking bodies in this area, but also to highlight the innovations 
they have put forward and how these could be expanded further.      
 
After the analysis of reparations ordered or recommend by international and national 
courts and truth commissions, the final part of this research turns to the assessment of 
administrative reparation programmes – programmes established by national legislation. 
Chapter V looks at programmes dealing with a particular type of reparation, land 
restitution, which can include the restitution of land taken for economic reasons during an 
armed conflict or time of repression. The are a number of reasons for the focus on land 
restitution: land acquisition is often a driver of conflict; land confiscation, forced evictions 
and population displacement are common during conflict; land disputes are a key aspect 
that countries in transition need to address; land is in most cases the most important asset 
that victims seek back after a transition; corporations are often involved in land 
confiscation either directly or in complicity with the state; land rights abuses are some of 
the most widespread corporate human rights abuses; and innovative reparation 
programmes have tried to deal with victims’ grievance in this area. This chapter focuses on 
efforts to return land that was seized for economic projects in transitional countries in three 
different continents (Colombia, Myanmar, and South Africa). It shows that, despite 
challenges, innovative reparation programmes involving the responsibilities of business 
have been implemented, presenting an interesting avenue for remedy.      
 
This research shows that justice and remedy processes across a number of countries in 
transitional justice contexts have addressed corporate accountability to different extents 
and have attempted to provide reparations for victims. But it also shows that corporate 
accountability is very rarely achieved, that impunity is the norm, and that victims face 
major obstacles to obtain reparations for past abuses in transitional justice contexts. This 
research analyses the normative, practical, economic and political reasons for such failure, 
compare different transitional justice processes across different countries, and identifies 
practices within the transitional justice ‘toolbox’ that can more adequately achieve 
corporate accountability and redress for victims. It concludes with suggestions for the 
potential expansions of certain avenues. 
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I. NUREMBERG AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Introduction 
 
Judicial processes are key mechanisms to achieving remedies for corporate human rights 
abuses in transitional justice contexts. This Chapter explores the options and limitations of 
judicial processes at the international level, while the next two chapters analyse the regional 
and the national level. Because currently there are no mechanisms available to hold 
corporations legally accountable for human rights violations at international level, this Chapter 
examines the avenues available through international criminal law. International criminal law 
deals with the responsibility of individuals (natural persons) for the most serious international 
crimes. International criminal law has a narrow area of application - genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. Human rights law instead spans a whole array of rights, civil and 
political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as group rights. But while the 
theoretical obstacle for corporate human rights obligations is the shift from states to legal 
persons as subjects of law, in international criminal law a similar shift is not required – instead 
the shift is from individuals to corporations, which is less problematic from an international 
law perspective.1   
 
Prosecution initiatives as part of transitional justice aim to ensure that those responsible for 
committing crimes committed in the context of conflict or repressive rule, are tried in 
accordance with international standards of fair trial and, where appropriate, punished. But 
states emerging from years of conflict or repressive rule may be unable or unwilling to 
conduct effective investigations and prosecutions. In such situations, international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals may exercise concurrent, or ‘complementary’, jurisdiction. These 
mechanisms have never used their jurisdiction over corporations for crimes under international 
law. This Chapter discusses the normative and political reasons.  With the analysis of the post-
World War II cases (explored in section I.1) to the possibility of holding corporate officers and 
managers criminally responsible before the International Criminal Court (I.2) and the ad hoc 
tribunals (I.3) and the debate of scholars and practitioners in this area, this Chapter assesses 
the limitations of international criminal law in holding corporations accountable for the 
                                                
1 A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006), 3. 
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commission of crimes under international law. It also discusses area of potential future 
expansion of this avenue.   
 
I.1 Nuremberg and Subsequent Trials    
 
The debate over the responsibility of corporations under international criminal law has its 
roots in the Nuremberg trials conducted after World War II.2 Evidence of the central role of 
business in the Nazi war effort revealed the extent of crimes committed by companies through 
the forcible transfer and enslavement of millions of people, the production of arms used to 
wage aggressive war and the supply of poisonous chemicals for the killing of civilians in 
concentration camps.3 The cases against executives and employees of Germany companies, 
analysed in the next sections, remain the starting point for any discussion of corporate criminal 
responsibility in transitional justice contexts.  
 
The International Military Tribunal  
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) established the principle of 
individual criminal accountability for the first time, for certain crimes under international law.4 
In departing from the notion of state responsibility under international law, where states were 
the only relevant subjects, responsibility was instead conceptualised along an individual 
dimension. This conception continues to shape the understanding of individual responsibility 
and has had a significant impact on the broader scope of transitional justice, including in 
relation to the prosecution of corporations.5  
 
The IMT did not have jurisdiction over legal persons. The tribunal declared, ‘Crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
                                                
2 International Military Tribunal, Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Vols 1-43 [hereinafter Trial of the Major War Criminals]. 
3 JA Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg 
Really Said’ (2009) 109 Colom LR 1094, 1105. 
4 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal], article 6 (granting the Tribunal authority to evaluate the ‘individual 
responsibility’ of ‘persons’ who acted as ‘individuals or as members of organizations’). Organizations could be 
held to be ‘criminal’, subjecting certain members to prosecution for the crime of membership in a criminal 
organization, ibid., arts. 9, 10. See also, Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188, A/64/Add.1 (11 December 1946). 
5 RG Teitel, ‘Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays’ (2014) Oxford Scholarship Online.  
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individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced’.6  
The IMT’s innovation, however, based on the American law of conspiracy, was in linking up 
individual and organizational responsibility.7 A distinctive feature of the Charter of the IMT 
was the possibility for the Tribunal to declare, in connection with any act for which an 
individual was convicted, that groups or organizations of which the accused was a member 
were criminal organizations.8 Under the Charter, the IMT had jurisdiction for ‘the trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals…acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, 
whether as individuals or as members of organizations’.9 As such, the Tribunal declared the 
Gestapo and 55 other Nazi organizations to be criminal in nature.10 Yet, the Tribunal’s 
recognition of the criminal responsibility of these organizations served to provide a legal basis 
for the prosecution of individuals, and should not be interpreted as recognition of 
responsibility of legal persons. Such bodies were not analogous to private corporations, as 
they represented the Nazi state.11 
 
Among the 21 people prosecuted at Nuremberg, there were no industrialists who did not also 
hold an official position in the Nazi regime.12 One prominent German industrialist, Gustav 
Krupp, was indicted, but the IMT declared him unfit for trial.13  Several of those convicted at 
Nuremberg and subsequent trials were involved in private industry and banking, but also 
operated as state agents.14 For example, Walther Funk was the president of the Reichsbank and 
also Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy. The Tribunal 
found that Funk agreed with the SS that the Reichsbank was to receive personal belongings 
taken from the victims who had been exterminated in the concentration camps.15 The aid given 
to the SS by the bank would render Funk an accessory in the crimes against concentration 
                                                
6 Trial of the Major War Criminals (n 2). 
7 RH Jackson, ‘The Law Under Which Nazi Organizations Are Accused of Being Criminal’ (1946) 19 
Temporary L Quarterly 371. 
8 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (n 4), article 9. 
9 Ibid., article 6. 
10 Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 91, 
97,102 (United States Printing Office 1947). 
11 P Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights and Multinationals: Is there a Problem?’ (2001) 77(1) Intl Affairs 31, 39. 
12 N Bernaz, ‘An Analysis of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization 
from the Perspective of Business and Human Rights’ (2017) J Intl Criminal Justice. 
13 Ruling of the Tribunal on 15 November 1945 in the matter of the application of Counsel for Krupp Von Bohlen 
for postponement of the Proceedings against this defendant, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for 
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Vol. I (United States Printing Office 1946), ch. IV, 92. 
14 KJ Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (OUP 2011).  
15 Trial of the Major War Criminals (n 2), Vol. 1, 306. 
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camp victims.16 In addition, as president of the Reichsbank, Funk was indirectly involved in 
the use of concentration camp labour  - the bank set up a fund to the credit of the SS for the 
construction of factories to use concentration camp labourers. Funk was found guilty for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 17  
 
While the main objective of the trials at Nuremberg was to hold individual high-ranking 
civilian and military officials accountable for the Nazi regime’s crimes, the prosecutors 
acknowledged that the owners and directors of large German companies played a key role in 
supporting and facilitating the regime and its crimes.18 It was alleged before the IMT that, in 
order to execute a common plan, the defendants undertook acts that included using 
‘organizations of German business as instruments of economic mobilization for war.’19 The 
chief the prosecutor at the IMT, Robert Jackson, wrote, ‘[I]t has at all times been the position 
of the United States that the great industrialists of Germany were guilty of the crimes charged 
in this Indictment quite as much as politicians, diplomats, and soldiers’.20  Jackson wrote in his 
first report of his intention to:  
 
accuse a large number of individuals and officials who were in authority in the 
government, in the military establishment…and in the financial, industrial, and 
economic life of Germany who by all civilized standards are provable to be common 
criminals.21 
 
Jonathan Bush documented how, in addition to the trial of Nazi officials at the IMT, the allies 
envisaged holding at least one other international trial that would target ‘businesses or 
businessmen’.22 In the end, the plan of holding a second international trial was dropped, and so 
                                                
16 T Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (Knopf 1992), 398. 
17 Trial of the Major War Criminals (n 2), Vol 1, 171, 304-07. For commentary see S Michalowski, ‘No 
Complicity Liability for Funding Gross Human Rights Violations?’ (2002) 30 Berkeley J Intl L 451, 476; CR 
Jakobsen, ‘Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials whose Business 
Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity’ (2005) 56 Air Force LR 176, 196. 
18 Bush (n 3); W Kaleck and M Saage-Maab, ‘Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting 
to International Crimes The Status Quo and its Challenges’ (2010) 8(3) J Intl Criminal Justice 700, 701.  
19 Trial of the Major War Criminals (n 2), Vol. 1, 35, 183. 
20 Answer of the United States Prosecution to the Motion on Behalf of the Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, 
International Military Tribunal Document, 12 November 1945. 
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was the idea of prosecuting corporations.23 Instead, individual allied countries held their trials 
in their respective zones of occupation of Germany. 
 
Industrial Cases 
On 20 December 1945, the Allied Control Council issued Control Council Law No. 10, which 
empowered any of the occupying authorities to try suspected war criminal in their respective 
occupied areas.24 Based on this law, the United States Military Tribunal (USMT) held twelve 
subsequent trials, from 1946 to 1949 after the end of the Trial of the Major War Criminals 
before the IMT. Among these, is a series of cases known as the Industrial Cases, where 
German industrialists who collaborated with the Nazi regime were indicted for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, complicity in the crime of aggression and mass murder, and aiding and 
abetting murder, torture, and other atrocities committed by the Nazis.25 These business leaders, 
often working through their companies, had supplied poisonous gas to concentration camps 
knowing it would be used to exterminate people, sought slave labour for their factories, helped 
in the deportation, murder and inhumane treatment of slave workers, and made profits by 
plundering property in occupied Europe.26 
 
These cases revealed an underlying implication that the corporations for which the 
industrialists worked had also committed international crimes.27 During the trials, even though 
only individual businessmen were charged, and ‘corporate liability formally was not at 
stake’, 28  the tribunals adopted an institutional approach. For example, the prosecution 
considered ‘responsibility on different levels of decision making instead of targeting only the 
head office’.29  In practice, corporate and individual liability could not be strictly separated at 
all times.30 The idea of the responsibility of the corporations was underlying, and transpires 
                                                
23 Ibid., 1162.  
24 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against 
Humanity, Berlin, 20 December 1945. 
25 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 
Nuremberg, October 1946-April 1949 (United States Government Printing Office, 1953).  
26 Bush (n 3), 1105, 1113-14; A Ramasastry, ‘Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An 
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations’ (2002) 20 
Berkeley J Intl L 91. 
27 T Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, A Personal Memoir (Bloomsbury 1993). 
28 KC Priemel, ‘Tales of Totalitarianism: Conflicting Narratives in the Industrialist Cases at Nuremberg’ in KC 
Priemel and A Stiller (eds.), Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Transitional Justice, Trial Narratives, 
and Historiography (Berghahn Books 2012), 170. 
29 Ibid. 
30 N Bernaz, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability under International Law. The New TV S.A.L. and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. 
Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2015) 13 J Intl Criminal Justice 313, 321.   
 
 
 32 
from some of the judgments. For example, in the Farben case, the tribunal remarked: 
 
While the Farben organization, as a corporation, is not charged under the indictment 
with committing a crime and is not the subject of prosecution in this case, it is the 
theory of the prosecution that the defendants individually and collectively used the 
Farben organization as an instrument by and through which they committed the crimes 
enumerated in the indictment.31  
 
In 1948, the USMT held five of the directors of I.G. Farben, a major German chemical and 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, the then largest corporation in Europe, criminally liable for the 
use of slave labour.32 This was the first time that a court imposed liability on a group of 
persons who were collectively in charge of a company.33 The I.G. Farben case represented the 
first attempt to hold individuals accountable for their business activity under international 
criminal law.34 Because the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over legal persons it could not 
render a verdict against Farben as a legal entity. But the USMT based much of its findings on 
the role of Farben as a corporate entity. The prosecution was of the opinion that the accused 
had used Farben as a tool to commit crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.35 The Tribunal noted: ‘Auschwitz was financed and owned by Farben’.36 It added, 
‘If not actually marching with the Wehrmacht, Farben at least was not far behind. But 
translating the criminal responsibility to personal and individual criminal acts is another 
matter’.37  
 
This consideration points to a key challenge faced in this and other trials against corporate 
managers: establishing the criminal responsibility of the company itself separately from the 
responsibility of the individuals managing it. In the Krupp case, the Tribunal looked at the 
actions of the company as opposed to decisions or conduct of any individual director.38 The 
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case involved the prosecution of twelve employees and officers for the commission of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity with respect to plunder of factories and other property in 
occupied Europe, and to the deportation and use of prisoners of war and concentration camp 
inmates as forced labourers in Krupp factories in Germany.39 Six of the defendants were found 
guilty. As with the Farben decision, the Tribunal focused on the role of the company as such 
and decided that Krupp had violated The Hague Regulations in its seizure and confiscation of 
property in occupied countries.40 The position of individuals within the company is what 
determined their liability.41 
 
The responsibility of individual businessmen was framed both as direct and accomplice 
liability. The element of knowledge to establish complicity was discussed in detail in the 
Industrial cases and in the trial against Bruno Tesch. He was the owner of Tesch & Stabenow, 
a company that supplied the Auschwitz concentration camps with Zyklon B, a pesticide used 
by the Nazis in the gas chambers. Tesch was tried in the 1946 Zyklon B case by a British 
Military Tribunal in Hamburg.42 The charge was that Tesch, ‘in violation of the laws and 
usages of war, did supply poison gas used for the extermination of allied nationals interned in 
concentration camps, well knowing that the said gas was to be so used’.43 The co-defendants 
named included Karl Weinbacher, the company general manager, and gas technician Joachim 
Drosihn. The crucial question for the tribunal was whether the accused knew of the purpose of 
the gas they supplied.44 According to the tribunal, the prosecution proved that Tesch and 
Weinbacher had acted with the requisite knowledge. They were sentenced to death by 
hanging,45 while Drosihn was acquitted.  
 
The Flick case provides an innovative approach to the liability for financing crimes under 
international law.46 The trial was conducted against Friedrich Flick and Otto Steinbrinck, two 
leading officials of the Flick Concern, and members of the ‘Himmler’s Circle of Friends’, a 
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group that ‘throughout the period of the Third Reich, worked closely with the [Schutzstaffel 
(SS)], met frequently and regularly with its leaders, and furnished aid, advice, and support to 
the SS, financial and otherwise’. 47 Himmler was the commander of the SS and the German 
Minister of the Interior, and was also responsible for the extermination policy in Germany’s 
concentration camps. Flick and Steinbrink were charged with aiding and abetting criminal 
activities of the SS, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the enslavement 
and abuse of concentration camp inmates.48 They were found to have provided ‘extensive 
financial and other support’ by profiting from slave labour in the camps.49 The USMT found 
both guilty first observing that ‘an organization like the SS that commits war crimes and 
crimes against humanity on a large scale could be nothing other than criminal’.50 The tribunal 
continued, ‘One who knowingly by his influence and money contributes to the support thereof 
must, under settled legal principles, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly an accessory 
to such crimes’.51  
 
Flick and Steinbrinck were convicted even though the prosecution could not show that any 
part of the money donated by either of them was directly used for criminal activities of the SS. 
52 For Sabine Michalowski this is an interesting approach to one of the most complex issues in 
the context of liability for providing funds, that is, whether liability requires establishing a link 
between a particular loan or donation and specific violations committed by the recipient.53 The 
Tribunal showed that in the context of financing, it was not necessary to prove that the 
contributions made by the defendants were intended for unlawful purposes. Rather, it was 
sufficient that some part of the receiving fund had such an intended use.54 Funding that went 
toward an organization with such clear criminal purposes as the SS was regarded as 
contributing to maintaining it, eliminating the need to examine the exact use of the funds 
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provided.55 It is at this point that legal theories related to the liability of financial accomplices 
started, an area that has received contradictory court decisions and interpretations since then 
and present particular challenges in transitional justice contexts, as discussed in Chapter III.    
 
The Ministries Case 
The Ministries case, with 21 defendants, is another important post-World War II decision 
regarding the liability of bankers.56 One of the defendants was Emil Puhl, who had been 
Deputy President of the German Reichsbank during the Third Reich and played an active role 
in arranging ‘the receipt, classification, deposit, conversion and disposal of properties taken by 
the SS from victims exterminated in concentration camps’.57 He was found guilty for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity for the administration of concentration and extermination 
camps.58 Puhl was also charged with slave labour, including for negotiating a massive loan 
between the SS and DEST, a company specifically designed to utilize concentration camp 
labour. 59  The Tribunal held that although Puhl had held positions of considerable 
responsibility and authority, he had not played a decisive role and that it was doubtful whether 
Puhl ‘did more than act as a conduit in these particular transactions’.60 Accordingly, the 
Tribunal dismissed charges against Puhl on the slave labour count.61  
 
But it is the case against Karl Rasche that set a precedent about commercial lending not giving 
rise of liability for gross human rights violations.  Rasche was also charged in the Ministries 
case with different counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and with slave labour 
on the grounds that he had made loans to entities using slave labour.62 Rasche was a member 
of the board of managers of Dresdner Bank, a private commercial bank in Germany 
characterized as the bank of the Third Reich.63 In the report of the Office of Military 
Government, he was described as ‘one of the key liaisons between the Dresdner Bank and the 
SS, Nazi Party, and government so that the bank might function as an integral part of the Nazi 
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war machine’.64  
 
The evidence in the trial established that ‘the Dresdner Bank loaned very large sums of money 
to various SS enterprises which employed large numbers of inmates of concentration camps, 
and also to Reich enterprises and agencies engaged in the so-called resettlement programs’.65 
The Tribunal had to decide whether such loans would give rise to liability for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, and first looked at Rasche’s criminal responsibility for having been a 
member of Himmler’s Circle of Friends, and for having approved large annual contributions 
by Dresdner Bank to a fund placed at Himmler’s personal disposal.66 The Tribunal rejected 
any liability of Rasche related to these contributions on the grounds that there was no evidence 
that ‘Rasche knew that any part of the fund to which the bank made contributions was 
intended to be or was ever used by Himmler for any unlawful purposes’.67  
 
The Tribunal, however, held that Rasche did have the requisite knowledge for the loans 
Dresdner Bank made to SS enterprises, which employed slave labour and otherwise funded 
the Nazi resettlement programme.68  The Court reasoned that banks generally seek to learn the 
purposes of their loans as a matter of practice and found it inconceivable that Rasche did not 
have the necessary knowledge.69 In this context, the Tribunal made a statement that has since 
been interpreted by some courts and commentators as authority for a general rejection of 
liability for commercial loans that finance gross human rights violations. 70 It identified ‘the 
real question’ as: 
 
…is it a crime to make a loan, knowing or having good reason to believe that the 
borrower will use the funds in financing enterprises which are employed in using labor 
in violation of either national or international law?...A bank sells money or credit in the 
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same manner as the merchandiser of any other commodity. It does not become a 
partner in enterprise, and the interest charged is merely the gross profit that the bank 
realizes from the transaction…Loans or sale of commodities to be used in an unlawful 
enterprise may well be condemned from a moral standpoint…, but the transaction can 
hardly be said to be a crime. Our duty is to bring to justice those guilty of violating 
international law, and we are not prepared to state that such loans constitute a violation 
of that law. 71 
 
Michalowski rightly argues that the general conclusion drawn from this case that commercial 
loans are always exempt from complicity liability is put into doubt when examining the 
Tribunal decision in its entirety.72 Under count seven Rasche was charged for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in the context of slave labour for allegedly having ‘participated in the 
financing of SS enterprises’ that used concentration camp labour.73 Because Rasche testified 
credibly as to having no knowledge of the slave-labour programme, he was found not guilty 
under this count.74  The Tribunal rejected Rasche’s liability under count seven not because 
making loans is an activity that is per se exempt from liability, but rather because there was 
not sufficient proof to justify holding Rasche personally criminally liable for the loans.75  
 
More contemporary decisions have essentially followed the tribunal’s reasoning in Rasche. 
For example, the South African Apartheid Litigation, discussed in Chapter III, reached the 
conclusion that commercial loans and other banking services do not result in complicit 
liability.76 In the litigation brought fifty years after Nuremberg by Holocaust survivors against 
Swiss banks (also detailed in Chapter III), the defendant banks cited Rasche to demonstrate 
that the mere act of providing money or credit to finance criminal activity does not constitute a 
violation of customary international law, even where the bank had knowledge of the purpose 
for such financing.77 
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Lesson from Nuremberg 
The Nuremberg and subsequent trials provide important lessons for establishing corporate 
accountability through judicial processes in a transitional justice context. First, the concept of 
individual responsibility for crimes under international law was established for the first time. 
This provided support for the capacity of courts to adjudicate criminal cases whereby 
corporate officials are accused of committing gross human rights abuses. Although the IMT 
only prosecuted individuals, it recognised that legal persons can engage in criminal conduct. 
The Tribunal made clear that norms applicable to ‘persons’ applied to legal persons as well as 
individuals.78  
 
Second, the involvement of the corporate officers was framed in terms of both direct as well as 
accomplice criminal liability.79 The post World War II trials helped to understand the role that 
business enterprises have played in times of conflict or repression and to develop criteria of 
responsibility, in particular in relation to aiding and abetting.80 Current notions of corporate 
responsibility for facilitating human rights abuses are indeed backed by legal theories whose 
origins can be traced back to these trials.81  
 
Third, the position of the individual defendants within the corporation, including their 
decision-making authority, was a crucial factor for establishing liability.82 For example, the 
tribunal found that Funk exercised a sufficiently influential position to be held personally 
criminally liable for the loans he authorized, whereas it acquitted Puhl and Rasche, finding 
that although also holding a position of authority, they did not play a decisive role.  
 
Fourth, while only individuals were prosecuted, the Industrial cases linked the individual and 
the corporate responsibility, providing the initial jurisprudence for understanding how 
corporate actors may be held legally accountable.83 Starting with Farben, the trials of German 
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industrialists adopted an ‘institutional’ approach and highlighted the relationship between 
corporate activities and the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.84 Florian 
Jessberg concludes:  
 
From the angle of today’s international criminal law, the value of the [Farben] decision 
above all lies in having undertaken the attempt to highlight the responsibility of industry 
and business through the instruments of international criminal law.85  
 
Corporate criminal liability was seriously explored, and while it was no adopted, it was never 
rejected as impermissible under international law. Corporate liability would have added a 
novel dimension to the emerging legal theory, by broadening the reach and impact 
international criminal law and enhancing the other features that have emerged from the 
Nuremberg trials, starting with the idea of an international criminal trial, or for crimes against 
peace and crimes against humanity.  
 
Fifth, the issue of financial contribution was discussed at length in the Industrial cases, but the 
trials produced different opinions.86 According to Bohoslavsky and Rulli, ‘The notion of 
complicity for financial actors has been confusing to say the least, producing mixed 
jurisprudence’.87 The first judicial representations of the idea that financing crimes could 
trigger responsibility were indeed contradictory, as evidenced by Flick and the Ministries 
cases. 88 In Flick, Flick and Steinbrinck were convicted because even though the prosecution 
could not prove that the money they had donated to the SS was directly used for criminal 
activities, the tribunal took it for granted that some of it had gone into maintaining this 
organization, regardless of whether it was spent on salaries or lethal gas.89 In the Ministries 
case, the tribunal reached a different opinion – it recognised that money or credit are fungible 
commodities, which could be used for unlawful enterprises, but did not find it a crime under 
international law.90 Nuremberg case law does not draw a clear line between the liability of 
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who committed the crimes and who provided the financial means to make the commission of 
crimes possible.91 But beyond the different legal conclusions, both cases recognized the 
substantial effect that money can have over a massive criminal campaign and affirmed the 
notion that loans can contribute to the commission of international crimes.92 
 
Finally, the wider political context within which the post World War II cases were carried out 
is of great importance. American foreign policy was undergoing a change in its attitude to 
German industry. The original goal was the ‘industrial disarmament’ of Germany. But later on, 
in 1945-1946, the United States adopted the ‘Truman Doctrine’, which sought to refrain from 
severe reprisals against the industrialists.93 German industry was not to be ‘purged’; it was to 
be recruited against the new communist enemy. The subsequent trials were influenced by the 
Allies’ intention to reintegrate the German economy into the Western system, and the German 
economic elites into the German society. Jessberg argues that the Farben trial may have been 
‘the expression of a justice that understood the accused to be prospective allies’, and that that 
the comparatively mild judgment in Farben reflected the changed political instructions.94 Here 
it is already possible to discern the tension between dealing with the past and shaping the 
future that confronts any intervention by international criminal law in post-conflict and 
transitional situations95 - a point that is addressed also in relation to contemporary cases of 
domestic criminal liability, in Chapter III.    
 
Indeed, at some point there were discussions about a second international trial being held at 
Nuremberg that would have targeted German businessmen and corporations.96 But the appetite 
for such trial died out, and the idea was abandoned. The reason was that discussions about 
whether and how to try big German businesses for their alleged war crimes was part of a 
broader economy policy in the occupation of Germany.97 Germany’s industrial facilities, its 
ability to produce and distribute coal and electricity, and its currency were already in 
suspension. Bush articulates the sentiment in relation with I.G. Farben: public feeling was 
                                                
91 Bohoslavsky and Opgenhaffen (n 81), 174; JP Bohoslavsky and S Michalowski, ‘Jus Cogens, Transitional 
Justice and Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts - A Response to the World Bank Discussion Paper on 
Odious Debts’ (2010) 48 Colum J Transnatl L 61. 
92 Bohoslavsky and Rulli (n 87), 834.   
93 Jessberg (n 32), 798. 
94 Ibid., 799. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Bush (n 3), 1105, 1113-14; D Bloxham, “‘The Trial that Never Was”: Why There Was No Second 
International Trial of Major War Criminals at Nuremberg’ (2002) 87 J Hist Assn 41, 46-47. 
97 Bush (n 3), 1117.  
 
 
 41 
centred around the notion that ‘the sinister-seeming Farben, a massive octopus of a company 
with tentacles reaching around the globe, was fully complicit in the crimes of the Nazis’.98 But, 
continues Bush: 
 
Even without counting its tens of thousands of slave labourers at any one time, it had a 
larger workforce than DuPont, Standard Oil (New Jersey), and Imperial Chemicals 
combined. It dominated the economic life of entire Latin American countries. Through 
its factories, patents, and cartel arrangements, it supplied vital commodities to the 
Wehrmacht, and was able to choke their supply to the Allies even during the war.99  
 
West German authorities also brought few prosecutions against businessmen. One of the few 
cases was the prosecution in 1948 of Gerhard Peters, the former general manager of Degesch, 
a distribution company (in which Farben had a 42% stake) that manufactured Zyklon B for 
use at Auschwitz. Peters was first sentenced by a court in Frankfurt to six years in prison for 
acting as accessory to murder, and finally acquitted in a new trial in 1955.100 Accountability in 
West Germany for international crimes committed by corporations and business officials was 
essentially non-existent. But the reasons for this were political and economic, rather than a 
matter of international legal theory. Despite having suitable doctrines of principal and 
accessory liability and complicity within their legal lexicon, Germans authorities decided not 
to pursue corporate cases. With the political currents running in favour of rebuilding the West 
German economy, the result was near-total impunity for corporations, which instead had 
resumed their place as pillars of the West German economy. In his 170-page essay that survey 
‘a story of legal energy and optimism in 1946-47, followed by a political about-face around 
1948, with accountability yielding to amnesia’101, Bush concludes:  
 
…perhaps the last lesson of Nuremberg is that innovative doctrines, vigorous trial 
programs, and a broad impulse toward accountability can, even together, be 
irrelevant…Germany turned out in time to be everything that the wartime Allies hoped 
for-peace-loving, democratic, prosperous, quiet-very much like Japan, with big 
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industrial firms in both countries a crucial part of that prosperity…[S]urely a final, 
forgotten lesson of Nuremberg has to be that countries can be rebuilt and companies 
cleansed without legal accountability.102 
 
I.2 The International Criminal Court  
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), an international tribunal that sits in The Hague, has 
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and aggression. It does not have jurisdiction over corporations. Article 
25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court limits the jurisdiction of the ICC to 
‘natural persons.’103 There was, however, a proposal to add legal entities to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC during the negotiations of the Rome Statute. The French delegation proposed a 
restricted form of corporate criminal liability, limited to private (rather than public) 
corporations and requiring corporate criminal responsibility to be linked to the individual 
criminal responsibility of a leading member of a corporation.104 The 1998 draft statute 
provided that in addition to natural persons the Court ‘shall also have jurisdiction over legal 
persons, with the exception of States, when the crimes committed were committed on behalf 
of such legal persons or by their agencies or representatives’.105 The French delegation 
believed that this inclusion would make it easier for victims of crimes to sue for restitution and 
compensation. The proposal was rejected because of a number of concerns.106 First, that the 
Court would be confronted with overwhelming evidentiary problems when prosecuting 
corporations. Second, that there was not yet a recognised standard of criminal liability of 
corporations, which is still rejected in many national legal orders, and this international 
disparity would make the principle of complementarily unworkable.107 No consensus was 
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reached and finally the Working Group dropped the draft provision.108  
 
Arguably, expanding the scope of the ICC over corporations may also face the resistance of 
those worried that this would detract from the focus of the ICC on individual criminal 
responsibility and about the international criminal justice system being used to punish ‘groups’ 
rather that individuals, in conflict with the principle of individual responsibility for criminal 
offenses. Since the adoption of the Rome Statute, however, there has been persistent support, 
indicating that the idea of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over corporations 
has particular merit and utility and should be pursued further.109 A special tribunal for 
international corporate liability has also been suggested, but the case is most often made to 
expand the jurisdiction of the ICC in a future amendment of the Rome Statute, given its 
existing institutional framework, broad geographical coverage, and future-oriented mandate.110 
 
Currently, the ICC can, in theory, adjudicate corporate involvement in international crimes, 
when the focus is shifted from the corporation to the individuals acting on behalf of a 
corporation. Business people, as natural persons, do fall under the ICC personal jurisdiction. 
Shortly after the adoption of the Rome Statute, an article in the Financial Times had already 
warned that ‘the treaty’s accomplice liability provision could create international criminal 
liability for employees, officers and directors of corporations’.111 The article continued, ‘It 
takes little imagination to jump from complicity with human rights violations to complicity 
with crimes covered under the ICC Treaty’.112 As William Schabas pointed out, the question, 
then, is how and to what extent these accomplices may be prosecuted by the ICC.113   
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Luis Moreno Ocampo, the first prosecutor of the ICC, observed in 2003: ‘officials of 
multinational corporations could be held accountable before the ICC for directly or indirectly 
facilitating conducts that leads to violations of international law’. 114 Moreno Ocampo further 
noted that he intended ‘to investigate these companies to assert whether any of them should be 
brought before the ICC’.115 Referring to the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC)’s civil war, Moreno-Ocampo stated that clarifying the economic aspects of the alleged 
crimes was fundamental for preventing future crimes and prosecuting those already 
committed.116  He was pointing to the activities of European and American companies 
exploiting gold, diamonds and oil in the DRC.117 Ten years later, in 2013, Moreno Ocampo’s 
successor, Fatou Bensouda, reaffirmed the commitment of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
to investigate business entities responsible for contributing to international crimes.118 As she 
put it,  
 
Conflicts are driven either by financial enrichment or ideology: a thorough investigation 
of the finances behind a conflict therefore helps to identify suspects and develop a more 
complete picture of responsibility.119  
 
The threats of the ICC prosecutors to open the door of the Rome Statute to crimes involving 
economic entities remains unheard to date, with no investigation undertaken so far. A few 
communications against business people have reached the ICC, but without leading to any 
prosecution.120 In October 2014, representatives of Ecuadorian victims sent a communication 
to the OTP against the ‘Chief Executive Officer of Chevron and any other corporate officer’ of 
the company.121 The heart of the case was Chevron’s dumping of toxic waste into Ecuador’s 
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Lago Agrio region. Because the ICC cannot look at events that occurred before its 
establishment on 1 July 2002, the communication focused only on Chevron’s strategy to avoid 
complying with the judgments of Ecuadorian courts on this matter. The communication 
asserted that Chevron, by deliberately refusing to comply with Ecuadorian judgments, had 
committed ‘an attack against the civilian population of the Oriente’.122 It argued that Chevron 
officers ‘deliberately maintained the situation of contamination of the Oriente and the deathly 
health effects it causes’ and that this could constitute a crime against humanity.123 Chevron 
officers’ actions cannot, however, be identified as crimes against humanity within the meaning 
of Article 7 of the Rome Statute.124 Crimes against humanity are crimes of context: to 
establish such crimes, it is necessary to prove that certain criminal acts were ‘committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack’.125 To be held criminally liable, Chevron executives would have to 
have committed certain criminal acts, within that context.126 The complaint mentions a few of 
such acts, such as murder and persecution, but without explaining how the alleged perpetrators 
named in the complaint are supposed to have committed them. 127 In March 2015, the ICC 
decided that there was no basis to proceed in the case.128  
 
In May 2017, a coalition of human rights groups submitted a communication to the ICC 
prosecutor asking to investigate the complicity of Chiquita’s executives in crimes against 
humanity in Colombia. 129  The communication traces the executives’ involvement with 
payments made to Colombia paramilitaries between 1997 and 2004. ‘At the time, Colombian 
paramilitaries were notorious for targeting civilians, among them banana workers and 
community leaders’, a representative of the victims stated, ‘but Chiquita’s executives decided 
to continue giving money to paramilitaries’.130 Chiquita pled guilty in a US federal court in 
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2007 to illegally funding Colombian paramilitaries. But accountability for the executives who 
oversaw and authorized the payment scheme has been elusive. While civil litigation is pending 
in US courts against Chiquita executives, no criminal prosecution has been attempted and 
Colombia has not been able to exercise jurisdiction over them.131 The communication came at 
a critical time in Colombia, as the country began to implement a peace agreement after nearly 
half a century of conflict. If the OTP decides to start an investigation into Chiquita officials 
for their payments to the paramilitaries it would be the first time the court examines the role of 
a corporation – through its executives – in international crimes. 
 
Thematic Prosecutions 
Another trend that may have implications for the ICC focus on the business dimensions of 
conflict are the so-called ‘thematic prosecutions’. This term refers to the prosecutorial practice 
of selecting certain crimes and giving priority to particular phenomena within international 
criminal indictments, usually for purposes related to the best use of limited resources, but 
often also due to elevating attention on a given matter of international concern.132  In 
September 2016, the OTP released a policy document on the office’s selection and 
prioritisation of cases.133 In relation to assessing the gravity of the crimes, one of the case 
selection criteria, the document highlights:  
 
The impact of the crimes may be assessed in light of…the social, economic and 
environmental damage inflicted on the affected communities. In this context, the 
Office will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are 
committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land.134  
 
The acts described in the policy (environmental destruction, illegal exploitation of natural 
resources and land confiscation) constitute serious human rights violations for millions of 
people across the world, especially in countries affected by conflict and poor governance. 
They often involve multinational corporations, particularly in the extractive and agribusiness 
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sectors. The new policy implies that these could be gateways to the commissions of 
international crimes under the Rome Statute. For this reason, the new policy has attracted the 
attention of those working in the business and human rights field, who view it as a potential 
tool to achieve justice for victims in a context of prevalent impunity.135 Global Witness, an 
NGO, considered the policy a ‘landmark shift in international criminal justice’ and praised it 
as a move that ‘could reshape how business is done in developing countries’.136 Others have 
dismissed it as mere talk unlikely to lead to any real change.137 Schabas remarks: ‘One recalls 
the excitement when, thirteen years ago, the Prosecutor indicated that he would be looking at 
the business connections to war crimes and other atrocities. Did anything happen?’138 
 
Indeed, nothing happened. The policy shift, however, could at least in theory have important 
implications in relation to both corporate behaviour and activists’ advocacy work.139 Arguably, 
it is in relation to crimes against humanity and war crimes that the new policy is most likely to 
change the practice of the OTP because these two crimes can be committed ‘by means of’ the 
conduct referred to in the policy - while the crimes of aggression and genocide cannot.140 And 
it is particularly the effect of the policy on the crime of pillage that could lead to changes in 
the area of corporate accountability.  
 
The Rome Statute describes pillaging as the appropriation of property without the consent of 
the owner, with intention to deprive the owner of the property ‘in the context of’ an armed 
conflict.141 Although the provisions on pillaging do not mention natural resources, it is 
reasonable to interpret ‘property’ as to include natural resources and consider that pillaging of 
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natural resources falls within the remit of the ICC.142 Different commentators have argued for 
the prosecution of the crime of pillage for acts that amount to plundering a country’s natural 
resources. For example, van den Herik and Dam-de Jong argue that existing principles of 
international criminal law ought to be directed to address the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources during a conflict.143  
 
The question of natural resources are increasingly being recognised as a priority in transitional 
justice processes.144 Resources are a natural connecting point for post-conflict development 
and transitional justice. While rarely the single, driving cause of conflict, links between 
conflict and natural resources are present in every conflict. As Olga Martin-Ortega points out, 
although the majority of modern conflicts are not fought over natural resources, once the 
fighting starts all parties tend to consolidate their positions by exploiting the financial 
opportunities that resource access provides.145 Michael Ross has linked natural resource 
extraction to an increased likelihood of authoritarianism.146 There are a few examples of 
efforts to hold perpetrators of pillaging crimes legally accountable. A case at the International 
Court of Justice found that Uganda failed in its obligation to prevent the pillage of natural 
resources by its armed forces and non-state collaborators in the DRC.147 Charges against the 
Revolutionary United Front and Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone included 
crimes directly associated with efforts to control diamond mines in Sierra Leone.148 Truth 
commissions and other investigative bodies across different countries have analysed the link 
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between natural resource exploitation and conflict to some extent.149 As detailed in Chapter IV, 
a number of those (for example in Liberia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the DRC) have also 
identified the responsibilities of corporations and businesspeople in their final reports. The 
current reconsideration and expansion of transitional justice may pave the way for further 
investigating into the role of natural resources in conflicts.150 Arguably, the new policy paper, 
which mentions the illegal exploitation of natural resources as a conduct the OTP will pay 
more attention to, is a step in that direction.151  
  
The new policy could influence new communications brought to the ICC. Before the release 
of the policy paper the OTP had already received at least two communications related to one 
of the conducts the office had specifically stated it would pay attention to, viz. land 
confiscation. In 2010 the OTP initiated a preliminary examination of the situation in Honduras 
in this context.152 In particular, the situation that arose in the Bajo Aguán region involved the 
killings of at least 100 civilians and other acts of violence by state and private security forces 
in land disputes between individual landowners and private corporations on one side, and 
peasant movements on the other side.153 In 2015, the OTP decided not to proceed because ‘in 
the absence of sufficient information on links and commonality of features between the 
multiple alleged crimes’ it found insufficient evidence to conclude to the existence of a 
‘course of conduct’ within the meaning of crimes against humanity.154 In 2014, the OTP 
received a communication asking for it to investigate allegations that the ‘widespread and 
systematic land grabbing conducted by the Cambodian ruling elite for over a decade amounts 
to a crime against humanity’.155 The new policy may lead the OTP to open a preliminary 
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examination of the situation in Cambodia, and, if more evidence is brought concerning events 
in Honduras, to move the preliminary examination to the next stage.156  
 
It is likely that the new policy paper is going to result in an increase of communications filed 
by civil society organizations on issues related to the exploitation of natural resources and land 
confiscation. Bernaz raised the concern that ‘[t]he language of the policy paper, coupled with 
the desire of some organizations to obtain justice, may lead to…the erroneous belief that the 
Court’s jurisdiction has changed to encompass land grabbing as a stand-alone offence’.157 This 
might encourage the filing of manifestly unfounded communications, which arguably waste 
the scarce resource of the OTP.158 Megan Fairlie defines ‘strategic communications’ as ‘highly 
publicized investigation requests aimed not at securing any ICC-related activity, but at 
obtaining some non-Court related advantage’.159 The ‘appeal of the technique’, she argues, ‘is 
obvious: much good can come from directing international attention to the many unthinkable 
atrocities taking place around the globe’.160 Despite this risk, the new policy paper is important 
for its potential impacts on business behaviour and advocacy work of business and human 
rights activists. Even a NGO communication with little chance to pass the admissibility stage, 
if picked up by media, could lead to reputational damage for companies, and increased public 
awareness of the issue. 
    
I.3 The ad hoc Tribunals 
 
The two ad hoc tribunals, established for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda in 1993 and 
1994 respectively, expressly provided that they had jurisdiction ‘over natural persons’ thus 
excluding prosecution of corporate bodies or organizations.161 The Security Council resolution 
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) said it was 
for the purpose of prosecuting ‘natural persons’ responsible for serious violation of 
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international humanitarian laws. The then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali made a 
passing reference to the desirability of criminalising certain juridical persons ‘such as an 
association or organisation’ under the Statute of the ICTY, but ultimately rejected this idea in 
favour of focusing on natural persons.162 Resolution 955, which established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), said the tribunal was targeted at ‘natural persons’ 
responsible for genocide.163 Arguably, the exclusion of jurisdiction over legal persons was 
partly due to crimes in the contexts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda not involving 
businesses to any great extent.  
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCLS) statute did not specifically referred to natural 
persons only. Thus it did not explicitly exclude jurisdiction over legal persons, but it did not 
explicitly provide for it. The report of the Secretary General on the draft statute did not explain 
why the limitation to ‘natural persons’ provision was not included.164 Mats Berdal and David 
Malone argued that this might be a reflection of a specific interest in corporate liability in the 
Sierra Leone conflict.165 Theoretically, the SCSL could have prosecuted corporate entities. 
Despite this possibility, however, SCSL prosecutions have been confined to natural persons.166  
 
While international criminal tribunals have not used jurisdiction over corporations over 
international crimes, they have prosecuted and convicted corporate officials who supported 
international crimes.167 Key cases are the ones at the ICTR involving Radio Télévision Libre 
des Mille Collines.168 The station broadcasted from July 1993 to July 1994 and it was 
determined by the Tribunal that its propaganda and vindictive speech incited the Rwandan 
genocide. In 2003, prosecutors of the ICTR sought life sentences against Ferdinand Nahimana, 
a director of the radio, and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, associated with the station. The ICTR 
also prosecuted Hassan Ngeze, the founder and director of Kangura newspaper, known for 
spreading anti-Tutsi propaganda. The court consolidated the indictment of the three men into a 
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single trial, known as the Media Case.169 This trial was the first time since Nuremberg that the 
role of the media was examined as a component of international criminal law. Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza and Ngeze were convicted on counts of genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity. 
Nahimana and Ngeze were sentenced to life imprisonment and Barayagwiza to 35 years. Upon 
appeal, in 2007, Nahimana and Ngeze’s sentences were reduced to 30 and 35 years 
respectively. Later, in 2009, Valeria Berneriki, a broadcaster, was also found guilty of 
incitement to genocide by a gacaca court (traditional community justice courts of Rwanda, 
revived in 2001), and sentenced to life imprisonment.170  
 
In the case against Alfred Musema, the director of a tea factory, the prosecutor alleged that 
Musema transported armed attackers, including employees of the factory, to different 
locations, and ordered them to attack Tutsis seeking refuge there.171 He exercised legal and 
financial control over his employees, including the power to appoint or remove them and to 
prevent or to punish their use of factory equipment that was used in the crimes.172 He was held 
responsible for the actions of his employees and convicted of genocide, but the conviction was 
not directly related to his business activities.  
 
So far, no international criminal tribunal has had jurisdiction over corporations for crimes 
under international law. In 2014, however, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon decided in two 
cases, New TV S.A.L and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L., that it could assert jurisdiction over 
corporations for the offence of contempt of court.173 The Appeals Panel ruling in New TV was 
the first decision by an international criminal tribunal asserting jurisdiction over corporations, 
although not for human rights violations or international crimes.174 Its findings were then 
confirmed in the Akhbar Beirut appeal decision. The decision was in relation to the 
prosecution of Al-Akhbar newspaper and Al-Jadeed TV as well as two employees, Ibrahim al-
Amin and Karma al-Khayat on charges of contempt of court.175 The charges were brought 
against them for publishing information about secret witnesses on whose testimonies the 
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prosecution relied to issue indictments. The STL’s Contempt Judge had issued a decision 
stating that the Tribunal prosecutes individuals involved in the assassination of former 
Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, not legal persons, concluding that the STL had no 
personal jurisdiction to prosecute Al-Jadeed TV.176 He decided to proceed with the prosecution 
against Khayat, but not the company for which she worked. But the appeals panel reversed 
this decision. It expanded the jurisdiction of the tribunal, reiterating that it was not restricted to 
the prosecution of individuals, but included the prosecution of legal persons.177  
 
The STL relied on the point that even if corporate liability is not included in the Rome Statute, 
this does not mean that the concept does not exist under international law. The STL elaborated 
on its decision:  
 
The omission of legal persons from the Rome Statute should not be interpreted as a 
concerted exercise that reflected a legal view that legal persons are completely beyond 
the purview of international criminal law. We thus hold that no definitive legal 
conclusion can be drawn from the exclusion of legal persons from the 
jurisdiction ratione personae of the ICC. Instead, it is a reflection of the lack of a 
political (rather than legal) consensus to provide such jurisdiction in the Rome 
Statute.178  
 
The scope of this decision is narrow and it does not represent a breakthrough in terms of 
corporate accountability for human rights violations or international crimes. It is, nonetheless 
important as it establishes for the first time that an international tribunal can exercise 
jurisdiction over business entities. In this context, the STL decision is of great conceptual 
importance.179 Once the precedent is set, other courts may expand the subject matter to include 
human rights violations and crimes under international law. The New TV case may be relied 
upon in future business and human rights litigation as evidence that corporations may commit 
crimes that can be prosecuted at the international level. As such, this decision may have 
important practical consequences. For example, in Kiobel, analysed in Chapter III, a US Court 
of Appeals asserted: ‘although international law has sometimes extended the scope of liability 
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for a violation of a given norm to individuals, it has never extended the scope of liability to a 
corporation’.180 After the New TV decision this is no longer true. It is possible and probable 
that this decision will not remain an isolated one, and that other courts, including domestic 
courts, may be influenced by this precedent and seek to consolidate it to address the issue of 
corporate accountability, including in transitional justice contexts.181   
 
Conclusion  
 
The motivation for calls to extend international criminal jurisdiction over corporations vary, 
but most arguments operate on the premise that corporations can, and do, commit or assist in 
international crimes, and that individual criminal responsibility alone is insufficient to address 
the realities of corporate crime in modern conflicts. 182  Contemporary conflict studies 
demonstrate that many wars are rooted in competition over resources and in economic 
inequality, with the resulting calls for a new generation of international criminal law 
addressing economic actors and economic crimes.183 Relatedly, there is the argument that if a 
goal of international criminal law is to support durable peace, then addressing economic 
networks that sustain conflicts should be a crucial feature of international criminal practice.184 
Human rights scholars point to the current lacuna in governance, which see corporations 
enjoying impunity for abuses that overlap with violations of international criminal law. 185 
Others point to the prosecutions of industrialists after World War II to claim that 
contemporary corporate responsibility for international crimes would honour the legacy of 
Nuremberg.186 Some advance a legal claim to support calls for institutional competence over 
corporations committing international crimes: that customary international criminal norms 
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apply equally to corporations as they do to natural persons, with the only distinction lying in 
the jurisdictional limits of international courts to date.187  
 
The pursuit of corporate offenders under international criminal law could have positive 
implications in at least three areas: i) in setting a framework that promotes deterrence of such 
crimes; ii) in fostering the legitimacy range and effectiveness of the international criminal 
system; and iii) in overcoming certain obstacles of international human rights law.188 First, the 
deterrent effect of international criminal prosecutions is routinely criticized on the basis that, 
among other things, it presupposes a psychologically rational actor where such may not 
exist.189 However, as some scholars have noted, the ideological presuppositions of criminal 
law’s rational actor may be more accommodating to corporate persons than to human 
beings.190 As Joanna Kyriakakis puts it,  
 
In direct contrast to the usual contention that criminal law is necessarily most effective 
when responsibility is atomized to the human agent, the proposition is that it is 
potentially more so when directed at legal entities that are constitutionally designed to 
behave rationally in terms of engaging in emotionally and socially disengaged cost-
benefit analysis. 191 
 
Second, in relation to the legitimacy of the international criminal system, it is the phenomenon 
of the transnational identity of the corporation that is particularly pertinent. Multinational 
corporations continue to be primarily headquartered in developed countries (sometimes called 
‘the global North’), while the dynamics that press against corporate accountability for 
business-related human rights abuses, and where these tend to be most egregious, are most 
pronounced in underdeveloped countries (‘the global South’).192 Kyriakakis argues that an 
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international criminal court addressing this phenomenon through appropriate prosecutions 
‘provides the opportunity for international criminal jurisprudence to construct more complete 
narratives of power, law and responsibility for otherwise apparently localized conflicts’.193 
Further, Jordan Sundell notes:  
 
Local populations, if they notice the proceedings at all, often view international 
tribunals’ brand of justice as distinctly Western. In the case of corporate offenses, 
however, the target audience is not the local population, but rather multinational 
corporations. An international trial in such a situation would not go unnoticed by the 
relevant actors. Nor would it generally be perceived as Occidental bias or victor’s 
justice since a large percentage of multinational corporations come from the developed 
world.194  
 
Third, international criminal law may also overcome certain obstacles of human rights law. 
While it is still largely debated whether non-state actors, and in particular corporations, are 
bound by international human rights law, from a normative point of view there are no 
obstacles for an international criminal tribunal to have jurisdiction over corporations.195 
Conceptually, corporations are bound as individuals are by the prohibitions underlying the 
core crime of international law. Ingrid Gubbay, head of human rights litigation at Hausfeld, 
rejects the idea that the international criminal tribunals’ limitation of jurisdiction over natural 
persons means that corporate liability for international crimes does not exist under 
international law.196 The fact that these institutions’ jurisdiction is limited to individual 
criminal liability and does not extent to corporate liability ‘says nothing about the existence or 
non existence of a norm’. 197 As a 2007 report by the Special Representative on business and 
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human rights concluded, corporations can be held liable under similar principles that are used 
to hold individuals liable for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.198  
 
Andrew Clapham, writing in 2008, said that it was imaginable that the jurisdiction of the 
international criminal tribunals could be expanded to include corporations, arguing that the 
exclusion of legal persons could be seen as ‘the consequence of a rule of procedure rather than 
the inevitable result of application of international criminal law’.199 Ten years after, the only 
international tribunal taking on new cases is the ICC and, while it does not appear likely that 
there will be an imminent expansion of its jurisdiction to include corporations, there are no 
conceptual reasons why corporations should be immune from liability under international 
criminal law. 200 The idea has never been clearly rejected.201 Instead, as Bernaz points out, ‘a 
closer look at both the law and the practice from a historical perspective reveals a mixed 
picture when it comes to the idea of corporate liability under international criminal law’.202 
 
 Current notions of corporate responsibility for facilitating human rights abuses are backed by 
legal theories that originated in Nuremberg. As seen above, although the IMT only prosecuted 
individuals, it recognised that legal persons can engage in criminal conduct, labelling the Nazi 
leadership corps, the SS and the Gestapo as ‘criminal’.203 In the trials of German industrialists, 
the idea of the responsibility of the corporations was an underlying element in some of the 
judgments.204 Some scholars have suggested that concerns over the extension of the ICC 
jurisdiction are far from insurmountable and they do not preclude states parties to the ICC 
from extending personal jurisdiction of the Court to legal persons in a future amendment of 
the Rome Statute.205 
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Moreover, the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction is more accepted in international criminal 
law than it is under human rights law.206 Many state parties to the Rome Statute have vested 
their courts with universal jurisdiction upon the implementation of the Statute in their 
domestic codes. By contrast, these same countries are hesitant about regulating corporations 
headquartered in their territory for extraterritorial corporate activities. Larissa van den Herik 
and Jernej Letnar Černič argue that the acceptance of corporate responsibility under 
international criminal law may have beneficial effects on the human rights discussion in terms 
of recognizing the legal personality of corporations under international law.207   
 
The international criminal law framework, however, cannot serve as an adequate enforcement 
tool of human rights law.208 International criminal law only covers the most serious human 
rights violations: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.209 Even if corporations 
were in the future accepted as subjects of the ICC, and even considering the focus of the OTP 
thematic prosecution over natural resources exploitation and land grabs, corporations remain 
unlikely to become the primary focus of an ICC prosecutor. The contextual element of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and the specific intent required for genocide limit the 
scope of application of international crimes at least in practical terms. Thus, while 
international criminal law could address crimes attributable to corporations, it would intervene 
only in extraordinary circumstances.210  
 
Despite prosecutions on accomplice liability grounds, international courts concentrate on 
prosecuting people who were directly involved in committing crimes, in particular military or 
political officials.211 By contrast, individual business people, often only play a supportive role 
in the commission of international crimes. The priority is to prosecute the ‘most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole’. 212 The ICC prosecutorial strategy is to 
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‘select for prosecution those situated at the highest echelons of responsibility’. 213 
Businesspeople and corporations would rarely meet the criteria for ICC prosecution as in most 
cases they are not among those masterminding international crimes, but they, for the most part, 
rather benefit from a given situation and exploit the financial opportunities. Investigations 
initiated, or not initiated, by the OTP may hint that business responsibility may not be ‘of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action.’214 Too broad a swathe of prosecutions for a variety 
of crimes may conflict with the ICC’s focus on a small number of perpetrators of the most 
notorious offenses. Therefore the responsibility of corporations for their involvement in 
international crimes has been of marginal interest in international prosecution efforts.215 This 
is arguably a necessary limitation of international criminal law that remains unlikely to be 
overcome. For these reasons, international criminal law does not currently offer an effective 
avenue to seek remedy for corporate human rights abuses in transitional justice contexts. The 
next Chapter assesses whether the regional human rights systems may be a suitable option. 
 
                                                
213 Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, The Hague, 1 February 2010, 19. 
214 H Vest, ‘Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law’ 
(2010) 8(3) JICJ 852.  
215 Jessberg (n 32), 801; Kaleck and Saage-Maab (n 18), 710. 
 
 
 60 
 
II. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS 
 
Introduction 
 
After the assessment of the limitations of international criminal law as a remedy for corporate 
human rights abuses in the previous chapter, this chapter turns to the analysis of the potential 
of the regional human rights systems in this area. The European, Inter-American and African 
regional human rights systems have developed judicial, legislative and administrative 
mechanisms to provide remedies to people, who have suffered human rights violations within 
states party to the respective regional human rights conventions.1  Arguably, the regional 
systems also contribute to providing remedies in transitional justice contexts, as they order and 
supervise national prosecutions and reparations measures when states emerging from conflict 
or repression have been unable or unwilling to act.2 These mechanisms can in some instances 
also remedy violations involving business activities through scrutiny of complaints made 
against states that fail to prevent, investigate or redress human rights violations related to 
corporate activities. Bodies set up to monitor the implementation of the regional treaties can, 
for example, order new investigations into corporate abuses and can contribute to shape 
reparations programmes at national level. 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in particular, has provided important 
contributions to the analysis of evidence of corporate abuses and the provision of remedy and 
reparations for victims, including in transitional justice contexts.3 A decision of the African 
Commission of August 2017 ordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo to investigate the 
role of an Australian mining company in a village massacre during the 1998 civil war also 
provides innovative precedents in this area.4 This chapter shows that while the regional 
systems are not mandated to directly investigate corporate human rights abuses (they 
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investigate violations by states parties, or circumstances where state parties have failed to 
provide adequate remedies to violations that occur on their territory), they can offer a 
complementary avenue for victims that have failed to obtain justice and reparations at the 
national level. This is particularly important in transitional justice contexts where, for a 
number of reasons detailed in the next chapter, national litigation is rarely an effective option. 
This chapter examines the jurisprudence of the Inter-American (Section II.1), the African (II.2) 
and the European systems (Section II.2).        
 
II.1 The Inter-American System 
 
The Inter-American Court, established by the Organization of American States in 1979, is an 
independent judicial institution with jurisdiction over the states that are party to the American 
Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) and have accepted its jurisdiction for 
alleged violations of the obligations included in the convention. The Court has adjudicated on 
several cases involving large-scale abuses, which occurred during conflict or repression. Such 
cases often arrived at the Court when the state concerned had undergone or was undergoing a 
transition. The Inter-American Court is not a criminal court and cannot adjudicate on 
individual responsibility. But in a creative interpretation of its remedial powers, it regularly 
orders states to investigate, try, and punish those responsible for human rights violations and 
to provide different forms of reparation to victims.5 The Court was, from its first contentious 
case, confronted with mass, state-sponsored violations of human rights, whose dynamics came 
to shape the Court’s remedial practice.6 The Velasquez-Rodriguez case, which dealt with 
enforced disappearances in Honduras, established new ground rules with respect to reparations 
that were ‘manifestly transitional’.7 The decision had an enormous impact on the processes of 
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political transformation on-going in various Latin American countries. 
 
The Inter-American Court only has jurisdiction over states that have ratified the American 
Convention, clearly not over companies. Arguably, however, the Court’s decisions can have 
an indirect impact on corporate accountability and can determine effective remedies for 
victims when investigating states’ conduct related to the regulation of business activities. In 
this sense, the Court has begun to refine its guidance on state obligations including the duty to 
regulate and supervise corporations.8 The Court recognizes that there are instances when 
certain acts or omissions by private actors can be directly treated as state acts – and therefore 
they amount to a violation of state duties to protect people from human rights abuses and to 
provide victims with a meaningful remedy. This occurs when such actors are ‘empowered to 
act in state capacity’ (such as through a contract) and they act with the ‘acquiescence, 
collaboration, support or tolerance of state agents’.9 State responsibility can also result when 
there is a failure to prevent, investigate, and punish rights violations.  
 
Most cases brought before the Inter-American system involving corporate activities concern 
environmental harms and indigenous communities.10 While not relevant for transitional justice 
as such, they are, however, important in setting precedents, especially in relation to reparations 
standards for victims of human rights abuses. For example, in Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Inter-
American Court found that the Ecuadorian government violated the American Convention 
because it failed to protect and respect the Sarayaku indigenous community’s right to free, 
prior and informed consent, as well as their community property rights and their cultural 
identity, when it granted oil concessions in the community’s ancestral lands without 
consultation.11 The Court awarded the Sarayaku people a total of $1.3 million in damages. 
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Only a few months after the Sarayaku case was presented, the State Oil Company of Ecuador 
and Compañía General de Combustibles signed a deed of termination of the partnership 
contract for the exploration and exploitation of crude oil in Sarayaku lands, but with the 
agreement that there was ‘no environmental liability’.12 
 
The Inter-American Court cannot assign specific obligations to corporations through its award 
of remedies. As a consequence, the remedies ordered (to states), while substantial and often 
including full land restitution, removal of explosives, and reforestation of the affected 
territories, usually neglect a full consideration of the violations at issue and their connection to 
corporate accountability.13 For example, Nicaragua, in compliance with the Court’s order in 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, suspended the logging concession on 
Awas Tingni community’s ancestral land that had been granted to SOLCARSA, a Korean 
lumber company.14 The ending of such contractual relationships, however, came without any 
obligation for corporations to pay reparations to affected communities.  
 
In the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname judgment, the Court did not order the review 
and revocation of mining concessions, as requested by petitioners, only requiring that the 
government institute a consultation process for awarding future concessions.15 The Court 
required Suriname to establish ‘the necessary mechanisms to monitor and supervise the 
execution of the rehabilitation by the company’.16 Even without a full development of 
corporations’ obligations, the Kaliña case is significant as it represents the first time that the 
Court designed specific reparations to restore the indigenous territories, placing the obligation 
not only on the state, but ‘in conjunction with the company’.17 Alejandra Gonza, a former 
lawyer at the Inter-American Court, argues that this tentative first step indicates that the Court 
might require in the future stronger substantiation of remedies by petitioners.18 
 
The Inter-American Court has also adjudicated, and ordered reparations in cases associated 
with business activities in the context of armed conflicts. For example, in Santo Domingo 
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Massacre v. Colombia, the representatives of the victims asked the court to establish the 
participation of private security agents acting to supervise and protect Occidental Petroleum 
(Oxy)’s property, as well as the financial and arms collaboration between Oxy and the 
Colombian National Army.19 In 2003, residents of Santo Domingo had filed a lawsuit against 
Oxy and its security contractor, Airscan, in US federal court under the Alien Tort Statute. The 
plaintiffs claimed that in 1998 Oxy and Airscan, in a bid to secure Oxy’s pipeline in Caño 
Limón, helped the Colombian Air Force (CAF) conduct an aerial bombing attack on Santo 
Domingo. The raid led to 17 people dead, 25 injured and the destruction of homes and 
properties. Plaintiffs alleged that Oxy and Airscan provided key strategic information, as well 
as ground and air support to the CAF in the bombing raid, and thus they were complicit in 
extrajudicial killings, torture, crimes against humanity and war crimes.20 In the case before the 
Inter-American Court, the representatives argued that Colombia ‘did not have an adequate 
legislative framework that truly developed the obligation to protect human rights in relation to 
the activities of multinational corporations on its territory’ and that the contribution to the 
Santo Domingo massacre by Oxy and Airscan was evident.21 The Court found, that there was 
‘no dispute that the armed conflict in Arauca is closely related to the revenue derived from the 
oil and the location of the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline’ and that this ‘resulted in the 
establishment of illegal armed groups since the 1980s’.22  
 
A particularly relevant case in the context of transitional justice is the Afro-Descendant 
Communities Displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, 
which arose from fighting in the Colombia’s Urabá region. 23 The area was ‘of major 
geostrategic importance in the armed conflict, in particular for the illegal armed groups’, who 
used the passage to Panama to traffic arms and drugs.24 The public administration in the region 
was corrupt, ‘also owing to the award of permits or the corruption of public officials by 
logging companies’.25 When illegal armed groups exerted pressure on the Afro-Descendant 
communities, which were ‘firmly established’ in the region, the communities attempted ‘to 
                                                
19 Santo Domingo Massacre (n 3), 135. 
20 In 2014, after years of proceedings, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case finding that it had insufficient ties 
with the United States to be heard in US courts.  
21 Santo Domingo Massacre (n 3), 185.  
22 Ibid., 55, 56, 59. 
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maintain their autonomy’.26 In response, armed groups threatened, murdered, and disappeared 
community members. 27 The case before the Inter-American Court raised several claims, 
including in relation to the forced displacement and allegations of illegal logging by the 
Colombian company Madarién.28  
 
Legal recognition of land rights for the Afro-Descendant communities of the Cacarica River 
basin took a long time and, as a result, Madarién was able to gain government approval for 
logging rights on the territory claimed by the communities.29 In 1992, government agencies 
granted Madarién several permits, which were met by complaints by the public and finally a 
constitutional court decision to suspend the logging activities.30 In 1996, after the courts 
revoked the order allowing Madarién to proceed, but before the logging operations were 
suspended, paramilitary groups launched attacks against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). 31 Communities were 
attacked and members of a Colombian military and paramilitary group ‘told the leaders of the 
Afro-descendant communities that they had to evacuate’.32 The communities, and their 3,500 
members, remained displaced until 2001.33 They alleged that Madarién, which continued 
logging in the area, unlawfully benefitted from, and was complicit in their forced displacement. 
34 Clearly, the Inter-American Court could not establish whether Madarién was complicit in 
the forced displacements. The Afro-Descendant Communities case process, nonetheless, 
represented a avenue for the communities, which did allege Madarién’s complicity,35 to 
launch their grievance against the company and against the state’s actions. The Inter-American 
Court heard the complaint and found that the ‘logging activities ignored the Law concerning 
the black communities’ and that the state was responsible for the failure of administrative and 
judicial bodies to protect the communities’ property rights. 36  
 
                                                
26 Ibid., 85, 87, 93, 94. 
27 Ibid., 93. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 132, 137, 347. 
30 Ibid., 132. 
31 Ibid., 91, 92, 95 
32 Ibid., 105, 108. 
33 Ibid., 111, 125. 
34 Ibid., 140, 142, 341, 378. 
35 Ibid., 341, 374. 
36 Ibid., 355-58. See also, van Ho (n 21), 69. 
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Another relevant case is the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, which involves the 
construction of the Chixoy dam in Guatemala.37 The dam, financed by the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank, was constructed in the early 1980s during the civil war in 
Guatemala by the state-owned National Electricity Institute (INDE). The project forcibly 
displaced more than 3,500 Achi Maya people. The damages caused by the project were 
extensive and included pollution of the rivers, loss of land, livestock, crops, fishing grounds, 
and religious sites. When community members from the village of Río Negro protested that 
the alternative land offered to them was unsuitable and the compensation inadequate, they 
were massacred by paramilitary civil patrols acting under army orders; over 400 people were 
killed.38 The massacre took place during the height of the genocide campaign of the 1980s, 
and it was the subject of the National Reparations Programme as well as several domestic 
criminal cases against the perpetrators.39 Eventually a case against the Guatemala government 
reached the Inter-American Court. In 2012, the Court found the government responsible for 
violations of the American Convention including freedom of movement and residence, as a 
result of the forced displacement of the population during the internal armed conflict and the 
impossibility of returning to their ancestral lands due to construction of the dam and 
reservoir.40 In relation to reparations, the Court ordered Guatemala, among other things, to 
build basic infrastructure and services for the Río Negro community, implement a project to 
rescue the culture of the Maya Achi, provide medical and psychological treatment to the 
victims, and provide compensation for material and immaterial damages.41 
 
The novel strategy of this case was that the victims worked on redress at the Inter-American 
and national levels simultaneously, focusing on the banks that had financed the Chixoy project. 
They argued that the banks, as well as the Guatemala government, knew that the dam was 
being constructed by a murderous regime that would be unlikely to make adequate provision 
for the people being displaced. In 1996, the World Bank investigated the claims and found that 
INDE had only partially compensated the community. For example, titles to alternative land 
                                                
37 IACtHR, Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala Ser C, No. 250 (2012). See also, N Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations 
and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in DN Sharp (ed.), Justice and Economic Violence in Transition 
(Springer Science Business Media 2014) 109, 132.  
38 Rio Negro Massacres (n 35), 65-74. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 172–82. 
41 Ibid. 
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were never granted, not all those eligible received land, and the land was of poor quality.42 
While it was impossible to sue the banks directly before any administrative or legal body due 
to immunities, the banks agreed to finance a solution by the government as a result of pressure 
from international and national civil society organizations.43 In 2010, the ‘Reparations Plan for 
Damages Suffered by the Communities Affected by the Construction of the Chixoy Dam’ was 
signed and agreed to by all parties.44 The plan included provisions to compensate community 
members up to $154.5 million for material and non-material damages and losses, construct 
and repair homes, and improve roads, water, and sewage systems. The government, however, 
did not sign the local agreement that would have made the reparation plan binding, and as a 
consequence this still remains to be implemented. 
 
II.2 The African System 
 
Cases alleging the liability of states for violations of human rights by private actors have 
rarely been brought before the African Commission.45 But a recent successful case may 
change the trend. In June 2016, the African Commission found the government of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) responsible for the 2004 massacre of over 70 people in 
Kilwa, in the southeast of the country, and granted an unprecedented compensation of $2.5 
million to the victims and their families.46 Anvil Mining, an Australian-Canadian mining 
company who operated a copper and silver mine near Kilwa, was publicly criticised for its role 
in the violations, which included providing logistical support to soldiers who indiscriminately 
shelled civilians, summarily executed at least 28 people and disappeared many others. The 
decision in Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Others v. 
Democratic Republic of Congo followed a 13-year legal battle for justice by the victims and 
their families. 
 
                                                
42 Center for Political Ecology, ‘Reparations and the Right to Remedy’ (World Commission on Dams Briefing 
Paper 2000). 
43 S Herz, ‘Rethinking International Financial Institution Immunities’ in D Bradlow and Da Hunter (eds.), 
International Financial Institutions and International Law (Kluwer 2010), 137. 
44 Plan de Reparación de Daños y Perjuicios Sufridos por las Comunidades Afectadas por la Construcción de la 
Hidroeléctrica Chixoy, April 2010.  
45 In Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, No. 145/02 (2006), the African Commission, for the first time, 
held that the state duty to protect human rights applies to protecting against abuse by all non-state actors, 
including corporations. See also, South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and 
International Law, ‘Obligations and Extra-territorial Application in the African Regional Human Rights System’ 
17 February 2010, 30. 
46 IHRDA v DRC (n 4). Victims were notified on 7 August 2017. 
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On 14 October 2004, a small group of lightly armed rebels tried to take control of Kilwa. In 
retaliation, the Congolese army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique de Congo - 
FARDC) bombarded the town, and searching for rebels, arbitrarily detained, tortured and 
killed civilians. Over two days, at least 73 civilians were killed, including an estimated 28 
people who were arbitrarily arrested and then summarily executed. Others were brutally 
tortured, some dying from their injuries in the weeks and months that followed. A week after 
the events, the UN peacekeeping mission based in Congo (Mission des Nations Unies au 
Congo – MONUC) conducted an investigation and accused the FARDC of war crimes.47  
 
The massacre in Kilwa was part of the second of two consecutive wars in DRC, from 1998 to 
2003. The exploitation of the DRC’s vast mineral wealth was an important feature in the wars. 
Anvil won the license to mine the copper and silver at Dikulushi, 50 km from Kilwa, in 1998, 
during the DRC’s second war. It began mining operations in 2002.48 According to the UN 
investigation, Anvil provided substantial logistical support to the military action by the 
FARDC in Kilwa.49 An airplane chartered by Anvil was used to transport an estimated 150 
troops from Pweto to Kilwa on October 14 and 15.50 The FARDC used the company’s 
vehicles, driven by Anvil employees, to transport soldiers.51 The vehicles also transported 
looted goods, corpses and people arbitrarily detained by the soldiers. 52 As noted by MONUC: 
 
In October 2004, the Commander of the 6th military region in Lubumbashi informed 
MONUC that the intervention of the FARDC to bring safety back to Kilwa was made 
possible thanks to the logistical assistance given by Anvil Mining. On another occasion, 
during an interview made with an Australian television channel (ABC) on 6 June 2005, 
the President and CEO of Anvil Mining, M. Bill Turner, responded to a question 
concerning the use of Anvil Mining vehicles by saying “so what?”. He acknowledged 
that Anvil Mining had provided logistic [sic] to the army, following a “request from 
                                                
47 Mission des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC), ‘Report on the conclusions of the Special Investigation 
concerning allegations of summary executions and other human rights violations perpetrated by the Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) in Kilwa (Katanga Province)’, 15 October 2004.    
48 In 2010, the Dikulushi mine was sold to Mawson West, a small Australian mining company. In January 2015, 
Mawson West stopped industrial production at Dikulushi, stating the mine was no longer economically viable. 
49 MONUC (n 47), VI. 
50 Ibid., para 36. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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the army of a legitimate government”. He also added: “We helped the military to get to 
Kilwa and then we were gone. Whatever they did there, that’s an internal issue”53 
 
In 2006, after two years of pressure by human rights groups, a Congolese military prosecutor 
recommended nine soldiers and three serving and former Anvil employees stand trial for war 
crimes or complicity in war crimes.54 In March 2007, just before the trial was due to start, the 
prosecutor was removed from the case and replaced by a close associate of President Kabila, 
who had also been an advisor to a former Anvil board member.55 A few months later, all the 
defendants were acquitted. 56 A higher military court refused to hear the appeal against the 
acquittals.  
 
Survivors and their families continued to pursue justice in Canada and Australia, where Anvil 
had offices. In 2005, the Australian Minister of Justice instructed the federal police to open an 
investigation into Anvil’s role in the Kilwa massacre.57 The inquiry was flawed by personnel 
changes: in the space of two years the case was assigned to six different officers.58 In October 
2006, just before the start of the Congolese trial, the police recommended the investigation be 
closed because of insufficient evidence.59 Following the verdict in Congolese Military Court 
in June 2007, the Australian police ended its investigation. It brought no charges. In March 
2007, human rights NGOs requested the Canadian Minister of Justice to open an investigation 
into the Canadian entity of Anvil.60 The War Crimes Unit of the Canadian police began to 
investigate, but its efforts were slow and appeared to languish after a number of years. In 
March 2010, the Canadian Association Against Impunity, a coalition of six NGOs, filed a 
class action suit in Quebec, where Anvil had its Canadian office, in an effort to obtain justice 
and compensation for the victims.61 Finally, the Court of Appeal ruled that that Quebec courts 
                                                
53 Ibid., para 37.  
54 Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) and others, ‘Kilwa Trial: a Denial of Justice – a chronology, 
October 2004-July 2007’ 17 July 2007. 
55 UN News Centre, ‘DR Congo: UN’s top rights official concerned at acquittal in military trial’, 4 July 2017.     
56 Ibid. 
57 Pierre v. Anvil Mining Management NL (2008), SCWA 30. 
58 RAID (n 54), 5-7. 
59 Ibid., 7-10. 
60 Ibid., 11-25.  
61 Canadian Association Against Impunity, ‘Significant step forward in holding Anvil Mining to account’ 29 
April 2011. 
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did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.62 An appeal to the Supreme Court by the victims was 
unsuccessful. 
 
Following the failure to obtain justice in the DRC, Canada or Australia, the victims and the 
human rights groups supporting them, decided to seek justice through the African Commission. 
In 2010, they submitted a complaint.63 The Commission found the Congolese government had 
violated nine human rights provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter), including extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary arrests, disappearances 
and forced displacement.64 It awarded the eight victims named in the complaint $2.5 million, 
the highest ever award by the African Commission.65 The decision sets new precedents.  
 
First, it specifies the exact sum to be paid to each individual victim - the Commission does not 
usually indicate the sum of compensation to be paid, but rather recommends that the State 
provide ‘adequate compensation’. Second, the Commission’s decision covers not only 
compensation for the direct violation the victims suffered, but also acknowledges the needs of 
the larger Kilwa community. It urged the DRC government to identify and compensate other 
victims and their families not party to the complaint who were also directly affected by the 
attack.66 The Commission said the government should formally apologize to the people of 
Kilwa, exhume and re-bury the bodies dumped in a mass grave, construct a memorial, provide 
trauma counselling for those affected, and rebuild the schools, hospital and other structures 
destroyed during the attack.67 These collective and restorative reparations benefit the Kilwa 
community as a whole and recognise the wrongs done to both the individuals and the affected 
community.  
 
Third, the Commission urged the government to launch a new criminal investigation and ‘take 
all due measures to prosecute and punish agents of the state and Anvil Mining Company 
staff’. 68  The Commission publicly criticised Anvil by stressing that extractive industry 
                                                
62 Canadian Association Against Impunity, ‘No justice in Canada for Congolese massacre victims as Canada's 
Supreme Court dismisses leave to appeal’ 1 November 2012.  
63 IHRDA v DRC (n 4). 
64 Ibid., para 154. The Commission found that DRC violated articles 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 22 and 26 of the African 
Charter. 
65 Ibid., para. 154(ii)(iii)(iv). 
66 Ibid., para 154(v). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., para 154(i). 
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companies are also legally required to carry out their activities with due regard to the rights of 
the host communities: ‘At a minimum, [extractive industry companies] should avoid engaging 
in actions that violate the rights of communities in their zones of operation. This includes not 
participating in, or supporting, violations of human and peoples’ rights’.69  
 
Finally, the collection of evidence immediately after the attack was key in this case. The 
African Commission cannot directly investigate the actions of companies, but it can request 
the complainant to present evidence substantiating the allegations, including reports by 
international organizations. In this decision, the report by MONUC was key to establish the 
facts. The UN investigation team was able to interview eyewitnesses, speak with Anvil, and 
collect other evidence just a week after the attack, and the African Commission used this 
material in its criticism of the company.70 
 
Despite the importance of this decision and the precedents it sets for future cases, however, 
remedy for victims will now depend on the willingness of the DRC government. The 
Commission recommended the establishment of a monitoring committee to supervise the 
implementation of its decision, which is another innovation.71 But the African Charter contains 
no provision for enforcement of the Commission’s findings and recommendations, which are 
not formally binding. The Commission can refer cases to the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, if a state is a member, but the DRC is not.72  
 
Until the decision in HRDA, the Commission’s most comprehensive decision concerning the 
involvement of a corporation in human rights violations was the Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre (SERAC) v. Nigeria case.73 The case alleged that, in the process of oil 
production, the Nigeria military government, through a consortium formed by the state oil 
company Nigerian National Petroleum Company and Shell, caused environmental 
contamination and health problems to the Ogoni people living in the oil areas, and thus 
                                                
69 Ibid, para 101. 
70 Ibid., para 73. 
71 Ibid., para 154(vi). 
72 As at July 2017, only eight of the 30 states Parties to the Protocol had made the declaration recognizing the 
competence of the Court to receive cases from NGOs and individuals.  
73 ACHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR) v. Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 [SERAC v Nigeria]. 
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violated several rights in the African Charter.74 It also alleged that Nigerian security forces 
attacked, burned and destroyed several Ogoni villages and homes in response to the 
Movement of the Survival of Ogoni People’s campaign against the oil companies. Many 
Ogoni people became displaced as a result.  
 
The SERAC case is significant as the African Commission affirmed the state duty under the 
African Charter to protect human rights against abuses perpetrated by private parties.75 The 
Commission ruled that the Nigerian government violated the rights to life, to health and to 
clean environment, among others. The Commission also held that the state’s failure to monitor 
oil activities and involve local communities in decisions violated the right of the Ogoni people 
to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.76 The direct role of the Nigerian 
government included ‘placing the legal and military powers of the State at the disposal of the 
oil companies’.77 The Commission found that the Nigerian government gave ‘the green light 
to private actors, and the oil companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of 
the Ogonis’. 78  As remedial measures the Commission recommended the provision of 
information to exposed communities in addition to conducting an investigation and 
prosecuting government and private officials for their involvement in human rights violations, 
cleaning the land and rivers affected and ensuring adequate compensation to victims.79  
 
Some additional developments in the African System might led to further cases scrutinising 
the role of corporations in human rights abuses. In 2014, the African Union adopted a Protocol 
that, should it come into operation, would create a new international criminal law section of 
the African Court of Justice and Human and People’s Rights 80  with jurisdiction over 
international and certain transnational crimes, as well as competence to hear cases against 
                                                
74 Articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21, and 24 of the African Charter.  
75 SERAC v Nigeria (n 73). See also, D Aguirre, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights Law in 
Africa’ 2005 5(2) African Human Rights LJ, 239, 263. 
76 Article 21 of the African Charter. SERAC v Nigeria (n 73), paras. 55-58. 
77 SERAC v Nigeria (n 73), para 58.  
78 Ibid. 
79 South African Institute (n 43), 32; J Oloka-Onyango ‘Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of 
Globalization: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and The Struggle for People’s Rights in Africa’ 
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corporations.81 Should it come into operation, the new criminal chambers of the African Court 
would have the potential to hear cases against corporations doing business in Africa, whether 
or not they are also headquartered or incorporated in states that are a party to the African 
Charter.82 
 
In 2015, the African Commission adopted General Comment No. 3 on the Right to Life.83 This 
is the first time that a treaty body mentions the direct responsibility of corporations operating 
an entirely private business without performing state-like activities.84 Paragraph 18 reads:  
 
States must hold to account private individuals and corporations, including private 
military and security companies that are responsible for causing or contributing to 
arbitrary deprivations of life in the State’s territory or jurisdiction. Home States also 
should ensure accountability for any extraterritorial violations of the right to life, 
including those committed or contributed to by their nationals or by businesses 
domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction.85 
 
II.3 The European System 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has also dealt with cases alleging the responsibility of 
the states in relation to activities of corporations.86 Of some relevance to transitional justice is 
the case related to the operations in Colombia of the Swiss multinational company Nestlé. 
Over the last 30 years, almost 3,000 trade unionists have been murdered in Colombia, 
including 13 workers at Nestlé. In 2005, Luciano Romero, a trade unionist and former 
employee at Nestlé factory Cicolac was kidnapped, tortured and murdered by members of a 
                                                
81 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, Annex to the Protocol on Amendments 
to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted 27 June 2014 (Malabo 
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paramilitary group. His murder came after a number of death threats in the context of a long-
standing labour dispute between the trade union Sinaltrainal and Cicolac. Criminal 
proceedings were launched in Colombia resulting in the conviction of the direct perpetrators 
of the murder. In his verdict, the Colombian judge stated that Nestlé’s role in the crime was of 
particular relevance and ordered an investigation to look into the matter in more detail. But 
finally, the Colombian prosecution authorities failed to look into the issue. In 2012, the 
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and Sinaltrainal filed a 
criminal complaint in Switzerland against Nestlé and some of its managers. The complaint 
alleged that Nestlé was complicit in the murder of Luciano Romero, for failing to take 
precautionary measures to prevent the crime. The prosecution rejected the claim and closed 
the proceedings on the basis that the crimes were statute-barred and finally the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court dismissed the case in 2014. Having exhausted all domestic remedies, the 
ECCHR filed a complaint against Switzerland, on behalf of Luciano Romero’s widow, before 
the European Court. In 2015, the Court dismissed this complaint, without giving explanation, 
exhausting all legal avenues in Europe.87  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although they are not a transitional justice mechanism as such, regional human rights courts, 
and in particular the Inter-American Court and the African Commission, have at times 
examined material related to companies when deciding on a state’s violation of human rights 
during times of conflict or repression. These courts are only mandated to establish the 
responsibility of states, but their judgments provide useful elements to understand the role of 
business in contributing to human rights violations during conflict or under the rule of 
authoritarian governments. The jurisprudence of the regional systems usually seeks to describe 
the context in which violations took place and in doing so they also contribute to establishing 
facts related to corporate involvement in human rights abuses. In some cases this may lead to 
further investigations at the national level or to payment of reparations, but at the very least 
this contributes to the establishment of a more truthful and accurate picture of the facts.  
 
Arguably, precedents set by the regional systems may become particularly relevant if a future 
business and human rights treaty is adopted. Although negotiations are still under way, it is 
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likely that such treaty will follow the classic UN treaty model: it will only bind states that have 
ratified it (i.e. it will not directly bind corporations). Possibly, if a UN business and human 
rights treaty is adopted, this will include obligations for the states that ratify it to regulate the 
operations of corporations headquartered in their territory and to investigate business-related 
human rights abuses.88 As such, the jurisprudence being developed by the regional system 
may set precedent for cases that could be adjudicated under a potential future monitoring body 
of the business and human rights treaty.  
 
Despite the theory that human rights systems ought to present an important avenue for victims 
of corporate human rights abuses when domestic remedies have failed, this chapter shows that 
their effectiveness is curtailed by a number of limitations. Proceedings are extremely lengthy, 
as the HRDA case demonstrates: the facts transpired in 2004; the complaint before the African 
Commission was filed in 2010, after a number of unsuccessful attempts in different 
jurisdictions; the Commission took six years to reach the decision and more than one year 
after that to releases the judgement and notify the parties. Now is up to the DRC government 
to pay reparations to victims and reopen an investigation against Anvil. The decisions of the 
regional systems have the potential to recommend national governments to implement 
reparations measures addressing corporate activities. Ultimately, however, the national 
governments have to implement those recommendations. As discussed in this chapter, to date 
they have done so only to a limited extend. Currently, the most effective avenue to seek 
remedy for corporate human rights abuses, including in transitional contexts, is litigation at the 
national level, which the next chapter analyses. 
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III. DOMESTIC CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY  
 
Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have assessed the potential and limitation of international criminal 
tribunals and regional human rights systems to provide remedies in cases of corporate human 
rights abuses. This chapter moves to the analysis of domestic jurisdictions, which currently 
afford the only viable option to directly prosecute corporations for human rights violations and 
provide reparations to victims. Enjoying legal personality under domestic law, corporations 
are subject not only to the national regulations but also to the international obligations 
incorporated into domestic law, among which are those of international human rights law and 
international criminal law.1 This has led to a dynamic development of law - a search for how 
different branches of national law can be adapted to hold business enterprises accountable for 
violations of human rights and international criminal law norms. 2 These types of judicial 
processes are not specifically transitional justice mechanisms, but they have provided, at times, 
the only opportunity for remedies to victims of corporate-related abuses in a transitional 
justice context. The Guiding Principles recognises: 
 
Some operating environments, such as conflict-affected areas, may increase the risks 
of enterprises being complicit in gross human rights abuses committed by other actors 
(security forces, for example). Business enterprises should treat this risk as a legal 
compliance issue, given the expanding web of potential corporate legal liability arising 
from extraterritorial civil claims, and from the incorporation of the provisions of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in jurisdictions that provide for 
corporate criminal responsibility. In addition, corporate directors, officers and 
employees may be subject to individual liability for acts that amount to gross human 
rights abuses.3 
                                                
1 R Bismuth, ‘Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of  International Humanitarian Law 
Sailing Between International and Domestic Legal Orders’ (2009/2010) 38 Denver J Intl L Policy 203, 205. 
2 International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International 
Crime (International Commission of Jurists 16 Sep 2008), vol. 1, 2; PC Zumbasen, ‘Transnational Legal 
Pluralism’ (2010) 10(2) Transnational Legal Theory 141. 
3 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework, annexed to Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
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The integration of international obligations in domestic legal orders has created two channels 
of liability of corporations: criminal and civil. Actually, establishing a strict distinction 
between the two remains a questionable point. In both cases, the liability of the corporations is 
sought for the same violations and stems from similar international obligations and similar 
standards of corporate complicity are used. The enforceability comes directly from 
international norms, through national laws. But while the distinction between civil and 
criminal liability of corporations is blurred from a substantive perspective, the two channels of 
liability are procedurally different and present distinct challenges, which the next session 
seeks to analyse.4     
 
This chapter starts with the analysis of corporate criminal liability in transitional justice 
contexts (Section III.1) and then turns to the issue of civil liability (Section III.2) looking in 
particular at cases under the Unites States’ Alien Tort Statute. Cases are selected on the basis 
of their relevance in transitional justice contexts – in other words, all the cases selected 
concern alleged corporate abuses that occurred in a country in conflict or that was governed by 
a repressive regime. Examples of cases discussed here are the ones against Unocal, Talisman 
Energy, ExxonMobil, and Chiquita, where complicity in gross human rights violations was 
levelled against the corporations in Myanmar, Sudan, Indonesia, and Colombia respectively. 
The South Africa Apartheid Reparation litigation is another key lawsuit discussed in Section 
III.2. This chapter engages in an analysis of the normative, economic and practical obstacles to 
achieving corporate accountability and reparations for victims through domestic litigation in a 
transitional justice context. 
 
III.1 Criminal liability  
 
There are three potential venues at the domestic level for prosecuting companies or executives 
alleged to have committed, or been complicit in, human rights violations or international 
crimes: the ‘host’ state on whose territory the crimes were committed; the ‘home’ state in 
whose territory the executive lives or the corporation is legally domiciled (through the use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction); or any state exercising universal jurisdiction over the crimes 
                                                                                                                                                    
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 
2011) [Guiding Principles], principle 23, commentary. 
4 Bismuth (n 1), 218. 
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considered to be of concern to the entire international community. Proceedings may be 
directed against corporations or against individual corporate officers. 
 
The Prosecution of Corporations 
Corporate criminal liability was common in continental Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries 
and was reflected in great detail, for example, in the French Criminal Code of 1670.5 The 
concept fell into disfavour after the French Revolution however, when corporate-style 
associations were disbanded and individualism dominated. 6 There are two key problems with 
the criminal liability of corporations from a theoretical legal perspective. First, the existence of 
a moral dimension of corporations - and therefore the existence of the mens rea in the 
commission of a criminal act.7 ‘Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to 
be condemned; they therefore do as they like’, said Edward Thurlow, first Baron Thurlow in 
the 18th century.8 It is difficult for some to conceptualise the moral culpability of companies 
and the nature of any punishment they may receive.9 Second, the consideration of corporate 
criminal liability as a form of ‘collective punishment’ and therefore incompatible with 
criminal law. Criminal law has traditionally focused on individual, rather than collective, 
guilt.10 There has been an understandable reluctance to impose on a group what might be seen 
as collective punishment for the wrongdoing of an individual.11 The concern is also that 
sanctioning the corporation could in some cases unjustly hurt its stakeholders (shareholders, 
employees, etc.), who would pay an unjust price for past actions of the corporation. 
Theoretical arguments on the merits of corporate guilt are outside the remit of this research, as 
is a comparative assessment of how the concept of corporate criminality is realized, or not, in 
                                                
5 G Stessens, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective’ (1994) 43 Intl Comp LQ 493, 494. 
6 Ibid. 
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8 Edward, First Baron Thurlow, Oxford Dictionary of Quotation (OUP 1989) 550:32. 
9 AW Altschuller, ‘Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corporations’ (2009) 46 American Criminal L 
Rev 1359; J Clough and C Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (OUP 2002), 4-5; KF Brickey, ‘Corporate 
Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ (1982) 60 Wash Univ LQ 393; VS Khanna, 
‘Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?’ (1996) 109 Harv L Rev 1477, 1479-81; J Hill, 
‘Corporate Criminal Liability in Australia: An Evolving Corporate Governance Technique?’ (2003) J Business L 
3. See also United States v. Sam, 141 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998) reviewing nature of a corporation as separate 
legal entity, capable of suing and of being sued.  
10 M Pieth and R Ivory, Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence, Convergence and Risk, Ius Gentium: 
Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice (Springer 2011), 4. 
11 J Hasnas, ‘The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2009) 46 
American Criminal LR 1329. 
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different jurisdictions.12 What is important is that most countries now permit corporations to 
be prosecuted for criminal offences.13  
 
Today, the principle of corporate criminal liability is typically recognised in common law 
countries, and is increasingly accepted in civil law systems - Australia, Canada, the United 
States, Japan, the United Kingdom and many countries in Europe, led by the Netherlands in 
the 1920s.14  These countries consider that a corporation is an entity that can exercise 
autonomous will, and commit a crime, distinct from the individual intentions of its directors, 
representatives and employees, and therefore can be held criminally accountable. 15 The 
Council of Europe gave additional impetus to this movement in 1988, when it recommended 
that member states adapt their laws to permit corporate criminal prosecutions.16 Across 
jurisdictions, however, different corporate criminal liability laws apply and the field is 
continuing to develop unevenly under different legal orders.17 
 
Importantly from a transitional justice perspective, an increasing number of states have 
incorporated international criminal law into their domestic criminal legislation.18 States parties 
of the Rome Statute have amended their domestic criminal laws to include international 
crimes among those that may be prosecuted in national courts.19 Consequently, there is a basis 
                                                
12 Pieth and Ivory (n 10); Hasnas (n 11); Altschuler (n 9); Fafo, Business and International Crimes. Assessing the 
Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of International Law (Fafo 2005); J Kyriakakis, ‘Corporate 
Criminal Liability and the ICC Statute. The Comparative Law Challenge’ (2006) 56(3) Netherlands Intl LR, 340. 
13 The United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and a number of EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the United Kingdom, 
Luxembourg and Spain, but notably not Germany).  
14 Fafo (n 12); Kyriakakis ‘Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC Statute’ (n 12), 342; International 
Commission of Jurists (n 2), 31–32; H de Doelder and K Tiedemann (eds.), Criminal Liability of Corporations 
(Brill 1996); C Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (OUP 1993); LH Leigh, ‘The Criminal Liability 
of Corporations and Other Groups: A Comparative View’ (1982) 80 Mich L Rev 1508 (1982); Stessens (n 5). 
15 M Krcmnitzer and H Gcnaim, ‘The Criminal Liability of a Corporation’ in A Barak (ed.) Shamgar Rook (Israel 
Bar Association 2003), 33, 67-68; R Slye, ‘Corporations, Veils and International Criminal Liability’ (2008) 33 
Brooklyn J Intl L 955, 960-61; S Beale and A Safwat, ‘What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us about 
American Critique of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2005) 8 Buffalo Criminal L Rev 89, 110-15; M Kremnitzer, 
‘A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law’ (2010) 8(3) J 
Intl Criminal Justice 913. 
16 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R(88)18. Vol. 20:45 20. 
17 International Commission of Jurists (n 2), vol II, 57; Bismuth (n 1), 203. 
18 For example, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South 
Korea, South Africa, UK, and US have introduced legislation that extends domestic legislation on international 
crimes to legal persons. See, Max Planck Institute, National Prosecution of International Crimes 
<www.mpicc.de/ww/en/pub/forschung/forschungsarbeit/strafrecht/nationale_strafverfolgung.htm> (accessed 6 
September 2017).  
19 A Ramasastry and RC Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability 
for Grave Breaches of International Law (Fafo 2006). 
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for finding companies liable for international crimes within most domestic legal systems.20 As 
David Scheffer, the diplomat at the Rome Conference who led the US delegation, underlined: 
‘Rather than witnessing a retreat from corporate liability in international practice since 1998, 
there has been a marked progression towards adoption of corporate criminal liability among 
nations joining the International Criminal Court’.21  
 
Anita Ramasastry and Robert Thompson argue that ‘since most of the countries that have 
incorporated [international criminal law] into their domestic statutes also do not make a 
distinction between natural and legal persons…, these jurisdictions include corporations and 
other legal persons in their web of liability’.22 Arguably, the growing recognition of the 
criminal liability of corporations in national legal orders, added to the domestic incorporation 
of international crimes, can be a vehicle for liability of corporations for violations of 
international criminal law.23  
 
Further, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited ratione personae not only to individuals, but also 
by provisions stipulating that persons covered by the ICC jurisdiction must either be nationals 
of a state party to the Rome Statute, or must have perpetrated their criminal conduct on the 
territory of a state party. Domestic criminal legislation does not include such limitations and 
makes possible, under certain conditions, the prosecution of a legal person of any nationality 
and even for a conduct occurring abroad. 24  Cory Wanless argues that the extended 
jurisdictional basis of domestic laws may ‘fill the impunity gap left by the ICC’s focused 
jurisdictional approach [and] we should expect national courts to cast a wider prosecutorial net 
than the ICC’.25 Prosecutions at the national level may become increasingly possible as more 
                                                
20 A Batesmith, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility for War Crimes and Other Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law: The Impact of the Business and Human Rights Movement’ in C Harvey, J Summers and N 
White (eds.), Contemporary Challenges to the Laws of War: Essays in Honour of Professor Peter Rowe 
(Cambridge University Press 2014), 296. 
21 Ambassador DJ Sheffer, Amicus Curiae in support of the petitioners in Joseph Jesner et al v. Arab Bank, Plc, 
26 June 2017, 19. 
22 Ramasastry and Thompson (n 19), 15.  
23 In addition, some international treaties on financial, economic and transnational crimes require states which are 
party to introduce criminal liability of legal persons into domestic law. See in particular Article 10 of the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which calls for legal persons to be subject to civil, 
administrative or criminal sanctions. 
24 Bismuth (n 1), 219- 22 
25 WC Wanless, ‘Corporate Liability for International Crimes under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act’ (2009) 7(1) JICJ, 201, 205-06. Ruggie also observed, in 2008, an ‘expanding web of potential 
corporate liability for international crimes.’ Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Issue of 
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states incorporate all or some aspects of gross human rights abuses amounting to crimes under 
international law into their domestic laws.26  
 
While prosecution in the ‘host’ state where the abuses have been committed is in theory the 
most effective -  as victims, evidence and witnesses are located there - in a transitional justice 
context the reality of most countries emerging from conflict or repression makes it difficult to 
pursue. Indeed, the majority of cases dealing with the responsibility of companies for human 
rights violations have been litigated in a different country from the place where the violations 
have occurred, usually invoking the home state’s use of its extraterritorial jurisdiction. An 
obligation relying on the home state, however, requires an extraterritorial application of the 
international instrument containing such obligation, which is not yet a settled debate in 
international law. There is an immense body of national, regional and international 
frameworks and case law, decisions of UN Committees, and scholarship regarding the 
applicability of human rights beyond borders.27 Several international bodies have also been 
encouraging states to take extraterritorial measures to exercise control over the overseas 
activities of companies registered in their territories.28 For example, the Committee on 
                                                                                                                                                    
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, respect and remedy: A 
framework for business and human rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, 20. 
26 International Commission of Jurists (n 2), vol II, 8. 
27 eg, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 14: The right to the 
highest attainable standard of health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, para 39 (11 August 2000); General Comment 15 on 
the right to water, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/1 para 31 (January 2003); Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, General Comment 16 on State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector on children’s rights, 
UN Doc. CRC/C/ GC/16, paras 43 and 44 (April 2013); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, General Recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 para 
36 (December 2010). See also, SL Seck, ‘Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of 
Global Mining’ (2008) 11 Yale Hum Rts Dev LJ 177; W Vandenhole, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation to Cooperate Internationally for Development’ (2009) 17 Intl J Children 
Rts 23 (2009); R McCorquodale and P Simons, ‘Responsibility beyond borders: State responsibility for 
extraterritorial violations by corporations of international human rights law’ (2007) 70 Modern L Rev 618; DM 
Chirwa, ‘The Doctrine Of State Responsibility As a Potential Means of Holding Private Actors Accountable for 
Human Rights’ (2004) 5 Melb J Intl L 1, 4-5, 36. 
28 For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirms that states parties should, 
prevent third parties from violating the rights protected under the Covenant in other countries, if they are able to 
influence these third parties. CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (2000), The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (article 12 of the Covenant), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 39, General Comment No. 
15 (2003), The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), E/C.12/2002/11, 20 Jan 2003, para 33 which 
reads: ‘Steps should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the 
right to water of individuals and communities in other countries.’ In regard to corporations, the Committee has 
stated that States parties should ‘take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations that 
have their main seat under their jurisdiction’, CESCR, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties regarding 
the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination has also called upon States to regulate the extraterritorial actions of third parties registered in their 
territory. For example, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has repeatedly emphasized that states parties ‘are 
required to take the necessary steps to prevent human rights violations abroad by corporations 
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction’.29 Victims of corporate human rights abuses 
have increasingly turned to courts using extraterritorial criminal or civil jurisdiction to hold 
companies responsible for such abuses accountable and to seek remedies and reparations.30  At 
times the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction is presented as a ‘magic potion’ to address the 
challenges of corporate accountability, and in particular in its use of transnational civil 
litigation. 31   
 
The use of extraterritorial jurisdiction for corporate criminal liability is important in a post-
conflict transitional context as victims in the host country may be unable to seek redress, the 
courts may be unable or ill-equipped to handle their cases or the host government may not 
pursue enforcement against the perpetrators.32 But extraterritorial application of these pieces 
of domestic criminal legislation varies from country to country, and some national judicial 
systems do not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by their companies in other 
countries.33  This often means impunity for companies when they are involved in criminal 
activity abroad and lack of reparations for victims. Amnesty International and the International 
Corporate Accountability Roundtable have documented over 20 examples where authorities 
                                                                                                                                                    
Canada, CERD/C/CAN/CO/18, 25 May 2007, para. 17; CERD/C/CAN/CO/19-20, 9 March 2012, para. 14; 
CERD/C/GBR/CO/18-20, 14 Sep. 2011, para. 29. The first example of the affirmation by an international body 
encouraging states to ensure that companies registered on their territories do not violate, while operating overseas, 
human rights contained in the UDHR is a 1970 resolution by the Security Council. In relation of the South 
African occupation of Namibia, the resolution called ‘upon all states to discourage their nationals or companies 
of their nationalities not under direct governmental control from investing or obtaining concessions in Namibia…’ 
UN SC Res 283, 29 July 1970 Situation in Namibia para. 7. In 1972, in the context of the strike of African 
contract workers, the Security Council adopted a resolution in which it called ‘upon all states whose nationals and 
corporations are operating in Namibia… to use all available means to ensure that such nationals and corporations 
conform in their policies of hiring Namibian workers, to the basic provisions of the UDHR.’ UN SC Res 310, 4 
Feb 1972, Situation in Namibia, para. 5. Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 301 (1972), S/10752, 31 July 1972, p. 14. 
29 CESCR, Statement on the obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and 
cultural rights, E/C.12/2011/1, paras. 5-6; General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities E/C.12/GC/2, 23 June 
2017, paras 25-28. 
30 IPIS, The Adverse Human Rights Risks and Impacts of European Companies: Getting a glimpse of the pictures 
(2014). 
31 B Stephens,  Corporate Accountability: International Human Rights Litigation against Corporations in US 
Courts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008); PI Blumberg, ‘Asserting Human Rights against Multinational 
Corporations under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems’ (2002) 50 American J Comp L 493. 
32 A Ramasastry, ‘Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon. An Examination of Forced Labor Cases 
and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations’ (2002) 20 Berkeley J Intl L 91, 92.  
33 W Kaleck and M Saage-Maab, ‘Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to 
International Crimes’ (2010) 8 J Intl Criminal Justice 699, 714- 15. 
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have not prosecuted multinational companies, despite being provided with evidence of illegal 
conduct linked to serious human rights abuses in other countries.34 Many of the documented 
cases implicate Western companies in serious human rights abuses in fragile or war-torn areas. 
For example, as discussed in Chapter II, no national government did an adequate investigation 
into the involvement of Australian-Canadian Anvil Mining in the DRC’s Kilwa massacre.35  
 
Some criminal complaints against companies have, however, been filed on the basis of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In particular, French authorities have opened investigations into at 
least four cases involving French companies accused of complicity of torture with Gaddafi’s 
regime in Libya and Assad’s in Syria. These cases are all at an initial stage and no corporation 
has been charged yet. Thus, while an assessment of the success of the cases from a victim 
point of view is not yet possible, the mere starting of the proceedings are significant. ‘As the 
notion of corporate criminal liability for international crimes is still at its infancy in 
international law’ Nadia Bernaz argues, ‘these domestic cases are of paramount importance’36 
in the area of corporate accountability and remedy.  
 
The first of such complaints was filed in 2011 against Amesys, a French company subsidiary 
of the Bull group.37 The complaint alleged that in 2007 Amesys had entered into an agreement 
with the Libyan government to provide and assist with the development of a communication 
surveillance network, which the authorities used to intercept private Internet communications 
and to identify opponents of Gaddafi - then detained and tortured. FIDH and the Ligue 
française des droits de l’Homme, two NGOs, lodged the complaint in France on the basis of 
the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, alleging the complicity of Amesys and its executive 
managers in acts of torture. The application of the UN Convention against Torture, and the 
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction enshrined therein, gives French judges jurisdiction over 
crimes committed outside of France, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the 
victim.38 In this instance, however, the fact that Amesys had its headquarters in France at the 
time that the alleged crimes were perpetrated was enough to give the French courts jurisdiction 
                                                
34 Amnesty International and International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, ‘Corporate Human Rights 
Principles’, 2016 <http://www.commercecrimehumanrights.org/> (accessed 7 September 2017).   
35 See Chapter II.2. 
36 N Bernaz, ‘Complicty of War Crimes: Criminal Complaint against a French Technology Company’ 30 June 
2016 <http://rightsasusual.com/?p=1057> (accessed 7 September 2017).  
37 FIDH, The Amesys Case (FIDH 2013).  
38 Article 7 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, ratified by 
France on 18 February 1986.  
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over acts of torture committed outside France where the main perpetrators were non-French 
nationals - namely, agents of the Libyan state.39 The opening of a criminal investigation was 
met with opposition from the Prosecutor of the Paris Tribunal, who asked that the case be 
closed. In 2013, the Criminal Investigations Tribunal of the Paris Appeals Court denied the 
Prosecutor’s request, thus confirming the opening of an investigation.40 The case in on-going.  
 
A second similar complaint was filed in 2012 by two NGOs, which urged the French courts to 
investigate the complicity of French companies in human rights violations in Syria. The 
complaint alleged that Qosmos, a French software company, provided the Bashar El-Assad 
government with surveillance equipment, which was used to monitor and target dissidents 
later arrested and tortured.41 Like in the Amesys case, the French courts asserted their 
jurisdiction based on Qosmos’s being headquartered in France. In April 2015, the investigative 
judge declared Qosmos an ‘assisted witness’, which means that there was evidence showing it 
was plausible that the company could have taken part in the commission of the offences.42  
This case is also on-going.  
    
The complaint against French company Exxelia Technologies, an electronic manufacturer, is 
the third of its kind in France. In June 2016, a Palestinian family, with the support of Action 
Des Chrétiens Pour L’abolition De La Torture (ACAT) and represented by the law firm 
Ancile-avocats, filed a criminal complaint against Exxelia.43 They claim that the company is 
guilty of manslaughter and possibly complicit in a war crime. In July 2014, a missile, probably 
dropped from a drone, landed on the Palestinian family house’s roof where several children 
were feeding birds. A little girl and two boys were killed in the attack. Two other children 
were severely injured. As the house was not a legitimate military target, the attack may 
constitute a war crime. A component with the mark ‘Eurofarad France’ was found in the 
debris. Experts have since determined that it is an effect sensor made by Exxelia. The core of 
the complaint is that the company sold the component to the Israeli government with 
                                                
39 FIDH, The Amesys Case (n 37).  
40 Ibid. 
41 FIDH, ‘France: Opening of a judicial investigation targeting Qosmos for complicity in acts of torture in Syria’, 
4 November 2014.  
42 FIDH, ‘Designation of Qosmos as “assisted witness” constitutes an important step forward in case underway’, 
20 April 2015. 
43 Middle East Monitor, ‘Palestinian family sues French technology company for complicity in war crimes’ 30 
June 2016.  
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knowledge that it would be part of a missile and that it was susceptible to be used to commit a 
war crime.  Exxelia has not been charged yet. 
 
Finally, in November 2016, Sherpa and the European Center for Constitutional and Human 
Rights, two NGOs, filed a criminal complaint against French-Swiss company LafargeHolcim, 
the world’s largest cement producer, accusing the company of complicity in war crimes in 
Syria. At issue is the activity of Lafarge before merging with Holcim, in 2015. In 2010, 
Lafarge had built a cement factory of 240 workers near Kobane, a northern Syria town. 
Operations there continued until 2014, long after the violence began in 2011. While fighting 
among Syrian rebels, the Syrian army and the terrorist group Islamic State (IS) drove other 
foreign companies out of the country, the plant operated by Lafarge was ‘curiously’ able to 
operate from its opening in 2010 through to 2014.44 The criminal complaint alleged that 
Lafarge paid, via third parties, local armed groups, including IS, to keep the plant open, 
despite sanctions by the UN on the terrorist group.45 France’s economy ministry also filed a 
complaint with prosecutors over possible violations of international sanctions. 46  Legal 
proceedings in this case too are on-going.  
 
France is not alone in attempting the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute companies 
for crimes under international law. For example, in the Netherlands, a criminal case was filed 
against Riwal Group, a Dutch company that rents out construction equipment, concerning its 
involvement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). In 2006, Riwal rented mobile cranes 
and aerial platforms for use in construction of the Wall around West Bank villages in the OPT. 
A criminal complaint was submitted to the Dutch public prosecutor alleging that Riwal was 
complicit in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the 
construction of the Wall and illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank. Riwal was also 
accused of complicity in the crimes of persecution and apartheid, and of being responsible for 
acts that were part of widespread and systematic violations of international law committed by 
Israel against civilian population. The International Crimes Act in the Netherlands prohibits 
the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by Dutch nationals, including 
                                                
44 EECHR, ‘Case Report. Lafarge in Syria: accusation of complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity’, 
November 2016.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.; The New York Times, ‘Lafarge scandal points to difficulty in business in war zone’ 4 April 2017.   
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companies.47 Acts that amount to complicity in crimes, such as the facilitation or the aiding or 
abetting of crimes are also criminalized. In 2013, after three years of investigations, the Dutch 
Public Prosecutor dismissed the case - Riwal’s contribution against the entire settlement 
enterprise including the Wall was deemed as minor.48 The Dutch prosecutor was not able to 
obtain the necessary evidence for a conviction, much of which was located in the OPT and 
Israel, as their collection required cooperation from the relevant authorities.49  
 
Despite the dismissal of the case, company executives came under legal and political scrutiny. 
The publicity and public pressure surrounding the case meant that Riwal took steps to 
disassociate itself from its subsidiary and its operations in the OPT.50  Similarly, in March 
2017, after an internal independent inquiry into possible dealings with armed groups, the 
LafargeHolcim board said the investigation had found that measures taken by staff had been 
‘unacceptable’ and described ‘significant errors of judgment’.51 In response to the criminal 
complaint coupled with mounting pressure in the press, LafargeHolcim conducted an internal 
investigation and in March 2017 issued a statement accepting that it had indirectly funded 
illegal armed groups in Syria in order to continue its operations there and allow safe passage 
for staff.52  In April, the company announced that its chief executive, Eric Olsen, would 
resign.53 
 
Universal Jurisdiction  
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, any state has the authority to investigate, 
prosecute and punish certain serious crimes under international law, regardless of the location 
in which crimes are committed and the nationality of perpetrators or victims of crimes. 54 In 
the absence of any connection to the prosecuting state, universal jurisdiction is asserted over 
                                                
47 International Crimes Act 2003, article 2(2). See also, International Commission of Jurists, Access to Justice: 
Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations. The Netherlands (ICJ 2010), 7. 
48 International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity in International Crime (n 2).   
49 Ibid.  
50 Al-Haq, ‘Prosecutor dismisses war crimes against Riwal’ 14 May 2013. 
51 The Economist, ‘A giant cemenet firmmay have unwittingly funded Islamic State’ 29 April 2017.  
52  LafargeHolcim, ‘Lafarge responds to Syria Review’ 3 February 2017   
<http://www.lafargeholcim.com/LafargeHolcim-responds-syria-review> (accessed 7 September 2017).  
53 Ibid. 
54 International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant Case (Congo v. Belgium), Case No. 121, 14 February 2002. See 
also, A Addis, ‘Imagining the International Community: The Constitutive Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction’ 
(2009) 31 HRQ 129; J Zerk, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights Sphere 
From Six Regulatory Areas’, Working Paper 59 of the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, June 2010. 
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‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community’.55 The source of this 
jurisdiction lies in the nature of the crimes, so serious that is universally condemned, and the 
international community as a whole is said to be concerned. In such instances, no connection 
is needed between the prosecuting state and the perpetrator. These crimes include war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, enforced disappearance, slavery genocide, and torture. Several 
international conventions provide for universal jurisdiction.56 National legislation enabling the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction for international crimes exists in a number of both common 
and civil law countries, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom.57  
 
The principle of universal jurisdiction creates a possibility for victims of serious violations of 
human rights or international crimes committed by companies to lodge a complaint in any 
state invested with such jurisdiction. In 2001, William Schabas argued that possibly the 
lacunae related to the liability of corporations under international criminal law may be 
partially corrected by national legal systems exercising universal jurisdiction: ‘those that allow 
for corporate criminal liability will be in a position to prosecute, as they would prosecute 
individuals’.58 While there are no conceptual obstacles to the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
to prosecute corporations involved in serious international crimes, to date only one case has 
been pursued.  
 
In 2002, four Myanmar refugees in Belgium filed a lawsuit in Brussels against Total, the 
chairman and the former director of Total’s Myanmar operations over human rights abuses 
linked to the operation of the Yadana pipeline.59 The Myanmar refugees brought the lawsuit 
pursuant to a 1993 Belgian law on universal jurisdiction. This case was the first to be brought 
under this law against a company rather than an individual. The plaintiffs alleged that Total 
and its managers were complicit in crimes against humanity, such as torture and forced labour, 
                                                
55 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble,. For a list of examples of domestic prosecutions 
using universal jurisdiction, see J Rikhof, ‘Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes 
Prosecutions on International Impunity’ (2009) 20 Criminal L Forum 1. 
56 For example, the four Geneva Conventions, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment, and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons against Enforced 
Disappearances. 
57 International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity in International Crime (n 2), vol II, 53. 
58 W Schabas, ‘Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices’ (2001) 83(842) RICR 439, 
454. 
59 Actions Birmanie, ‘Civil action for Crimes against humanity and complicity in Crimes against humanity 
committed in Burma (Myanmar) lodged on 25 April 2002 in the Brussels magistrates court against X, the 
company Totalfinaelf S.A., Thierry Desmarest and Herve Madeo, (2007). 
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committed by the Myanmar military junta in the course of the construction and operation of 
the pipeline. The plaintiffs alleged that Total provided moral and financial support to the 
Myanmar military government with knowledge that its support resulted in human rights 
abuses. A procedural issue arose as to whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit 
under the law of universal jurisdiction because they were not Belgian citizens. Following a 
number of procedural hurdles, the case was closed in 2008, without the merits of the 
allegations being addressed.60  Total is the only example of attempt to using universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute companies for crimes under international law. 
 
The criminal prosecution of corporations for crimes under international law is an avenue, still 
at an early stage of development, that could potentially become more relevant for victims. If 
the cases opened in France are successful the judgements may provide important precedents 
and standards that may be replicated in other countries, especially in other European countries 
with similar criminal provisions. At the moment though, no corporation on its own right has 
been yet found criminally responsible by a national court for crimes under international law.      
 
The Prosecution of Businesspeople 
In addition to corporations, individual businesspeople have also been prosecuted over 
allegations to have committed, or been complicit in, crimes under international criminal law 
both at ‘home’ and abroad.61 For example, Frans van Anraat is a Dutch businessman who was 
accused of complicity in war crimes and genocide for having sold chemicals used in the 
fabrication of mustard gas, with knowledge of what the chemicals would be used for, to the 
Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein’s rule. The gas, made with the chemicals that Van 
Anraat sold, was later used in the massacres of Kurdish minorities in the Kurdish-Iraqi town of 
Halabja and in Iran in 1988 in the context of the Iran-Iraq war.62 In 2005, the District Court of 
The Hague found van Anraat guilty for aiding and abetting war crimes and sentenced him to 
                                                
60 For a summary of the case see Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Total lawsuit in Belgium (re 
Myanmar) <http://business-humanrights.org/en/total-lawsuit-in-belgium-re-myanmar> (accessed 7 September 
2017).  
61 International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity in International Crime (n 2), vol II, 53. Kaleck and 
Saage-Maab (n 33), 716; W Huisman and E van Sliedregt, ‘Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, International 
Crimes and Corporate Complicity’ (2010) 8 J Intl Criminal Justice 803; Kremnitzer (n 15), 911; H Vest, 
‘Business leaders and the modes of individual criminal responsibility under intl law’ (2010) 8 J Intl Criminal 
Justice, 851, 853; Wells (n 14); TL van Ho, ‘Transnational Civil and Criminal Litigation’ in S Michalowski (ed.), 
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15 years in prison, a sentence that was increased to 17 years by the Appeals Court in 2007.63 
The court found that he was aware that his product could be used for producing poison gas and 
that there was a reasonable chance it would be used for chemical attacks. The court found that 
Van Anraat ‘consciously and solely acting in pursuit of gain, has made an essential 
contribution to the chemical warfare program of Iraq…which enabled, or at least facilitated, a 
great number of attacks with mustard gas on defenceless civilians’.64  
 
The Dutch Supreme Court upheld Van Anraat’s conviction for being an accessory to war 
crimes.65 It found that the accused knew that the chemicals he was supplying to the Hussein 
regime were being used for the production of poisonous gas and, in the context of a 
longstanding war in which this gas was being used in the attacks, Van Anraat’s conduct 
constituted ‘deliberate contribution’ to the offences. In other words, he was found to have 
provided the opportunity and the means for the gas attacks.66 He was, however, acquitted from 
the charges of complicity in genocide because there was insufficient evidence that he had 
known of the Iraqi regime’s genocide intent towards the Kurdish minorities.67  
 
Guus Kouwenhoven is another Dutch businessman accused of complicity in war crimes. 
Kouwenhoven was the director of Firestone and Oriental and Royal Timber, two major timber 
companies in Liberia, and it was alleged that he supplied the former President of Liberia 
Charles Taylor’s forces with weapons and illegally traded in timber to finance Taylor’s 
conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.68 Oriental Timber gained trading concessions from 
Taylor at a time when conflict between rival militia spilled over to Sierra Leone.69 The Dutch 
prosecution indicted Kouwenhoven with aiding and abetting war crimes committed by 
Liberian militias and with the violation of an UN arms embargo. According to the prosecution: 
‘the militias hired by the former timber companies belonging to this Dutchman, are accused of 
participating in the massacre of civilians…Guus Kouwenhoven is accused of having supplied 
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the arms to the militias to enable them to carry out these crimes’.70  
 
In 2006, Kouwenhoven was acquitted by the District Court of The Hague of the complicity in 
war crimes charges due to lack of evidence, but convicted for illegal arms supplies to Taylor.71 
The conviction was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which acquitted Kouwenhoven of all 
charges.72 In 2010, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Appeal Court and ordered 
a re-trial.73 In April 2017, the Appeal Court convicted Kouwenhoven as an accessory of war 
crimes and arms trafficking and sentenced him to 19 years in prison. Global Witness, a 
campaign group that gathered evidence against Oriental Timber cited by the Dutch 
prosecutors, said that the case is ‘the first war crimes conviction for a businessman profiting 
from conflict resources’. 74  The court found that shipments for Kouwenhoven’s timber 
operation in Liberia carried caches of hidden weapons, used by Taylor in an armed conflict 
with rebels where ‘countless civilians’ died.75  Kouwenhoven’s conviction, the Dutch judges 
said in a written summary of their ruling, will serve as an example to others that do business 
with repressive governments ‘that they can thereby become involved in serious war crimes’.76 
Both cases were centred on theories of indirect perpetration as a mechanism to establish 
criminal responsibility and were able to proceed with the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
     
The cases discussed above involve the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute 
corporations in their home state for crimes allegedly committed abroad. Argentina offers a rare 
example of a country that after the transition has used its national laws to prosecute 
businesspeople responsible for human rights violations. A number of criminal prosecutions in 
Argentina have been directed against businessmen for their role in the abuses committed by 
the military junta between 1976 and 1983. Organized labour was one of the main targets of the 
repression. The report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons 
(Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas - CONADEP) found that almost half 
of the disappeared were part of the country’s organized labour force.77 For example, the 
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majority of the 5,000 detainees at Campo de Mayo, the country’s biggest prison, most of who 
were later executed, had been active in the labour movement. About a hundred unionists and 
dozens of the work council members of car manufacturers Ford and Mercedes-Benz were 
detained there.78  
 
Since the fall of the military junta in 1983, Argentina has been an innovator of transitional 
justice mechanisms. In December 1983, it established CONADEP, considered the first truth 
commission, and was the first country to convict a head of state for human rights violations in 
the contemporary era. With the repeal in 2003 of its amnesty laws, the Supreme Court 
reopened the possibility of human rights litigation in Argentina for abuses committed during 
the dictatorship. Now Argentinian prosecutors are also taking innovative steps to address the 
responsibility of company and individual businessmen.79 The theme of the yearly march in 
Buenos Aires on the 24 March 2012 anniversary of the military coup was the connection of 
‘economic groups’ to the coup d’état and the regime it installed. At the end of the event, on 
the stage where the final speeches were broadcast, a screen projected the names of companies 
allegedly complicit in the dictatorship. Investigations of such complicity, and in particular of 
the role of banks in financing the military junta, took off in the aftermath of the march.80 ‘The 
quest to end impunity in Argentina continues with renewed fervour…motivated by a 
widespread sense that justice has not yet been achieved’, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Veerle 
Opgenhaffenv write.81 
 
In 2006, three decades after the coup of 1976, a paper by historian Victoria Basualdo 
addressing corporate complicity shed light on the role played by business leaders during the 
dictatorship.82 Its publication opened the door to investigations to explore the issue further. In 
2015, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights published an exhaustive study that 
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investigated ‘business responsibility in crimes against humanity’.83 The investigation analysed 
25 companies across different sectors, including FIAT, Ford Motor, and Mercedes-Benz. The 
report found that in the majority of cases, directors and managers had played an active role in 
the arrest, kidnapping, torture and enforced disappearances of 900 workers.84 Even more 
common was the vast deployment of military and security forces on factory grounds; some 
corporate officials explicitly sought this military intervention and provided logistical or 
financial support.85 The report indicates the installation of clandestine detention and torture 
centres on company premises as the ‘most extreme manifestation of the widespread 
militarization of factories during the dictatorship’.86 
 
Criminal prosecutions against corporate officers followed.87 An emblematic case involves the 
trial of the corporate leaders of the Ledesma sugar mill, accused of cooperating with the death 
squads that abducted dozens of people in Jujuy in the mid 1970s. In 2012, the Federal Court in 
Jujuy prosecuted the director of Ledesma, Pedro Blaquier, and former manager Alberto Lemos, 
over complicity in arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances. The prosecution related to 
their suspected involvement in the so-called noche de apagón (night of the blackout). 
Allegedly, on the night of 21st July 1976, with technical assistance from Ledesma, electrical 
power was cut off in the entire municipality. Using military and company vehicles, members 
of the military arrested about 400 people, mainly unionists and employees of Ledesma – 55 
people are still disappeared.88 A raid of the company revealed intelligence reports compiled 
for Ledesma on trade unionists, who subsequently disappeared. 89  In addition, Ledesma 
allegedly allowed the armed forces to set up a clandestine detention centre, Escuadrón 20, on 
its grounds. In 2015, the Federal Court dismissed the charges against Blaquier and Lemos 
concluding that there was no evidence of the involvement of the two directors in the crimes.90 
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In 2013, an Appeals Court confirmed the charges for crimes against humanity against Pedro 
Muller, Guillermo Galarraga, and Hector Francisco Jesus Sibilla, three former executives of 
Ford Motor Argentina. 91   The criminal complaint filed against them alleged that they 
conspired with the regime in political repression, abductions and mistreatment of Ford’s 
workers and union organisers. The public prosecutor charged that the military operated a 
detention centre within Ford’s factory complex in Buenos Aires and that company officials 
gave names, ID numbers, pictures and home addresses to security forces who arrested 25 
Ford’s trade union leaders, and illegally detained and tortured them.  
 
A similar lawsuit against the manager of Mercedes-Benz involves the company’s creation of a 
‘blacklist’ of workers who were subsequently kidnapped.92 The case concerned 16 union 
activists working at the Mercedes-Benz plant in Buenos Aires, who were arrested by the 
military police in 1976 and disappeared. Journalist Gaby Weber, who investigated the case, 
described her motivation: ‘I wanted to research where the real power was concentrated. And 
this is not the military and its retired generals…I was looking for a German company…that 
had a skeleton in the cupboard’.93  
 
Based on her research, in 1999 a criminal complaint was filed in Germany against Juan 
Tasselkraut, a senior manager at Mercedes-Benz Argentina. It was alleged that he facilitated 
the arrest, torture and disappearance of a union worker by giving military personnel access to 
him in the workplace and by passing on the private addresses of other workers. In 2003, the 
public prosecution discontinued these proceedings for insufficient evidence, as the murder of 
the unionist was not proved.94 Because the case was filed before the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute, crimes against humanity, including enforced disappearance, did not constitute a 
crime in German law, thus the charges were of only of murder. In addition, because German 
law does not provide for corporate liability, the case was filed only against the manager of 
Mercedes-Benz.95  
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Cases targeting businesspeople, either under the national law of the country where they 
committed abuses or through the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction are an important remedy 
for victims of violations. Individual liability should be seen as complementary to corporate 
liability: even if the liability of individuals associated with the company such as directors or 
managers is established, this does not preclude corporate criminal liability.96 While under 
certain circumstances and depending on the underlying sentencing purposes, targeting 
individual businessmen may be an effective option, to a prosecutor both avenues of criminal 
prosecution should be left open.  
 
Despite being conceptually possible, however, the criminal prosecution of corporations at the 
domestic level for violations under international human rights law or crimes under 
international criminal law still represent the exception and have been largely unsuccessful. 
The recent ‘French cases’ against Amesys, Qosmos and LafargeHolcim, described above, 
represent an interesting development, but they are all still pending and their outcome remains 
unclear. Another possible venue to provide accountability for corporate violations in the 
context of transitional justice lies in an expansion of domestic civil liability, which the next 
section examines.  
 
III.2 Civil Litigation 
 
Under domestic civil liability law, a company may be held responsible and be required to pay 
compensatory or punitive damages to an aggrieved party if found guilty of violation of a civil 
law, tort, or breach of contract.97 Although the law of civil remedies does not use the 
terminology of human rights law, in all jurisdictions it protects ‘interests’ such as life, liberty, 
dignity, physical and mental integrity, and property. In countries that do not recognise the 
criminal liability of corporations the law of civil remedies provides victims with their only 
domestic venue to seek corporate accountability. Civil liability is an important means of 
assuring legal accountability when a company is complicit in gross human rights abuses.98 
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Civil liability gives more latitude than criminal liability for several reasons. First, compared to 
criminal prosecution, establishing a tortious act requires a lower burden of proof, and proving 
both liability and causation in a tortious suit may be easier than attributing criminal liability 
and causation.99 Second, victims do not have to wait for the decision of a state prosecutor for 
the case to commence. Third, across jurisdictions, there are similar principles of civil liability 
for companies - the law of civil remedies always has the ability to deal with the conduct of 
companies, as well as of individuals and state authorities. 100  
 
There are, however, some important drawbacks too. Ratione temporis, civil liability is 
generally restricted in time and does not benefit from the absence of statutes of limitations 
attaching to the commission of international crimes in domestic criminal law, which is 
important considering the frequent long time lapses between the perpetration of the crimes and 
the moment when victims are able to seek remedy.101 Further, in criminal liability, the impact 
on the reputation of the corporation is arguably more serious, which may make future 
deterrence more likely.102 In addition, the negligent or intentional conduct of the company 
involved in human rights abuses is not necessarily assessed against the standards of 
international human rights law and international criminal law. Arguably, when non-criminal 
liability is imposed for serious crimes, this may put the severity of the crime and the 
importance of the protected value in doubt.103  
 
Extraterritorial civil liability has provided an important avenue in a post-conflict transitional 
context where victims often face obstacles to access to justice in the country where the harm 
was inflicted. 104 Tort claims against the parent corporation of a multinational group brought in 
civil courts of the home state test the extraterritorial limits of civil litigation rules.105 This is a 
practice sometimes referred as ‘foreign direct liability’ - a term intended to reflect the flip side 
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of foreign direct investment. 106 The United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Canada, among others, have examined civil claims against companies for complicity in human 
rights violations committed in other countries in times of conflict or repression. While 
jurisdictions outside the United States have been used,107 the literature and practice on 
transnational civil claims has principally focused on US law.108 In particular, a great deal of 
attention has been paid to high-profile litigation against multinational corporations under the 
US Alien Tort Statute (ATS), also called Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 109 the largest body 
of domestic jurisprudence regarding corporate responsibility for violations of international law. 
The next sections discuss ATS cases most relevant in transitional justice contexts.  
 
The Alien Tort Statute 
Enacted in 1789, the ATS reads as follows: ‘The District Courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States’.110 In other words, it allows US courts to adjudicate 
civil actions involving breaches of international law.111 Originally, the ATS was intended to 
protect against ‘violation of safe conducts, infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy’ and the statute remained dormant for almost two centuries. In 1980, it was revived 
when it was successfully invoked in a claim on behalf of two Paraguayan nationals against a 
former Paraguayan police officer, based in New York at the time of the case, for having 
tortured to death a member of their family in Paraguay.112 Although the ATS makes no 
reference to human rights, the claim led to the landmark decision Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
which enabled victims of certain international human rights abuses to bring civil actions in US 
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federal courts.113 Access to judicial remedies in Paraguay had been denied by the dictatorship 
of General Alfredo Stroessner, and the ATS made it possible for victims to find a form of 
justice.  
 
Following the Filartiga decision, a wave of human rights cases was filed under the ATS, and 
beginning in the 1990s, human rights advocates began to use the law against corporations for a 
wide range of activities, including complicity in torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced 
disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and forced labour committed during times of conflict or 
repression.114 Indeed, before the round of cases in US courts, no corporation had ever been 
charged with or convicted for an international crime.115 Occasional suggestions to the contrary 
by human rights scholars are mistaken.116 The following sections analyses tort actions under 
the ATS that have pursued compensation from corporations accused of complicity in abuses of 
regimes in Myanmar, Sudan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, for their profits from the 
Holocaust and its victims, and for their involvement in the Apartheid regime.117  
 
Unocal (re Myanmar) 
In Doe v. Unocal, the first ATS case brought against a corporation in 1996, a group of 
Myanmar nationals alleged that US-based Unocal (since bought by Chevron), aided and 
abetted the Myanmar military in the commission of human rights abuses such as forced labour, 
murder, rape and torture during the construction of a gas pipeline that runs across Myanmar 
into Thailand.118 Unocal and Myanmar’s military government were in a consortium for the 
pipeline’s construction. The same charges were brought against the French oil company Total, 
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the actual operating company of the joint venture with Unocal, but they were dismissed 
because Total lacked a sufficient business presence in the United States for US courts to 
exercise jurisdiction. The trial court held that there was no evidence that the company desired 
the military’s violation, and as a result, Unocal could not be held liable. The court held that in 
order to be liable, Unocal must have taken active steps in cooperating or participating in 
forced labour activities. Mere knowledge that someone else might commit abuses was not 
sufficient.119 
 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, setting a precedent by agreeing to hear 
cases whereby corporations are charged for human rights violations committed abroad. The 
court noted that for certain violations of international law private actors might be liable absent 
state action.120 In relation to whether the ATS applies to corporations (ratione personae), it 
was established in Karadzic that some violations of the law of nations, including war crimes 
and violations of international humanitarian law, could be committed by non-state actors.121 
Citing the Karadzic decision, the court observed that participation in the slave trade ‘violates 
the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as 
private individuals’.122 Just prior to a hearing by the court of appeals in 2004, the parties 
reached an out-of-court settlement, in which Unocal denied any complicity, but agreed to 
compensate the plaintiffs and provide funds for programmes in Myanmar to improve living 
conditions and protect the rights of people from the pipeline region - the exact terms of the 
settlement are confidential.123  
 
Unocal is to this day the only decision under the ATS that regarded it as sufficient that the 
corporations should have been aware of the consequences of its acts. Relying on the 
Furundzija decision of the ICTY, the court set the mens rea standard to be one of ‘actual or 
constructive (i.e. “reasonable”) knowledge that [the accomplice’s] actions will assist the 
perpetrator in the commission of the crime”’.124  Applying this to the facts of the case, the 
court regarded it as sufficient that ‘Unocal knew or should reasonably have known that its 
conduct – including the payments and the instructions where to provide security and build 
                                                
119 Ramasastry, ‘Corporate Complicity’ (n 32), 130-39. 
120 Unocal (n 114). 
121 Kadić v. Karadzić (111). 
122 Ibid., 891. 
123 Unocal (n 114). 
124 Unocal (n 117), 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), 950 (quoting Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para 245). 
 
 
 99 
infrastructure – would assist or encourage the Myanmar Military to subject the Plaintiffs to 
forced labour’.125  
 
Talisman Energy (re Sudan) 
The extension of the ATS to corporations, expressly acknowledged in Unocal, was then 
explained in greater detail in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy where the 
court considered that ‘corporations may also be held liable under international law, at least for 
gross human rights violations’.126 Canadian oil producer Talisman was sued for supporting the 
Sudanese military during civil war. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sudanese government was 
engaged in an armed campaign of ethnic cleansing against the non-Muslim Sudanese, which 
included massive displacement, extrajudicial killing, torture and rape. They alleged that 
Talisman was complicit in such crimes against people living in the area of Talisman’s oil 
concession and that these abuses amounted to genocide. The case was dismissed because of 
insufficient admissible evidence and later the court of appeals found that to determine liability 
under the ATS the plaintiffs must have shown that the defendant ‘purposefully’ aided and 
abetted a violation of international law.127  
 
Ingrid Gubbay criticizes the ‘purpose test’ established in the Talisman ruling, according to 
which a company is only liable for aiding and abetting violations of international law where it 
has provided substantial assistance with the specific aim of furthering the violation. 128 
In Talisman the application of this test led to the conclusion that by letting the Sudanese 
regime use their airstrips the company had not aided and abetted the international crimes of 
the regime because they did not share the intent of furthering the crimes. Arguably, it would 
have been more accurate the use of a looser test, known as the ‘knowledge’ test, whereby 
aiding and abetting is established if the company knew or should have known about the 
violations, without necessarily aiming to furthering the crimes.129 The ‘knowledge’ element 
generally translates into the question: did the business entity know, or should it have known 
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that the business activities contributed to international crimes or gross human rights 
violations? 130   
 
ExxonMobil (re Indonesia) 
Another relevant ATS case concerns ExxonMobil’s role in employing the Indonesian military 
forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI) to protect its natural gas facilities in Aceh, 
Indonesia. In 2001, the International Labor Rights Fund brought a case in US Federal Court 
under the ATS on behalf of eleven surviving family members of victims of human rights 
abuses, including torture, rape, and killings, allegedly committed by members of the TNI. 
Following the discovery of vast natural gas fields, ExxonMobil helped build one of the largest 
and most profitable natural gas facilities in the world in Arun, north Aceh, in 1971. Very little 
of the profit that flowed from these operations remained in Aceh, and this inequality 
contributed to formation of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM) in 
1976. In its initial contract with Suharto, the president of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998, Mobil 
(which later merged with Exxon) agreed to hire members of the TNI as private security 
personnel. As the security situation in Aceh deteriorated, ExxonMobil increased its reliance on 
the TNI.  
 
According to the plaintiffs’ claims, by 2000 ExxonMobil was paying more than $500,000 a 
month to the TNI.131 The lawsuit alleged that ExxonMobil helped to equip and train TNI 
members who provided private security to its Aceh operations.132 The Indonesian government 
used the threat to the immense revenue generated at the Arun facility to justify its increased 
militarization of Aceh. This in turn led to escalation of the conflict between the TNI and GAM. 
Fighting between GAM and the TNI had a severe impact on civilians, especially those who 
lived near the ExxonMobil facility. The plaintiffs argued that ExxonMobil should have been 
aware of the high degree of risk that TNI security personnel might commit human rights 
abuses.133 The corporation should have taken appropriate measures after it became aware that 
Indonesian military forces acting as its agents were committing serious violations.  
 
In 2015, a US federal court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently ‘touch[ed] and 
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concern[ed]’ the Unites States and therefore could proceed in US courts.134 The court accepted 
‘as true for purposes of this motion’ the assertion that ExxonMobil exercised substantial 
control over the activities of the soldiers.135 The significance of the ExxonMobil case in Aceh 
is that it provided a strong contribution to transitional justice processes in Indonesia. The 
ExxonMobil case represents an opportunity to investigate the conflict in Aceh and to give 
acknowledgement to the victims of the Indonesian military and indirectly the actions of 
multinational corporations. To date, there has been limited judicial accountability for crimes 
committed by the TNI in Aceh despite evidence of their involvement in mass crimes. 
Commitments that were part of the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, to establish 
a truth and reconciliation commission and a human rights court, have not been fulfilled.136 
Although this case does not examine every aspect of the Aceh conflict and represents the 
claims of only a small number of victims, it is important in achieving some degree of 
accountability for human rights abuses committed in Aceh. The case has dragged on for more 
than 16 and victims are still waiting for justice.  
 
Closing of the ATS door after the Kiobel decision 
Occasionally cases under the ATS have alleged the direct commission of violations by a 
company as the principal perpetrator - for example, the private military company Blackwater 
as well as several of its private contractors were accused of war crimes committed against 
civilians in Iraq.137 For the most part, however, cases against companies under ATS have 
involved claims of complicity, where the direct perpetrators of human rights violations were 
public or private security forces, other government agents, or armed factions in civil 
conflicts.138 These cases have produced a range of solutions.139 Some courts that have dealt 
with ATS claims for company complicity in human rights abuses have referred to and applied 
the international criminal law standards of aiding and abetting.140 Some federal courts cited the 
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Nuremberg Industrial cases, which demonstrate how certain corporations could be an 
‘instrumentality of cohesion in the name of which the enumerated acts…were committed.’141 
Relying on this precedent, which did not recognize the actual criminal liability of corporations, 
the court, however, considered that ‘limitations on criminal liability of corporations do not 
necessarily apply to civil liability of corporations,’ thus exploiting the civil aspect of the ATS 
to extend its reach to corporations.142 Since the South Africa Apartheid Litigation judgment 
(analysed below), whereby Judge Korman in his minority opinion raised the objection that 
multinational corporations might not be sued under the ATS as they are not subjects of 
international law, multinational corporations summoned in ATS litigations for violation 
international human rights norms have started to include such an objection among their 
defence strategies.  
 
In September 2010, this theory was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co case.143  The Second Circuit dismissed Kiobel, with a 
divided opinion holding that the ATS did not apply to corporations.144 The foundational 
premise relied upon by Kiobel is that the actors in international law are almost exclusively 
states - therefore, private corporations do not have obligations under international law and thus 
cannot have liability under the ATS.145 Sarei v. Rio Tinto had relied on dissolution of I.G. 
Farben after War World II and of jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice to find 
that prohibition against genocide extends to corporations.146 But the Second Circuit in Kiobel 
relied on the fact that no international criminal tribunal has ever prosecuted a company.147 The 
Kiobel majority asserted that the fact that only individuals were charged at Nuremberg 
definitively demonstrated that there was no accountability mechanism under international law 
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for pursuing I.G. Farben as a juristic entity.148 Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein rightly 
contend, ‘this argument misses the mark’: the lack of charges against the corporation does not 
indicate anything about corporate liability under international law.149 The lack of criminal 
prosecution of corporations at Nuremberg does not support the conclusion in Kiobel that 
international law excludes juristic entities from liability. It only means that criminal 
prosecution was not chosen in that particular instance. 150 
 
In February 2012, during the Supreme Court oral arguments in the appeal, the focus shifted to 
the ATS’s extraterritorial reach. Justice Kennedy questioned whether any other jurisdiction in 
the world ‘permits its courts to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterritorial 
human rights abuses to which the nation has no connection’.151 Thus, the Court ordered the 
parties to reargue the case on this question: ‘Whether and under what circumstances the Alien 
Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violation of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States’.152  
 
In April 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under the ATS.153 
The ruling stated that the ATS could not be invoked for cases where the conduct did not 
‘touch and concern’ the territory of the United States with sufficient force as to displace the 
‘presumption against extraterritorial application’ (i.e. that the ATS does not apply to conducts 
outside the United States).154  
 
Kiobel’s denial of corporate liability in the ATS context generated a split of circuit authority155 
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and divided scholarship,156  including on whether corporations have direct human rights 
obligations under customary international law.157  In April 2017, the US Supreme Court 
agreed to hear a new ATS case, Jesner v. Arab Bank.158 The sole question for consideration is 
whether the ATS ‘categorically forecloses corporate liability.’159 The case concerns Arab Bank, 
which is based in Jordan and has been accused of processing financial transactions through a 
branch in New York for groups linked to terrorism. The plaintiffs in the case seek to hold the 
bank liable for attacks in Israel and in the Palestinian territories by Hamas and other groups.160 
They said the bank had ‘served as the “paymaster” for Hamas and other terrorist organizations, 
helping them identify and pay the families of suicide bombers and other terrorists’.161 In 
Kiobel the Supreme Court did not answer the question it had initially agreed to consider, 
whether corporations are categorically excluded from the law. The Arab Bank case is likely to 
produce that answer. 
 
Arguments have been made to consider multinational corporations as ‘modern day pirates’. 
Justice Breyer in a separate opinion considered ‘pirates’ in their modern form to include 
international violators such as ‘torturers or perpetrators of genocide’.162 This suggests that if 
multinational companies are alleged to be involved in such violations they should be held 
accountable just like the pirates of the past.163        
 
The Kiobel decision on the presumption against extraterritoriality has limited the claims that 
can be brought under the ATS for victims of corporate abuses, including in a transitional 
justice contexts. The Second Circuit majority, in the words of concurring Judge Leval, dealt ‘a 
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substantial blow to international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human 
rights’.164 In rejecting corporate liability under the ATS, the Second Circuit embraced a statist 
approach to international law. The reach of Kiobel decision and its impact on the 
accountability of companies involved in violations during times of conflict or repression is not 
clear yet, but preliminary evidence shows that it contributed directly to the dismissal of at least 
three such cases: against Chiquita, against Drummond, and in the Apartheid Litigation case.  
 
In Chiquita, the first such case to reach the Supreme Court after Kiobel, in April 2015, the 
court declined to hear the case because all the relevant conduct occurred outside the United 
States. The case had been on-going since 2007. It concerned more than 4,000 plaintiffs who 
contended that the funds that Chiquita paid to Colombian paramilitary organizations, from the 
1990s through 2004, made the company complicit in extrajudicial killings, torture, forced 
disappearances, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Chiquita’s Colombian 
banana-growing region.165  
 
Several cases were also filed under the ATS against Drummond, a coal mining company 
headquartered in the United States and operating in Colombia.166 In 2002, the families of three 
deceased Colombian labour leaders, and the union they belonged to, filed a suit in US federal 
court against Drummond and its subsidiary in Colombia. The plaintiffs alleged that 
Drummond hired Colombian paramilitaries to kill and torture the three labour leaders in 
2001.167 In 2009, the children of the three union leaders filed new lawsuits in the US alleging 
Drummond’s complicity in the killings, and that the company had made payments to the 
paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to kill labour leaders. Those 
cases were dismissed on similar grounds: the courts found they no longer had jurisdiction to 
hear the case, citing the decision in Kiobel.168 
 
The question then moves to what standard is necessary to provide a sufficient connection to 
the United States, to disprove the presumption against extraterritoriality. The South Africa 
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Apartheid Litigation, detailed below, provides some elements to answer this question. In 2013, 
the Court of Appeal recommended dismissing the Apartheid Litigation citing the limitation on 
extraterritorial application of the ATS in Kiobel. The lower court ruled the plaintiffs could 
amend their complaints against two of the defendants to provide evidence that the companies’ 
activities ‘touch and concern’ the territory of the United States.169 The judge said that in order 
to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality set forth in Kiobel, the plaintiffs must 
show corporate presence, in addition to other factors. In 2014, the lower court judge dismissed 
the case finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient connection with the United States 
to warrant the case being heard in US courts. 
 
While Kiobel has clearly narrowed the options under the ATS, it has not eliminated them. For 
example in the case against ExxonMobil, examined above, a US federal court decided in 2015 
that the claims sufficiently ‘touch and concern[ed]’ the United States, as to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritoriality that applies to ATS after Kiobel, and allowed the case to 
proceed. Noting that the ‘primary inquiry in deciding whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is displaced is the location of the conduct at issue’, the court found that 
plaintiffs had made ‘numerous and detailed allegations’ that ExxonMobil executives based in 
the United States had made decisions regarding the deployment of military security personnel 
in Indonesia. As federal courts continue to determine the parameters of the ‘touch and 
concern’ standard set forth in Kiobel, this decision is likely to be a key reference point for 
victims seeking remedies in transitional contexts. 170 As Austen Parrish notes: ‘Kiobel should 
not mark the end of human rights litigation…[rather, it] is time to rebuild the legitimacy of 
international law, and to reclaim international law and its institutions as primary methods for 
global governance’.171    
 
The South Africa Apartheid Litigation  
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 is emblematic of the complex 
challenges that make corporate accountability and reparations for victims a difficult issue for 
transitional justice.172 This is particularly clear in the way in which the South Africa’s TRC 
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dealt with the issue of corporate involvement with the apartheid (examined in Chapter IV). It 
also shows the potential and problems of using the courts to hold corporations liable to redress 
the shortcomings of the TRC’s approach and the government’s implementation of the TRC’s 
recommendations. The payment of reparations was described as the ‘unfinished legacy’ of the 
TRC. To the extent that ATS facilitated the payment of reparations, it can be considered a 
mechanism of transitional justice.173 
 
As detailed in Chapter IV, in its final report, the South Africa TRC extensively documented 
the central role businesses played in sustaining the economy during apartheid.174 The TRC 
recommended a number of reparation measures for business, including for example, a one-off 
‘wealth tax’ on businesses that profited from apartheid. The South Africa government, 
however, did not implement any of the TRC’s recommendations concerning business leaving 
victims unsatisfied.175 As a consequence, in 2002, four years after the publishing of the TRC 
report, lawsuits were filed in the United States on behalf of South African victims against 
several multinationals corporations for aiding and abetting or otherwise participating in 
violations committed by the apartheid regime. The South Africa Apartheid Litigation 
addresses two cases in its 2009 consolidated amendment: the Khulumani v. Barclays case and 
the Ntsebeza v. Daimler case. 176  
 
In 2002, a group of South Africans, represented by the Khulumani Support Group, sued 20 
banks and corporations that did business in South Africa during apartheid in US federal 
courts.177 The case alleged that from the 1960s to the demise of apartheid in the early 1990s 
these corporations made it possible for key areas of apartheid to continue to operate despite a 
mounting worldwide campaign to isolate the South African government.178 The plaintiffs 
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alleged that the participation of the defendant companies in key industries during the apartheid 
era was influential in encouraging and furthering abuses against black Africans. The plaintiffs 
were victims or relatives of victims of human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings, 
torture and rape, and they alleged that the companies’ activities in South Africa during the 
apartheid era made them complicit in the commission of those abuses.179 The claimants relied 
on the legal theory of secondary liability for aiding and abetting crimes, arguing that banks 
and corporations aided and abetted the apartheid regime in the commission of international 
crimes. The original complaint argued:  
 
The participation of the defendants, companies in the key industries of oil, armaments, 
banking, transportation, technology, and mining, was instrumental in encouraging and 
furthering the abuses. Defendants’ conduct was so integrally connected to the abuses 
that apartheid would not have occurred in the same way without their participation.180 
 
The Apartheid Litigation received a wide array of criticisms.181 The issue of apartheid, some 
critics said, had already been resolved domestically by South Africa; the TRC ran its course, 
and it achieved the peaceful transition to democracy that it was intended to achieve.182 
Digging the issues back up, as a scholar suggested, would ‘subvert what the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission sought to achieve.’183 John Bellinger, a Legal Adviser to the US 
Secretary of State, remarked in 2008:  
 
Imagine what the U.S. reaction would be if a Swiss court sought to adjudicate claims 
brought against U.S. government officials or businesses for Jim Crow-era racial 
restrictions, or…even for slavery…United States has come to terms with and sought to 
remedy the effects of slavery and Jim Crow laws through domestic measures. From the 
South African perspective, the apartheid case must look very similar.184  
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The South African government initially opposed the lawsuit, and it filed documentation with 
both the district court and appeals court urging to dismiss the case.185 The main argument of 
the so-called ‘Maduna declaration’ was that litigation in the United States interfered with 
South Africa’s sovereignty.186 The government officially justified their opposition to the 
Apartheid Litigation with the concern that such lawsuit could discourage foreign investment in 
South Africa and therefore be detrimental to the country’s economic development.187 The 
government attention focused on economic growth as a remedy to the apartheid legacy, which 
resulted in a policy of non-confrontation toward corporations and a lack of political will to 
follow the TRC recommendations regarding the accountability of corporations for their role in 
apartheid.188 The government approach to the recommendations of the TRC was influenced by 
its ‘Growth, Employment, and Redistribution’ policy, which acknowledged the importance of 
fast economic growth and job creation as the only way out of poverty, inequality, and 
unemployment’.189 Foreign and local private sector investment was regarded as crucial to 
achieve these goals. The avoidance of confrontation with the legacy of corporations by the 
South African government, however, is inconsistent with the aim of achieving justice for 
victims of their complicit behaviour. By focusing on growth, the government confused the 
rights of victims with the constitutionally guaranteed socioeconomic rights of all 
disadvantaged citizens. For example, claims of victims of torture or killing of family members 
should not be confused with general claims of all victims of apartheid to be lifted out of 
poverty and social exclusion.  
 
The government said that South Africa deliberately avoided a ‘victors’ justice’ approach to the 
crimes of apartheid and opted instead for a transitional justice process based on ‘reconciliation, 
reconstruction, reparation and goodwill’.190 It considered the remedies claimed before the US 
courts to be inconsistent with the government strategy of achieving reconciliation and social 
transformation through economic growth in partnership with private actors, including 
corporations.191 The government feared that the litigation could have a negative effect on 
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foreign investment so ‘undermining economic stability’.192 Alex Boraine, the vice-chairman of 
the TRC, argued that the lawsuit ‘could damage investment and new jobs just when we need 
business to come here’.193  
 
The government claims were contested by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC’s chairman, 
and by other commissioners, who filed amici curiae in support of the litigation, which they 
considered ‘entirely consistent’ with the findings of the TRC’.194 They argued that the 
litigation was unlikely to affect investment decisions and instead would have a positive effect 
of deterring threats to ‘inequitable economic growth in South Africa’.195 They pointed out that 
the TRC proceedings precluded litigation only against perpetrators who had been granted 
amnesties, which none of the defendants companies had received. ‘There was absolutely 
nothing in the TRC process, its goals, or the pursuit of the overarching goal of reconciliation, 
linked with the truth, that would be impeded by this litigation’, the commissioners said.196  
They further added that litigation was in line with the goals of transitional justice: ‘by giving 
voice to those harmed by multinational corporations aiding and abetting apartheid, it assists 
the healing on reconciliation process’.197 Archbishop Tutu had already concluded after the 
business hearings that these ‘did not mean the end of the process, as there was the question of 
restitution and repairing the wrongs done’.198  
 
The TRC process ‘did not put an end to the pursuit of accountability for human rights 
violations committed under apartheid (but) in fact started it’.199 The TRC expressly recognized 
bases for civil and criminal liability of certain business for their actions, including for aiding 
and abetting crimes committed by the apartheid regime. Serious findings were made against 
specific corporations.200 The TRC also suggested the existence of legal grounds for instituting 
a claim for reparations based on the enforceability of contracts that had been contrary to public 
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policy.201  The TRC report stated that, going forward, there were ‘legal grounds for instituting 
claims for reparations against banks and other corporations’.202 Although the TRC provided 
little clarification of the type of legal mechanisms it was referring to, it appeared clear that 
some form of legal proceedings was considered valid.203 The Commission acknowledged that 
the scope of its findings regarding business involvement was limited, and left the door open 
for future proceedings. The Apartheid Litigation drew significantly on the work of the TRC in 
terms of the factual findings made against companies and the Commission’s articulation of 
legal responsibility. 204 Indeed, the Apartheid Litigation needs to be understood as ‘a logical 
continuation of the outcome of the TRC’.205 With it victims extended efforts in South Africa to 
hold corporations accountable beyond the truth-seeking process.  
 
In 2009, after the decision in the district court, the government changed its view and 
announced its support of the lawsuit, withdrawing its previous opposition. The South African 
Justice Minister sent a letter to the District Court judge informing her that the government 
believed the court to be the appropriate forum to decide this case.206 This change was also 
linked with a new economic policy based on state-led development, and not only on free 
market practices.207 The Apartheid Litigation illustrates the consequences of the political 
tensions between justice and reconciliation with regard to corporations.208 Ruben Carranza 
argues that the failure of transitional justice in South Africa to hold corporations accountable 
was inherent in the design of the South African transitional justice model, animated as it was, 
by a spirit of ‘reconciliation’.209 Some scholars saw the Apartheid Litigation as an opportunity 
for some companies to prove that they were not complicit in apartheid, and to be free of any 
such stigma in the international community.210 In this regards, however, the litigation did little 
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in terms of establishing the role of business in apartheid.211 
 
After years of proceedings, the claims were first narrowed to proceed only against Daimler, 
Ford, General Motors, IBM, and Rheinmetall, and then allowed only against IBM and 
Ford.212 The court dismissed aiding and abetting claims against the banks. It dismissed, for 
example, the claims against Barclays and UBS for loaning money to the South African 
government.213 It based its decision on the grounds that commercial loans were too far 
removed from human rights violations carried out by their recipients for a legally relevant link 
to exist.214 The court considered that ‘simply doing business with a state or individual who 
violate the law of nations is insufficient to create liability under customary international 
law’.215 As a consequence, the only claims that remained were those where the court found 
that the goods and services provided by the defendant corporation had provided the direct 
means for carrying out the violations, such as the sale of vehicles with military specifications 
or the design of computer software to implement policy of geographical segregation and racial 
discrimination.216 For example, the court allowed the case to go forward and be heard against 
IBM for providing computers and software to the apartheid regime, charging that it had helped 
to implement a ‘de-nationalization’ policy against black South Africans.217 The plaintiffs later 
reached a settlement with General Motors. In 2015, the case was dismissed because, after the 
decision in Kiobel, the connection with the United States was not sufficient to warrant the case 
being heard in US courts.218  
 
The issue of corporate complicity was discussed during the litigation. On appeal to the Second 
Circuit, Judge Korman (dissenting) regarded the complaints as being about nothing other than 
condemning the defendants for having done business with the apartheid regime,219 something 
that it itself would not be sufficient to trigger legal liability for complicity: 
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[I]t is (or should be) undisputed that simply doing business with a state or individual 
who violates the law of nations is insufficient to create liability under customary 
international law. International law does not impose liability for declining to boycott a 
pariah state or to shun a war criminal. Aiding a criminal “is not the same thing as 
aiding and abetting [his or her] alleged human rights abuses”.220 
 
The original complaints in the Apartheid Litigation requested damages and also sought broad 
equitable relief, for example the institution of affirmative action education and training 
programmes.221 But because of the nature of the ATS, the Apartheid Litigation aimed to 
provide exclusively monetary reparations to victims seeking punitive as well as compensatory 
damages. To that end, the litigation was aligned with the TRC’s desire to leave civil 
obligations intact, and also with the Committee’s ultimate decision to provide monetary 
compensation to victims, as the preferred form of reparation.222 The South African government 
originally opposed the litigation, asserting that reparations should be addressed through a 
broad programme of socio-economic transformation.223 
 
In the end, the Apartheid litigation did not compensate the victims in the way they hoped. As 
seen, the claims were dismissed and only one of the corporations involved, General Motors, 
agreed to a settlement in 2012, ten years after the beginning of the litigation. It agreed to pay 
$1.5 million in shares in the company without acknowledging responsibility for apartheid 
crimes. The shares were to be placed into a trust fund and converted into money to be shared 
between the 25 plaintiffs and the Khulumani support group. The positive aspect of this 
approach is that the beneficiaries were not limited to the plaintiffs in the case, but also 
included victims more generally, such as those who may have been equally harmed but did not 
meet the requirements to qualify as plaintiffs in the lawsuit.224  There are important lessons 
from this case, in particular in relation to the debate on the role of financial actors and their 
potential responsibility for complicity in gross human rights violation. 
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Financial Complicity  
The Apartheid Litigation decision draws a distinction between the provision of goods or 
commodities and the provisions of loans or financial contributions. Without doing an analysis 
of the concrete effect of the loans, the ruling established that funds could never be sufficiently 
connected to the crimes, because they are not ‘lethal commodities’.225 Julian Simcock argues 
that the decision of the Apartheid Litigation to narrow the claims is in line with the TRC’s 
‘closed list’ approach, when it established the requirements for reparation eligibility and that 
limiting complicity liability to instances in which the corporation contributed some form of 
substantial assistance is also in line with the TRC’s efforts to stratify degrees of corporate 
involvement.226 According to Bohoslavky and Opgenhaffenv, instead, this differentiation, 
which focuses on the intrinsic qualities of the goods rather than assessing the provisions’ use 
and impacts, used a confusing rationale:  
 
On one hand, it accepted that the computers provided by IBM to the apartheid regime 
were “sufficiently risky” commodities in their connection to aiding in the 
denationalization of black South Africans, thus contributing to the State’s crimes. 
Simultaneously, however, the court asserted that even lethal gas could be used in some 
cases for so-called legitimate purposes.227  
 
The Apartheid Litigation ruling, which denied that financial assistance could contribute to or 
facilitate human rights abuses, represents a conservative and narrow interpretation of previous 
developments in international law with regard to corporate complicity, particularly for 
financing ius cogens violations.228 The view of the court was that money is inherently neutral 
and loans are always too far removed from the violations carried out by their recipients. In its 
decision, the court, using the ‘inherent quality’ of the commodities as its criterion, made a 
distinction between an agent like poison gas being provided to a regime (referring to the 
Zyklon B case) and a fungible resource, like finance or investment (referring to the Ministries 
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case), which it felt did not meet the legal standards for responsibility in this case.229 The court 
decided when analysing the actus reus component that loans could not empirically be 
sufficiently connected to the crimes in question.230  
 
The criterion of ‘inherent quality’ seems to ignore the very definition of money as a good that 
acts as a medium of exchange in transactions, a unit of account, and a store of value.231 Money 
allows its holder to do something by virtue of its purchasing power. Therefore, what is crucial 
is what the holder will do with it and this is the point where the foreseeable consequences of 
giving money to someone enter into play. By dismissing the claims against the banks, the 
Apartheid Litigation implies immunity for banks from the consequences of their actions.232 
The decision creates an exemption for commercial lenders from complicity liability, without 
the requirement of a case-by-case analysis or an examination of the lender’s mens rea. 
 
The court relied on the Ministries case as the sole authority in support the rejection of 
complicity liability for commercial loans, but developments in international law do not justify 
such conclusion.233 Since the Nuremberg trials, international law developed considerably the 
notion of accomplice liability in international criminal law and denunciation of financing 
human rights abuses.234 Particularly instructive in this respect is the decision in Almog v. Arab 
Bank. 235  The plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank ‘aided and abetted, was complicit in, 
intentionally facilitated, and participated in a joint venture to engage in acts of genocide in 
violation of the laws of nations by providing financial and other practical assistance…to 
HAMAS’.236 With regard to the question of whether routine banking activities can give rise to 
complicity liability, the court sustained that: ‘acts which in themselves may be benign, if done 
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for a benign purpose, may be actionable if done with the knowledge that they are supporting 
unlawful acts’.237    
 
The commission of international crimes, which by definition are large scale, requires finance 
to pay for the equipment and human resources crimes of that magnitude entail.238 Lenders that 
provide funds used to finance international crimes are often banks and other private financial 
entities, and gains from those crimes are often deposited in private banks.239 As Anita 
Ramasastry puts it, ‘What do Hitler and Marcos have in common? Their bankers. Both leaders 
used numbered Swiss accounts in order to deposit ill-gotten gains’.240 Already in 1978, 
Antonio Cassese had prepared a report, commissioned by the then UN Commission on Human 
Rights, on the role played by lenders in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship.241 The ‘Cassese 
Report’ explained in detail how the financial aid received by the regime facilitated human 
rights abuses in Chile. 242  In his 260-page report, Cassese developed a sophisticated 
methodology to evaluate the impact of the financial aid on the human rights situation, 
concluding,  
 
As foreign economic assistance largely serves to strengthen and prop up the economic 
system adopted by the Chilean authorities, which in its turn needs to be based on the 
repression of civil and political rights, the conclusions warranted that the bulk of 
present economic assistance is instrumental in consolidating and perpetuating the 
present repression of those rights.243 
 
But, as Bohoslavsky and Rulli point out, the Cassese Report was ‘inexplicably ignored for 
decades by those engaging in the corporate complicity debate’.244 Financial complicity in 
international crimes and gross human rights abuses is extremely difficult to establish. 
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Establishing liability in law, civil or criminal, requires a careful examination of causation and 
other key elements such knowledge or at foreseeability, and proximity.245 Even if it is 
recognised that corporations can be held accountable for complicity, there remains confusion 
about the scope of this responsibility and its broader implications.246 
 
For example, one question that may arise is whether investors may bear secondary 
responsibility for human rights violations committed using funds they have provided. The 
challenge in specific cases is to determine when neutral business activities, such as providing 
goods or financial resources, have turned into legally relevant behaviour and thus become an 
act of complicity with the perpetrator. Michalowski points out that in the context of financing, 
there is a need for analysis of the actus reus and causation elements of complicity liability.247 
The international standard defining the actus reus of liability in international law,248 which is 
consistently applied by US courts in the context of corporate complicity liability249 and widely 
accepted in the relevant academic literature,250 is that of ‘practical assistance, encouragement, 
or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime’.251 The 
assistance ‘need not constitute an indispensable element, that is, a conditio sine qua non for 
the acts of the principal’.252 Instead, it is sufficient that the acts of the accomplice make a 
significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by the principal. Further, Mastafa 
v. Australian Wheat Board Limited and Banque Nationale De Paris Paribas, a case on 
corporate complicity brought under the ATS, describes the relevant standard as follows: 
 
It is not enough that a defendant provides substantial assistance to a tortfeasor; the 
‘substantial assistance’ must also ‘advance the [tort’s] commission’…providing the 
Hussein regime with funds-even substantial funds-does not aid and abet its human 
rights abuses if the money did not advance the commission of the alleged human rights 
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abuses. This does not mean that plaintiffs must allege that the particular funds provided 
were used to commit the abuses, or that without the funds the Hussein regime would 
not have been able to commit such abuses, so long as the assistance is ‘a substantial 
factor in causing the resulting tort’.253 
 
The International Commission of Jurists has developed some helpful criteria to distinguish 
corporate complicity in international crimes from neutral business activity.254 It considered 
that the ‘liability of a financier will depend on what he or she knows about how his or her 
services and loans will be utilised and the degree to which these services actually affect the 
commission of a crime’.255 This distinction becomes relevant when companies facilitate state-
sponsored human rights abuses by providing the means to commit these violations. A similar 
principle has been expressed by an US court in Almog v Arab Bank.256 With regard to the 
question of whether routine banking activities can give rise to complicity liability, the Court 
sustained that ‘acts which in themselves may be benign, if done for a benign purpose, may be 
actionable if done with the knowledge that they are supporting unlawful acts’.257  
 
According to Kaleck and Saage-Maab, in cases that concern neutral business actions, a line 
must be drawn between the morally condemnable behaviour of ‘doing business with the devil’ 
and criminally relevant contributions to another actor’s international crimes.258 They argue 
that it is necessary to make the distinction between the supply of goods that are dangerous per 
se, such as weapons, and the supply of goods that may only contribute, in a certain scenario, to 
the commission of international crimes, such as computer programmes or certain chemicals. 
259 Talking about the liability of the funders of international crimes, such as banks and other 
financial institutions, Ingrid Gubbay recognises that ‘the legal theory about financing human 
rights violations is still in its early days’.260 Indeed, there are many unresolved questions in 
this area, including how to distinguish between ‘doing business’ and ‘being complicit’, and 
whether the purpose for which the loan was granted should make a difference. It seems clear 
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that simply ‘doing business’ would not entail liability, as ‘international law does not impose 
liability for declining to boycott a pariah regime’. Moreover, as Gubbay emphasized, ‘aiding a 
criminal is not the same as aiding and abetting their crimes’.261  
 
A number of scholars have made a solid case for reconsidering complicity liability of lenders 
in gross human rights violations.262 In particular, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky strongly argues for 
the liability of those who grant loans despite being aware that this money would contribute to 
commission of human rights abuses and crimes under international law.263 Bohoslavsky and 
Verbitsky’s book Cuentas Pendientes (‘Outstanding Debts’) examines the role of foreign 
financial institutions and their potential complicity in supporting the Argentina’s regime.264 
The authors advocate a national truth commission to investigate corporate financial support of 
the dictatorship, arguing that the dictatorship could not have existed or carried out the 
repression without corporations’ direct and indirect involvement.265 They suggest that the 
assistance provided by private financial institutions played a role in the dictatorship significant 
enough to warrant possible future legal action on the basis of complicity in crimes against 
humanity.266 Chapter IV analyses this proposal and its outcomes. 
 
There are several factors that render the act of scrutinizing companies responsibility relevant. 
For example, if it is determined that the banks are liable, this could provide an additional 
source of funding for reparations to victims and their families.267 Further, according to 
Bohoslavsky and Opgenhaffen,  
 
A thorough examination of the banks’ behaviour would create recognition of the idea 
that financial support can be as powerful a legitimating and strengthening tool as other 
types of assistance to regimes known to violate human rights. This could create 
precedent to subject other financial institutions to the same kind of scrutiny in the 
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future, which may serve as an overall deterrent effect on corporate behaviour.268  
 
While there is no international case law and no consensus on mechanisms to hold financial 
backers of international criminals liable for their role, there are at least three options to legally 
address the consequences of financing gross human rights violations or crimes under 
international law.269 An option is to challenge the validity of the loan, which is related to the 
‘odious debt’ debate.270 A second option is to demonstrate civil responsibility for financial 
complicity.271 Finally, another option is to prove the criminal responsibility of the financial 
accomplices.272 One of the rare examples of the latter is the on-going lawsuit against BNP 
Paribas, France’s largest bank. On 29 June 2017, three human-rights groups in France 
submitted a complaint to a French judge accusing BNP Paribas of war crimes and complicity 
in genocide in Rwanda in 1994.273 The groups claim that BNP transferred $ 1.3 millions from 
the Rwandan national bank to a Swiss account belonging to a South African arms dealer in 
June 1994, a month after the UN had implemented an arms embargo.274 According to the 
complaint, the alleged transfer of funds allowed for 80 tonnes of weapons to be sold to Hutu 
colonel Theóneste Bagosora, a key player in the genocide. The ICTR found him guilty of 
genocide and other crimes in 2008.275 This complaint represents a first against a bank in 
France.276       
 
Odious Debt 
‘Odious debt’ is a private-law doctrine whose core addresses debts incurred by despots, 
without the consent of their subjects, for corrupt purposes that are not in the interests of the 
population. 277  These debts are ‘odious’ because they are secured by the resources of 
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subjugated people who enjoy no benefit from the financial commitments made by illegitimate 
leaders.278 Despite this, the rules of state succession require a new state to repay debts incurred 
by its predecessor, even if they were used to perpetuate oppression. The sense of moral 
indignation that such result inspires is the driving force behind the doctrine of odious debt. 
Thus, principles of contract and agency prevent the burden of the debt from falling on those 
who did not consent or did not receive consideration.279  
 
While few authors expressly refer to concepts of transitional justice when discussing this 
particular feature of odious debts,280 the issue of odious debts frequently arises in transitional 
situations. To investigate the history of these debts and their role in contributing to the 
commission of human rights violations may contribute to achieving some of the goals of 
transitional justice.281 The ability of a state in transition to void debts associated with past 
atrocities also appears to promise a number of benefits in relation to the governments being 
able to free resources for reparation, reform, reconstruction, and restitution.282 Arguably, 
accepting the responsibility of business for human rights violations may provide a basis for a 
theory of ‘odious profit’, which borrows from the concept of odious debt: business should 
account for profits accumulated through their relationships with illegitimate regimes.283   
 
David Gray argues that in many circumstances, full faith in truth and accountability will 
require that transitional regimes accept the burden of financial obligations incurred by an 
odious predecessor. 284  He argues that this would reinforce assignments of liability to 
international investors and debtors who supply financial support to odious regimes.285 His 
central claim is that expansion of the odious debt doctrine to cover all debts of an odious 
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regime fails to account for the full truth about the past, and compromises transitional justice 
priorities of accountability.286 Gray argues:  
 
Voiding a debt as odious effectively puts all the blame for past wrongs on the 
shoulders of a few elites who are made to bear as personal both the weight of the debts 
and the weight of blame for past wrongs, providing a free pass for those whose 
complicity is ignored and for corporations, banks, and other investors who have a share 
of the responsibility.287  
 
By contrast, Michalowski and Bohoslavsky put forward the argument that debts can be void if 
they violate ius cogens norms.288 Lender awareness is clearly relevant, as the purpose of 
preventing ius cogens violations by deterring lenders from making money available to this 
effect can only be achieved where creditors have a clear idea of the situations in which this 
consequence might arise, and which they therefore need to avoid.289 It is, however, sufficient, 
according to Michalowski and Bohoslavsky, that lenders could or should have known of the 
use of the loan by the borrowing regime, whereas it is irrelevant whether they shared this 
purpose.290  
 
An example of how the ius cogens approach can be applied in practice is that of the debts 
taken up by the Argentina military regime. An argument for a partial repudiation of 
Argentina’s debt is that the loans were made to a regime that violated ius cogens norms, and 
that the incoming funds contributed to the growing expenditures of the military apparatus that 
perpetrated these violations.291 Claims for civil remedies presented in a federal court in 
Buenos Aires against financial institutions because of their complicity with the crimes 
committed by the junta might shed more light on these issues, as they raise some of the 
questions that are essential in the context of a ius cogens based odious debts doctrine.292  In 
2009, a civil suit was filed in Buenos Aires on behalf of five victims of the Argentina 
dictatorship against a number of banks accused of complicity with human rights abuses for 
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financing the military junta.293 The Ibañez Manuel Leandro and others v. Undetermined 
financial institutions case is a rare example of a civil claim over financial complicity filed in 
the country where abused allegedly occurred.  
 
Between March 1976 and December 1983, several commercial banks lent funds to the regime 
in Argentina. The claim alleged that the financing of the regime facilitated the commission of 
grave human rights violations, characterized as crimes against humanity, against the civil 
population, including the plaintiffs.294 The claim argued that due to the public character of the 
human rights abuses in Argentina, banks were aware of the potential and foreseeable 
consequences of lending money to the regime.295 An amicus curiae, field in support of the 
plaintiffs argued that while the defendant banks did not directly participated in the crimes, 
they met the requirements of liability, in that they participated as accomplices in the crimes 
committed by the regime and that caused harm to the plaintiff with the requisite mens rea, and 
their contribution was not too remote. 296   
 
In line with the international standard defining the actus reus of liability in international 
law,297 it is not necessary that without the contribution of the banks, the regime could not have 
committed the violations, but rather simply that the banks played an influential role and that 
without the loans, the military regime would not have been able to carry out its human rights 
violations in the same way, for example in the same intensity and over the same period of time. 
Applying the relevant provisions of Argentinean law in light of international principles and 
standards, it appears that the banks were complicit in the crimes committed by the Argentina 
military junta. The question of corporate complicity liability in gross human rights violations 
has arisen mainly in litigation before the ATS and a number of cases have defined the mens 
rea standard of such liability.298 The Marcos and Holocaust cases in particular are important in 
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that they attempt to challenge the role that commercial banks play with respect to international 
human rights. In both instances, plaintiffs challenge the assertions that banks are always 
neutral actors engaged in purely commercial activities.299 
 
Marcos Litigation  
In 1986, eight Filipinos residents in the United States filed a lawsuit in Hawaii over abuses 
committed by the Marcos government.300 The suit was filed while Marcos and his entourage 
were fleeing Manila and were en route to Hawaii after a democratic uprising forced them to 
leave the Philippines.301The plaintiffs sought compensation for torture, summary execution, 
disappearance, and arbitrary detention.302 Marcos died in Hawaii in 1989, but the litigation 
continued against his estate. In 1995, after receiving a $1.9 billion judgment, the plaintiffs 
tried to gain access to an estimated $475 million that Marcos had deposited in Swiss 
accounts.303 At that point the plaintiffs, who had not initially named the Swiss banks as 
defendants, alleged that the banks had done more than accept funds: they had actively helped 
Marcos conceal his wealth.  
 
In 1996, the court ordered the Swiss banks to hand over the Marcos accounts in partial 
satisfaction of the $1.9 billion judgment. 304 The court found the Swiss banks to be ‘agents and 
representatives’ of the Marcos estate and authorized a permanent injunction as to the assets 
held by the banks.305 The Marcos litigation does not contain detailed accounts of the role of 
the Swiss banks because the banks were not initially named as defendants. The litigation is 
instructive, nonetheless, because it is the first to characterize Swiss banks as agents and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute: The South African Apartheid Litigation and the Lessons of Central Bank’ 
(2009) 18 Transnatl L Contemp Probs 247, 280-81.  
299 Ramasastry, ‘Secrets and Lies?’ (n 241), 449. 
300 In re Ferdinand Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994), 94 F.3d 539, 
542 (9th Cir. 1996) [Marcos Litigation]. Five cases were filed against Marcos and were eventually consolidated: 
Clemente v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Hilao v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Ortigas v. 
Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989); Sison v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Trajano v. Marcos, 878 
F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989). See also, RG Steinhardt, ‘Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights 
Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos’ (195) 20 Yale J Intl L 65 (1995).  
301 Marcos Litigation (n 300). 
302 Ibid., 94 F.3d 539, 542.  
303 Ramasastry, ‘Secrets and Lies?’ (n 241), 430-33.  
304 Marcos Litigation (n 300), 910 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (D. Haw. 1995).  
305 Ibid. The Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging the district court judge’s characterization of the banks as ‘agents’ 
of Marcos, reversed the decision because the banks were not parties in the original lawsuits, Hilao v. Estate of 
Marcos, 95 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 
 
 125 
facilitators in an ATS lawsuit.306 The decision to subject the banks to the worldwide injunction 
and to vest title with the bank accounts in the Marcos plaintiffs’ attorneys demonstrates a view 
that the banks were not just repositories of wealth, but entities that had played a more active 
role for their client.307 
 
Holocaust Reparation Lawsuits  
After World War II, the Allies had agreed not only to punish war criminals, but also to 
implement reparations.308 The Allied Control Council ordered the dissolution of certain 
corporations and the seizure of their assets.309 For example, I.G. Farben received the ultimate 
administrative sanction when the Control Council ordered its dissolution, ‘the equivalent of 
the corporate death penalty’, as Giannini and Farbstein put it.310 Control Council Law No. 9 
ordered that important I.G. Farben assets, including some plants, be destroyed.311 The Council 
also included provisions related to the distribution and payment of reparations.312 In the end, 
however, the tensions between the goals of reconstruction, reparations, securing political 
alliances, and unification were incompatible, and reparation efforts ended.313 By mid-1946, 
when decisions about war crimes in which business played a role were being reached, the 
Allies had concluded that political and economic stability could only be achieved with the 
participation of German industry run by the same managers, regardless of culpability.314 
Companies had long rejected legal claims by slave labourers, insisting that the German 
government, as successor to the Third Reich, should pay any damages. 315  While the 
government paid out over DM80 billion to victims of the Nazis, German companies paid 
                                                
306 Ramasastry, ‘Secrets and Lies?’ (n 241), 430-35. 
307 Ibid., 449-50. 
308 Bush (n 115), 1119. 
309 Control Council Law No. 9, art I, 225 (ordering dismantling of I.G. Farben as well as seizure of its assets: ‘All 
plants, properties and assets of any nature situated in Germany which were, on or after 8 May, 1945, owned or 
controlled by I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., are hereby seized by and the legal title thereto is vested in the Control 
Council’); Control Council Law No. 57, Dissolution and Liquidation of Insurance Companies Connected with the 
German Labor Front  (Aug. 30, 1947), in VIII Enactments and Approved  Papers of the  Control Council and  
Coordinating  Committee  1, (ordering seizure of insurance company assets).  
310 T Giannini and S Farbstein, ‘Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the 
Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights’ (2010) 52 HILJ 129. 
311 Control Council Law No. 9, art. III(b), 226 (providing for ‘destruction of certain plants’).  
312 Ibid,, art. III, III(a), at 225–26. 
313 Bush (n 115), 1120. 
314 Ibid., 1122. 
315 BB Ferencz, Less Than Slaves: Jewish Forced Labor And The Quest For Compensation (Indiana University 
Press 1979), xvii; MJ Bazyler, ‘Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts’ (2000) 
34 U Rich L Rev 1, 31-39, 191-92; The Economist, ‘Companies and the Holocaust: Industrial Actions’, 14 
November 1998, 75; E Black, IBM and The Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and 
America’s Most Powerful Corporation (Crown Books 2001). 
 
 
 126 
almost nothing.316 Only a few - most significantly Farben - paid small reparations amounts.317 
Monies and assets that had been seized in the United States during the war were returned to 
the companies in whole or part, notably in the high-profile settlement involving GAF, the 
Farben successor Interhandel, and the United States government. Flick, described as one of 
the two richest men in Germany and the owner of hundreds of companies, paid nothing. The 
richest man, Alfried Krupp, with his property restored in full, was instructed to pay an average 
of $825 per slave labourer to a small percentage of his former labour pool.318  
 
In the 1990s, the issue of reparation for slave labour practices in Nazi Germany gained 
momentum with a series of lawsuits brought in the United States.319 Hundreds of Holocaust 
survivors and relatives of Holocaust victims filed several class action lawsuits in US federal 
courts against Swiss banks in an effort to recover money deposited in bank accounts prior to 
and during World War II.320 Joined in these lawsuits were Holocaust survivors who were 
forced by the Nazis to engage in slave labour, and survivors and the heirs of Holocaust victims 
who had property looted by the Nazis.321  Plaintiffs alleged that Swiss banks knowingly 
accepted profits derived from slave labour as well as looted assets, and claimed that the banks 
actively financed such efforts.322 The Swiss banks were alleged to have violated ‘international 
treaties, customary international laws, and fundamental human rights laws’.323 
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The Holocaust claims evoked a number of criticism specifically as to the characterization of 
banks as collaborators. Walter Rockler, an American prosecutor at Nuremberg responsible for 
prosecuting the two German bankers Karl Rasche and Emil Puhl, asked:  
 
The charge that Swiss banks accepted moneys looted by the Nazis is probably true. So 
did French banks, Italian banks, Swedish banks. And so would any other banks, 
including American and British banks, were these countries not at war with the Nazis. 
A substantial aspect of the business of banking for profit is acceptance of deposits 
without regard to the history of the money being deposited. Swiss bankers are not 
unusual in this practice...[I]n the matter of the claims or survivors to deposits of the 
murdered persons in Swiss banks, the Swiss bankers seem to have behaved badly, but 
like bankers. They would not part with the money except upon strict proofs-proofs that 
of course were not available anywhere. As to many of these accounts, there were and 
are no claimants and that undoubtedly has pleased the bankers.... [H]ave they been 
insensitive and glad to profit? Of course. Why would anyone expect otherwise?324  
 
Rockler’s comments emphasize the problem of line drawing with respect to the activities of a 
commercial bank.325 Holocaust restitutions claims had to overcome considerable formal 
barriers. The claims were filed over 50 years after the facts, and were often instigated by 
descendants of victims who had either perished during the Holocaust or passed away in the 
following years. They initiated proceedings outside the jurisdictions where the acts were 
committed, and where the corporate defendants were incorporated.326 In the end, the validity 
of the claims was never fully adjudicated. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 1998, 
whereby the Swiss banks agreed to pay an unprecedented $1.25 billion to the Holocaust 
plaintiffs in exchange for a release of claims by the plaintiffs relating to the Holocaust, World 
War II, and targets of Nazi persecution.327 These lawsuits attracted some criticisms. In relation 
to the calculation of reparations due by companies that benefited from slavery, Lord Anthony 
Gifford, a senior British barrister, conceded: 
 
Such an approach would create more problems than it solved: Enormous research 
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would be needed to identify the companies and the families, to determine how much 
money was made by their ancestors, and to calculate how much should be forfeited by 
the present shareholders or family members. The process would inevitably be 
somewhat arbitrary, and potentially oppressive, and it would be rejected both by the 
targets themselves and their governments.328 
 
Lawsuits in US courts were almost always dismissed or denied.329 For example, plaintiffs in 
the lawsuit against Ford Motor sought disgorgement of profits accumulated over more than 50 
years, alleging that the US-based Ford parent company profited from the rapid growth of its 
German subsidiary. 330 This amount was in practice almost impossible to quantify, but lawyers 
initially requested $37 billion. The suit against Ford was finally dismissed because the claims 
exceeded time limits imposed under German and US laws.331 In a separate ruling on four cases 
involving Degussa and Siemens, two German companies, the US district judge decided that 
the matter was a subject of international treaties and not civil law – the question of payments 
to victims was left to states, not courts, to decide.332 
 
But the thread of lawsuits in the United States, contributed to the pressure to negotiate 
reparations with the surviving labourers and their representatives.333 Despite lawsuits being 
dismissed, any German company with a subsidiary in the United States was potentially liable 
under US law.334 Although companies admitted no legal obligation, they started talking of 
their ‘moral responsibility’ to former labourers. Volkswagen set aside DM45 million for 
‘humanitarian projects’. Siemens, which had tried to document its innocence within months of 
the war’s end, offered up to $1,250 per slave labourer – but with a written insistence that it 
was not under ‘any legal or moral obligation’ to do so. The company placed advertisements in 
East European newspapers to track down its former labourers, but it declined to increase its 
offer when additional claimants came forward, causing the actual average payment to shrink to 
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$825 – in total Siemens paid out DM20 million.335 After the $1.25 billion settlement with the 
Swiss banks, other claims were made against German and Austrian firms accused of profiting 
from slave labour.336 These cases were also settled and led to the establishment of a $5 billion 
fund to which the German government and corporations contributed in equal shares.337 
 
Out-of-court Financial Settlements 
 
Civil litigation is irremediably linked to settlement as a dispute-resolution mechanism, and 
settlement, by definition, undermines the attempt to determine legal and historical 
responsibility, as it allows the defendant to pay without the issue of liability being determined. 
338 In March 2016, for example, Anglo American and AngloGold Ashanti reached an out-of-
court settlement with 4,365 mine workers worth up to R464 million to be paid into an 
independent trust.339 Wiwa v. Shell, which was initiated on the accusation that Shell was 
complicit in human rights violations in Nigeria by funding the military to suppress civilians 
living in Shell’s operational area, also reached closure through an out-of-court settlement.340 
This settlement may have implicitly acknowledged Shell’s role in contributing to violations, 
but it kept issues around the alleged violations from receiving formal legal treatment.341 
Further, in 2004, just one day before a hearing by the court of appeals in the long-running 
Unocal litigation, the parties reached an out-of-court settlement. In the settlement, the exact 
terms of which are confidential, Unocal agreed to compensate the plaintiffs and provide funds 
for programmes in the Myanmar’s pipeline region, but denied any complicity in human rights 
abuses with the Myanmar military junta.342 Although the outcome of the case could arguably 
be considered a success, the settlement signified no further judicial scrutiny of the 
circumstances of the case.  
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As seen above, none of the Holocaust restitution cases was ultimately resolved on the merits. 
To avoid reputational damage and the monetary costs of litigation, corporations preferred to 
settle cases outside the courts without any formal acknowledgement of legal responsibility.343 
The settlements reached between the parties avoided any clear ruling on the legal 
responsibility of the corporations. Some legal scholars and historians have criticized this 
litigation, raising doubts as to the measure of redress achieved for Holocaust victims. For 
example, for legal historian Michael Marrus, the litigation not only failed to contribute to 
historical understanding, it also distorted the historical picture of the involvement of 
corporations in the Holocaust.344 He argues that the focus on monetary gains shifted attention 
away from the gravest crime committed during World War II to theft. ‘[The law] gets the 
history wrong’, Marrus claims.345 The legal pressure, however, did yield some historical 
findings. Swiss banks agreed to a comprehensive audit, and German corporations established 
historical committees and opened their archives to historians to investigate their involvement 
in the Holocaust.346 Though the courts did not make any pronouncement of liability, they were 
actively involved in the negotiation process as well as in the implementation of the Swiss bank 
settlement, issuing numerous rulings as to the proper categorization of claims and allocation of 
funds.347 In addition, by making claims of economic and property rights under the ATS, the 
Holocaust plaintiffs helped further an expansion of the substantive human rights recognized by 
international law.348   
 
Settlements are a two-edged sword. By accepting a settlement victims effectively renounce a 
final decision on the case and the potential granting of any different form of reparation.349 The 
out-of-court settlements of cases is frustrating for academics and activists because they impede 
the development of a much needed jurisprudence, and limit the goal of achieving corporate 
accountability and finding the truth about corporate involvement. But they reflect the financial 
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realities and risks to corporations and to the claimants of not settling. Unless a company is 
confident of a resounding victory and reassured that no significant evidence damaging to its 
reputation will emerge at trial, the risk of going to trial usually makes little commercial sense. 
Settlements also provide the quickest way for victims to obtain compensation.350 Litigation 
against corporations often takes a long time and involves high costs. Prolonged litigation often 
works to the disadvantage of the victims, in particular where their need for a remedy is 
immediate. For the South African miners, whose legal battle against Anglo American and 
AngloGold Ashanti began in 2004, the agreement was probably a relief. Likewise, the 
settlement in Unocal was a relief for Myanmar victims.351 
 
Further, settlements may also lay the ground for the production of new historical narratives. 
The process of the Unocal litigation, for example, did shine some light on the evidence against 
the company. In its decision granting summary judgment, the court described the history of 
Unocal’s presence in Myanmar and its knowledge of the forced labour problem.352 The court 
concluded, ‘the evidence does suggest that Unocal knew that forced labour was being utilized 
and it…benefited from the practice’.353 Similarly, despite failed attempts to litigate under the 
ATS the role of companies such as Chiquita and Drummond in the conflict in Colombia, the 
information retrieved in these lawsuits have shed some light on the material and economic aid 
companies provided to paramilitary groups.354 In addition to serving the punitive goals of 
justice, another function of judicial processes against corporations after periods of mass 
atrocity is to help understanding the systems that worked together to make these crimes 
possible, serving to discourage similar behaviour in the future, and authenticating an historical 
record about a given regime’s functioning. 355 
 
While the unprecedented sums paid in the Holocaust Litigation settlement made particularly 
salient the goal of reparation, the actions also brought about a certain degree of truth and 
reform of the corporate culture. Despite the absence of any court decision determining the 
degree of their liability, following the lawsuit, the defendant Swiss banks agreed to extensive 
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audits, and many German companies established internal historical committees charged with 
examining their involvement in the Holocaust, opened their archives to historians, and publish 
their findings.356 These archives were private and would not have been opened if not for the 
lawsuit.357 Indeed, ‘the lack of adjudication transferred the question of the defendants’ 
responsibility from the legal to the moral level’.358  Leora Bilsky argues that the class actions 
shifted attention from the individual perpetrator to the organization, and specifically to the 
complicity of private corporations in the plunder of victims of the Nazis, and put 
unprecedented pressure on the corporations to cooperate with the plaintiffs’ representatives. 359 
The civil action lawsuit allowed the financial story behind the Holocaust and the story of 
corporations’ involvement and contribution to the Nazi regime to be told. 360  
 
The clarification of the historical narrative continued after the settlement was reached. At that 
point, the entitlements of individual survivors and their families had to be ascertained.361 Thus, 
following the settlement, questionnaires were sent to approximately one million survivors and 
their families, seeking to allow potential class members to express support or opposition to the 
settlement, as well as to gather information to assist the court in designing a fair scheme of 
allocation of the settlement funds.362 In the view of Burt Neuborne, a central reason to bring 
the cases was ‘to speak to history – to build a historical record that could never be 
denied’.363 Thus, in parallel to the opening of the defendants’ archives, the lawsuit produced a 
large repository of oral history consisting of testimonies by survivors. 364 
 
Civil Litigation in other Jurisdictions 
 
The ATS legislation is unique to the United States, but it has arguably motivated lawyers in 
other countries to explore the feasibility of their jurisdictions in establishing civil liability of 
corporations involved in human rights abuses. There are a small, but growing number of civil 
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claims being brought in different jurisdictions seeking such liability.365 These developments 
are creating a network of avenues to accountability and justice that is slowly establishing 
opportunities for victims to obtain civil redress after times of conflict or repression.366 For 
example, in 1997, five South Africans suffering from asbestos-related diseases brought a suit 
against Cape in the English High Court seeking compensation.367 The plaintiffs, former Cape 
workers and people living in the vicinity of Cape’s asbestos mining and milling operations in 
South Africa, alleged that Cape exposed its workers to thirty times the British legal limit of 
asbestos dust. More victims joined the case, which ended in 2003 with an out of court 
settlement with the 7,500 claimants for £7.5 million. 368 Cape benefitted financially by 
operating in an apartheid state where health and safety of black workers was of little value and 
tort law was used to complement the reparations owned by the state to the victims.369  
 
The apartheid legacy led also to litigation against mining companies in South Africa.370 The 
South Africa’s TRC had indicated that the gold mining industry had been critical in designing 
and benefitting from the exploitative migrant labour system.371 In 2012, lawyers started to test 
the courts in South Africa for silicosis-related compensation claims for 4,365 mine workers 
against Anglo American and AngloGold Ashanti. The case was set for arbitration in April 2016, 
but a month before the mining companies announced they had reached an out-of-court 
settlement worth up to R464-million. 372 Also in 2012, attorneys filed a motion in South Africa 
court seeking class certification for 17,000 former gold miners suffering from the lung disease 
silicosis.  The proposed class action named 30 gold mining companies as defendants.373  The 
plaintiffs allege that the companies knew of the dangers posed to the miners by exposing them 
to silica dust, but failed to take adequate measures to protect the workers from this exposure. 
In May 2016, South Africa’s High Court allowed the class action lawsuit.374  
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On 30 January 2013, a Dutch court in The Hague issued a ruling against Royal Dutch Shell 
and its subsidiary Shell Nigeria for pollution in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.375 It was the first time 
that a Dutch multinational corporation appeared in the civil court in the Netherlands to answer 
for violations committed overseas. Although all claims against the parent company were 
dismissed, its foreign subsidiary Shell Nigeria was held liable to pay compensation to one of 
the plaintiffs for environmental damages caused by oil spills.376 In most cases human rights 
violations are committed by foreign subsidiary companies in countries affected by conflict or 
authoritarian regimes where human rights laws are poorly enforced. In this situations holding 
multinational companies accountable for abuses committed in the host state is often 
impossible for the victims.377 Lawsuits brought in Nigeria are a case in point. Despite the 
number of litigations pending in front of Nigerian courts, very few cases have ever awarded 
compensation to the victims of corporate human rights violations. After Kiobel, the United 
States no longer provides an accessible avenue for justice for victims of violations committed 
overseas. Therefore questions have emerged as to whether European jurisdictions may 
constitute an alternative for holding multinational corporations accountable. The underlying 
issues are the competence of European jurisdictions to hold multinational companies 
accountable in Europe for violations committed abroad, and the task of establishing the law 
applicable to these specific cases.378  
 
From a normative point of view, for a case against a multinational company over human rights 
abuses committed abroad to proceed, first the national court must establish its jurisdiction over 
the company’s conduct or facts abroad and effectively exercise it. In the United States and few 
other common law countries courts may invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens to 
abstain on the grounds that the jurisdiction would be more appropriately exercised by the 
courts of another country, such as the host state where the wrongful conduct occurred.379 This 
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doctrine presents a major hurdle to litigants in cases where the witnesses, other evidence and 
the subsidiary are all located in another country.380  
 
Further, when a parent company is allegedly complicit in human rights abuses alongside its 
subsidiary, the ability to seek the liability of the parent company may be necessary in ensuring 
proper redress for the victims and their rights to remedy and reparation. However, establishing 
jurisdiction over a parent company for the conduct of its subsidiaries remains a complex issue. 
In legal terms, each company has a separate legal personality and is deemed to be a distinct 
entity from all other legal and natural persons.381 This legal separation, or ‘corporate veil’, 
between different corporate entities affects whether or not a parent company can be held 
legally responsible in situations where its subsidiary has become involved in human rights 
abuses. Only in exceptional cases can the corporate veil be effectively ‘pierced’. As a result, in 
most cases parent companies manage to escape liability even though they effectively control 
their subsidiaries. The use of subsidiaries in host countries and the limited liability enjoyed by 
corporate entities means that the harms caused by multinational companies often cannot be 
traced back to solvent parent companies located in home states.382 
 
Until recently, the responsibility of multinational corporations for human rights violations was 
not a matter of concern in Europe. Very few tort cases had been brought in national courts in 
the European Union (EU), even though many national courts appeared to have jurisdictions 
over corporations operating abroad.383 An explanation for this lack of action lies in the legal 
culture of EU states, which, in comparison to the United States, is far less favourable to this 
type of litigation.384 In Europe public issues such as transnational human rights violations 
generally tend to be addressed on the basis on government intervention rather than 
litigation.385  
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Since the 1999 Brussels I Regulation, civil laws jurisdictions entertain foreign direct 
liability.386 Regardless of the nationality of the victim and of the place where the damage 
occurred, European multinational companies can be sued in the national courts of EU member 
states for abuses they committed overseas. In other words, courts can no longer make use of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine to refuse judicial competence, even if the competing forum 
would be in a non EU-member states. This conclusion could already be implied from the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgment in the Group Josi Reinsurance case, which stated 
that the rules on jurisdiction that are now reflected in Brussels I are ‘applicable where the 
defendant has its domicile or seat in a Contracting State, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a 
non-member country’.387 This was also the conclusion reached by some commentators.388 The 
ECJ later explicitly confirmed the non-applicability of the forum non conveniens doctrine in 
the case of Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson.389 As a general principle, after the passing of the 
Rome II regulation, for any future foreign liability claim related to events that occurred after 
11 January 2009, the applicable law is the law of the country where the damage occurs.390 In 
other words, the law applied to foreign liability cases is the law of the host state. As an 
exception, however, it is possible to apply the law of a state that has ‘manifestly closer 
connection’ with the case.391  
  
In the Dutch litigation, Shell did not contest the competence of the Dutch court over the parent 
company, but opposed the competence over its Nigerian subsidiary. In the Netherlands, the 
Dutch procedural civil code provides that a foreign subsidiary can be sued in front of the 
Dutch civil court by means of joint hearing when the court already has competence over the 
parent company, provided that the claims are connected to such extent to justify a joint 
hearing.392 The decision of the Dutch court that a sufficient connection existed and therefore 
that the case could be tried in the Netherlands is a major step forward for litigation in the area 
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of corporate accountability because it supports the concept that parent companies and their 
subsidiaries can be held accountable in the home state of the parent companies for abuses 
committed overseas.393  The decision also confirms the existence of a nascent trend to 
adjudicate foreign direct liability in the EU. This decision, however, still remains an isolated 
success case and underlines the legal difficulties that plaintiffs may face in the course of future 
proceedings. 
 
Claims by alleged victims of harm caused by the operations of UK-headquartered 
multinational corporations have enjoyed an increasing successful track record in British 
courts.394 Cases against corporations have been pursued on the basis of tort or negligence – 
alleging harm caused by negligence arising from a breach of a duty of care, rather than, for 
example, torture or violation of the right to life. Since they involve claims for compensation 
and are invariably costly, these cases may serve to achieve critical elements of corporate 
accountability, namely monetary redress for victims and deterrence against future human 
rights violations.395       
 
In Europe the development of foreign liability claims as a means to hold multinational 
companies liable for human rights abuses abroad is only in its infancy.396 Victims of corporate 
human rights abuses overseas are likely to encounter many obstacles. Questions about the 
competence of the jurisdiction and the law applicable, in addition to the burden of proof and 
the cost of litigation, may seriously limit the ability of victims to seek redress in Europe.     
 
Conclusion 
 
Lawsuits against corporations at the domestic level have provided alternative justifications for 
enforcement under international law through domestic courts’ interpretation and a clarification 
of multinational corporations’ obligations under international law and the extraterritorial 
enforcement of human rights law.397 Despite the occasional out-of-court financial settlement 
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though, none has resulted in adequate remedies for victims to date. The obstacles faced by 
victims seeking to hold companies legally accountable in a transitional context are inevitably 
more complex. Some of these problems, common to all victims of corporate abuses, are 
accentuated in transitional justice contexts due to the prevalence of weak rule of law, 
dysfunctional judicial systems, corruption, and logistical difficulties. These challenges, of 
normative, practical and political nature, include: i) the inability or unwillingness of host states 
to prosecute corporations; ii) the difficulty in establishing jurisdiction in the home state; iii) 
practical problems related to the investigation of corporate crimes; iv) the urgent need to 
encourage investment; and v) procedural difficulties that result in most civil lawsuits being 
dismissed, or at the best ending in out-of-court financial settlements. 
 
The positive obligation to address corporate abuse lies principally with host states, as the 
violations are committed on their territory. There are several advantages of conducting legal 
proceedings in the host state, above all, to ensure better access to evidence and witness 
testimonies. There are, however, normative and practical challenges for domestic authorities in 
host states conducting investigations against companies, especially multinational corporations. 
Relying on the human rights obligation of the host state presents two preliminary problems: 
first, whether the state has such an obligation (whether it has signed the relevant international 
human rights treaty); and second, whether the state has the will and capacity to sanction the 
corporate actor – especially in a transitional justice context where the host state’s economy 
may be heavily dependent on either a specific corporation, or the need to reassure corporate 
entities in general that their activities and revenues are relatively safe. In addition, in 
transitional justice contexts the legal systems and means of enforcement are often deficient, 
and the state may lack de facto control over relevant areas, or may be the principal perpetrator 
of the violations in the first place.398 The worst human rights violations are often committed 
during armed conflict where the rule of law is severely compromised, if not totally absent. 
Many wars are fought in countries with a weak police and judicial infrastructure where there is 
limited physical capacity to undertake even the most basic prosecutions. Systematic flaws in 
the domestic regulation and the judicial system due to the lack of institutional capacity and 
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resources are likely to be prominent in host states in a transitional context.399  In addition host 
authorities may themselves be involved in the abuses. In particular, in cases where the 
company is complicit in the abuses with an authoritarian or repressive government that may be 
the main perpetrator, victims face further difficulties in obtaining justice before that very 
state’s judicial system. Because the avenues offered by transitional justice mechanisms to 
address corporate accountability in the host state are limited, victims may be forced to turn to 
litigation in other courts.400   
 
The home state’s use of extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporations incorporated in its 
territory is a useful tool in a transitional justice context where the host state may be unwilling 
or unable to prosecute. But home states remain equally reluctant to hold multinational 
companies accountable, a factor Ruggie blames, in part, on ‘the permissible scope of national 
regulation with extraterritorial effect remain[ing] poorly understood’.401 The civil remedies 
system across different jurisdictions remains a possible avenue of redress for victims of 
corporate human rights abuses seeking justice in a transitional context. The jurisprudence 
developed so far has addressed issues related to transitional justice - for example, which 
human rights violations are severe enough to justify litigation against corporations for 
complicity in actions taken by a foreign state, or how courts should address competing claims 
by a society that has specific transitional justice processes. As Ruti Teitel points out, the ATS 
litigation appears as part of an array of responses to prosecution in the absence of full political 
or legal transition.402 But attempts to achieve legal accountability of corporations through 
extraterritorial jurisdiction face serious obstacles as the complicated history of the South 
Africa Apartheid Litigation and the recent narrowing of the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by the Kiobel decision demonstrate.403  
 
In more practical terms, as Alex Batesmith puts it, ‘extraterritorial international investigations 
can be a real headache’. 404 Because the corporate actors involved in crimes are often located 
in multiple jurisdictions, investigations of such activities become expensive, time consuming 
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and therefore daunting. It is often difficult for victims in proceedings against corporations to 
satisfy the necessary standard of proof, because the company retains control over the requisite 
documents and evidence.405 The capacity and willingness of law enforcement agencies to 
investigate such extraterritorial cases creates a further major obstacle.406 In addition, state 
authorities, often reliant on revenues generated by corporate entities, are less likely to 
prioritise the investigation and prosecution of corporate crimes.407 Even when they do, law 
enforcement officials often lack the expertise and resources to pursue this type of offence, and 
face difficulties in taking statements from witnesses and collecting other evidence from 
abroad. Ensuring adequate protection and support for such witnesses through such a 
complicated process may prove particularly troublesome, particularly where the home 
authorities are uncooperative. The political instability in post-conflict and transitional contexts 
adds to the challenge.  
 
Further, the investment and economic activity that a corporation (especially a multinational 
corporation) could bring and particularly its scale, may be more appealing to a post-conflict 
state than the need to provide redress for individual or groups of citizens, for violations 
committed by the company.408 Transitional governments thus have a vested interest in not 
investigating or prosecuting foreign companies for fear of jeopardising overseas investment 
and development.409 Makau Mutua explains that transitional justice concepts comprise a two-
step process of change.410 The first seeks to stabilise a post-conflict society through temporary 
measures that signal a commitment to addressing past abuses and building the public’s 
confidence in a process of reconstruction. In the second phase, those who have been aggrieved 
must find justice, but the place of the perpetrators of the abusive past in the future of the 
society is equally important. ‘While justice needs to be done, concessions must be made by 
each side in order to move forward to a shared and common future’, says Mutua.411 A basic 
condition for the intervention of judicial processes in a transitional justice context is that the 
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system or regime to which the accused belonged has changed – viz. that the transition has 
actually happened.412 As a rule in such processes, it is the political or the military elites that 
change first. As a result, situations of transition after conflicts and repression have often lead 
to the prosecution of political elites.  
 
By contrast, industry and business activities constitute a continuum in most societies, which 
may explain why there is often no drive for a determined legal remedy for these cases.413 
Economic elites are often seen as key actors in rebuilding a society as it goes through a 
political transition. Should corporations be brought to justice for complicity in human rights 
violations, or should they receive absolution to generate growth and economic activity in order 
to further national economic development? A state emerging from conflict or oppressive 
regimes is often less likely and perhaps even reluctant to pursue claims against corporations – 
especially foreign companies - during a time when it needs foreign direct investment, 
economic growth and development, and jobs.414 Countries in transition are often in state of 
economic collapse and in this scenario corporations are often viewed as critical for economic 
progress. Countries emerging from conflict or authoritarianism face increased pressure to 
reduce corporate regulations in an attempt to attract investment.415 As a result, even if 
economic actors have substantially contributed to the systemic injustice, they may not be held 
accountable, in a tacit promise to continue to contribute to the economic recovery. This 
tendency can be observed in the post-World War II cases, as well as later in the South African 
truth and reconciliation process and the initial position of the South African government 
towards claims of the Apartheid Litigation.416  
 
Finally, as has been alluded to in this chapter, most human rights lawsuits against corporations 
are dismissed on procedural grounds in the early stages of litigation.417 Complex jurisdictional 
and procedural difficulties have prevented most cases against corporations from being 
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considered on the merits.418 Binding legal precedents in this area are generally limited to 
procedural issues that, albeit of tangential relevance to the substance of a case, are frequently 
decisive.419 If cases survive inevitable legal procedural challenges and are not dismissed, 
corporate cases to date have been settled before trial as has been demonstrated in key cases in 
this chapter. For example, the majority of cases against corporations under the ATS ended in 
dismissal, while a significant minority resulted in out-of-court financial settlements, before the 
dispute was determined in a final judgment. No case against a corporation for human rights 
violations has yet been determined on the merits. But judicial processes are not the only type 
of remedy available for victims of corporate abuses: in transitional justice contexts, truth-
seeking mechanisms can also recommend measures related to the responsibilities of 
companies and reparations for victims. The next chapter analyses this aspect.   
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IV. TRUTH SEEKING PROCESSES 
 
Introduction  
 
After the assessment of the limitations, and potentials, of international, regional and national 
courts to establish corporate accountability and provide reparations for victims, the analysis 
turns to the work of truth-seeking processes, in particular truth commissions. Truth 
commissions are a typical transitional justice mechanism, with widespread use across the 
world, seeking to enable societies come to terms with the human rights violations perpetrated 
during the period of strife from which they are emerging. The UN Secretary General describes 
truth commissions as ‘official, temporary, non-judicial fact-finding bodies that investigate a 
pattern of abuses of human rights or humanitarian law committed over a number of years’. 1 
State practice of truth commissions vary: in some cases truth commissions are considered 
complementary to criminal trials, in others they may even form an alternative to criminal 
justice, where trials are unlikely because of an overwhelming number of perpetrators, a 
destroyed justice system, or political deals involving amnesties. 2 Although described as ‘non-
judicial’ bodies, truth commissions are, in effect, official bodies, usually established by 
legislation and often conferred with a wide range of legal powers, including compelling 
powers such the ability to subpoena, search and seize. 3 Each truth commission is a unique 
institution, but their core activities usually include collecting statements from victims and 
witnesses, conducting thematic research, organizing public hearings, and publishing a report 
outlining findings and recommendations. 4 Some commentators believe that a state’s duty to 
investigate and provide effective remedies, especially in the absence of a functioning judiciary 
system, mandates the creation of a truth commission to examine a repressive past. 5 
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Priscilla Hayner, a scholar who undertook comprehensive research on the work on truth 
commissions, specifies that truth commissions are usually focused on the past, rather than on 
on-going events, and will often investigate a pattern of events that took place over a period of 
time. 6 Because truth commissions generally seek to address systemic patterns of human rights 
violations, rather than those that may occur solely against specific individuals, they usually 
have the mandate to examine the underlying causes, consequences, and nature of gross human 
rights violations that other processes are often restricted from engaging with, not least due to 
statutory time limitations. 7 As part of their varied mandates, TRCs have started to pay more 
attention to the range of different actors involved in perpetrating violations or part of the state 
infrastructure that tolerated violations, including corporations. 8 While the majority of truth 
commissions have focused on the state’s responsibility for human rights violations, an 
emerging number of commissions have recognised business responsibility too in their final 
reports. 9  In this sense, they play the unique role of establishing an official record of 
corporations’ involvement in past abuses. 10 
 
In addition to truth commissions, UN-mandated commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions 
and other investigative bodies are increasingly being used to respond to situations of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, often in times 
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of conflict and transition.11 Normally, these are mandated to determine the facts surrounding 
the human rights violations, to make recommendations, and, in the case of commissions of 
inquiry – the highest level of investigation –, also to identify alleged perpetrators. While doing 
so, at times, they have also reported on the involvement of companies and businesspeople, and 
have framed recommendations to address their responsibilities.12 This chapter addresses this 
aspect as part of the attempt to identify a remedy-oriented architecture that can effectively 
address corporate human rights violations occurred in transitional justice contexts.  
 
This chapter first describes the investigations and finding of the TRCs and other bodies and 
then assesses their limitations in relation to corporate accountability. It looks in particular at 
the work of TRCs, starting with the South Africa’s TRC, whose findings represent the first 
and one of the most important contributions in the area of corporate accountability (Section 
IV.1). This section is followed by an exploration of the work of truth commissions established 
in Liberia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Argentina, and Brazil, alongside the contributions made 
by other investigative bodies (Section IV.2). The objective of this section is to describe 
emerging state practice in a variety of different settings. This chapter seeks to show that as a 
complement or alternative to judicial processes truth-seeking initiatives can recommend 
important measures for the accountability of companies involved in abuses during times of 
conflict or repression and for the reparations of victims. Often, however, mainly for economic 
and political reasons, governments have failed to implement such recommendations.     
 
IV.1 South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
When Nelson Mandela became the first black president of South Africa in 1994, the 
government established a TRC to investigate and document human rights violations 
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International Fact-finding Mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
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committed during the apartheid regime between 1960 and 1994. 13 The South African TRC 
was the first such commission to examine the role of different sectors of society during the 
previous authoritarian regime, and also the first to investigate business involvement in human 
rights abuses. 14 The TRC Act recognised the systemic nature of the gross violations of human 
rights, and that both individuals and collective entities were involved in those violations. 15 
Under its comprehensive mandate, the TRC investigated systemic patterns of human rights 
violations through public hearings on legislated apartheid, and the roles of different sectors of 
the society – the health, media, legal, and business sectors. 16 The sectoral hearings at the 
South Africa’s TRC aimed to address the issue of apartheid as part of a systemic phenomenon.  
 
The Business Hearing 
In November 1997 in Johannesburg, the South Africa TRC held a three-day institutional 
hearing to focus on the role of business during the apartheid era, with written and oral 
submissions by business organizations, companies, academics, civil society and political 
parties. The business hearing examined the relationship between apartheid and the economy 
and the role of business, government and trade unions. 17 Few corporations, however, decided 
to come forward and take part in the process. Most businesses were deliberately uncooperative 
during the hearing. 18 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chairperson of the TRC, concluded that 
there were ‘glaring absences’ in the business submissions that the TRC received. ‘No one 
today admits to supporting apartheid’, Tutu lamented in his opening remarks to the hearings. 19 
He continued that it would be ‘wonderful to have someone here saying “we did this and we 
did that”…and we want to rub some oil on the wounds’. 20 
 
The Commission conceded that business largely refused to participate in the hearings. 21 The 
                                                
13 M Parlevliet, ‘Considering Truth. Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human Rights Violations’ (1998) 16(2) 
Netherlands Quarterly Human Rights, 172-174.  
14 J Barnard-Naudé, ‘For Justice and Reconciliation to Come: The TRC Archive, Big Business, and the Demand 
for Material Reparations’ in F du Bois and A du Bois-Pedain (eds.), Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society 2008), 172; Nattrass (n 8), 374-75; Darcy (n 4), 53, 54. 
15 South Africa Government, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, Chapter 1, 
section l(ix) [South Africa TRC Act].  
16 Ibid., Chapter 2, section 4(a)(i) section 4(a)(iv)). See also South Africa TRC report (n 8), Vol 4. 
17 South African TRC, Press Release, Statement on Business Role Submissions, 4 September 1997. 
18 J Simcock, ‘Unfinished Business: Reconciling the Apartheid Reparation Litigation with South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission’ (2011) 47 Stan J Intl L 239, 242, 249-53. 
19 South Africa Press Association, ‘Some Glaring Absences in Business Submissions to TRC: Tutu’ 11 
November 1997. 
20 Ibid. 
21 South Africa TRC report (n 8), Vol 4, Ch 2, 18-19. 
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TRC broad assessment was that, ‘businesses were reluctant to speak about their involvement 
in the former homelands’. 22 The report reserved special mention for the agriculture and 
mining industries, highlighting that ‘[I]t was particularly regrettable that representatives of 
commercial agriculture did not participate in the hearing, despite an invitation to do so’. 23 It 
was also ‘regrettable that the Chamber of Mines made no mention in its submission of the 
active role they played in constructing and managing the migrant labour system’.24 Arguably, 
given the uncertain legal consequences that the TRC posed, some corporations simply opted 
out of the proceedings, preferring the risk of being stigmatized for their absence, to the risk of 
a concrete and public assessment of their direct or indirect culpability in maintaining, 
supporting or collaborating with the apartheid regime. Most notable amongst the absentees, 
the TRC reported, were the multinational oil corporations, such as Shell and BP, the largest 
foreign investors in South Africa during apartheid, which did not even respond to the 
invitation to take part. 25 As such, the conspicuous absence of testimony and submissions from 
multinational corporations doing business with the apartheid regime was a major omission 
from the hearings overall. 26 Although their activities were chronicled in the testimony and 
submission from the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) Archives Committee, which focused 
on the role of the multinationals during the period 1960-1994, this absence permitted critical 
actors to be free from any scrutiny for their roles in the apartheid and related rights violations.  
 
With few exceptions, businesses denied any active involvement with the apartheid 
government.27 They rejected any notion of culpability and resisted any attempts to link their 
business activities with human rights violations. This also applied to the media sector where 
the Afrikaans press declined to participate in the media hearing. Nasionale Pers, the largest 
Afrikaans newspaper publishing company, claimed that its affiliated papers did not commit 
any human rights abuse and therefore had nothing relevant to contribute to the TRC process.28 
A few representatives of the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) were prepared to 
admit that the SABC served as the propaganda arm of the government and thus contributed to 
                                                
22 Ibid., Vol 4 ‘Final Recommendation on Business Hearings’, 36. 
23 Ibid., 28. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 18. 
26 Lyons (n 8), 153-54. 
27 South Africa TRC report (n 8), Vol. 4, 58. 
28 Ibid. 
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abuses of human rights.29 But justifications and excuses abounded: the government was hostile, 
the general climate was dangerous and the SABC sought to portrait itself as valiantly seeking 
to do what it could in such an environment. 30 The English language press took a similar 
position: in its submission Times Media denied that their newspaper had not done enough to 
oppose apartheid.31  
 
Some of the business submissions accepted that apartheid benefited certain business interests 
such as Afrikaner capital, 32 but all rejected the idea that apartheid was good for business. The 
role of businesses in supporting the government during apartheid seemed to be a case of 
‘selective creeping amnesia’ among white businesses. 33 As Beth Lyons points out, what was 
most significant in white businesses’ testimony and submissions were the topics they did not 
address. 34 One of the omissions was any reference to businesses’ role in the military-industrial 
complex. 35 As a representative of Barlow Rand, an electronic equipment manufacturer who 
supplied the military-industrial complex for 27 years put it, ‘[T]here was no direct violation of 
human rights that could be attributed to business’. 36 Armaments Corporation of South Africa 
(Armscor), a state-owned armaments company that supplied weapons to the military, 
concluded that ‘…despite the covert and clandestine methods used by this organisation in the 
past, we have been unable to unearth what appears to be transgressions [of human rights]’. 37 
One of the very few business inputs that reflected critically on business support for the 
ideology of apartheid, was the submission from the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut (AHI), the 
main organization of Afrikaner business:  
 
Without in any way detracting from the AHI’s willingness to accept responsibility…it 
must be noted that support for separate development was part and parcel of the 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Anglo American, for example, complained that hostility from the National Party at times affected its ability to 
do business and South African Breweries (SAB) complained of a similar bias which forced them out of the retail 
liquor, wines and spirits industries. South Africa TRC report (n 8), Anglo American, Submission, 13; SAB, 
Submission, 15. 
33 Lyons (n 8), 144. 
34 Ibid., (137-41). 
35 South Africa TRC report (n 8), 126: ‘hundreds and probably thousands of South African private sector 
companies made the decision to collaborate actively with the government’s war machine. This was no reluctant 
decision imposed on them by coercive apartheid legislation. Many businesses, including subsidiaries of leading 
corporations, became willing collaborators in the creation of this war machine’. 
36 AM Rosholt, Business Hearings, 11 November 1997. 
37 South Africa TRC report (n 8), Armscor, Submission. 
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majority of the white community’s thinking at the time…the notion that the separate 
development of South African population groups was seen as the best guarantee for 
overall justice and peace in the country. The AHI was part of that collective thinking. 38 
 
Some business submissions included apologies for not having done more. Anglo-American, 
for example, apologized for not having provided more married accommodation for black 
workers. 39 This was regarded as one of the ‘missed opportunities’ and the corporation 
acknowledged ‘with regret that we did not sufficiently progress these and many other 
opportunities to oppose apartheid and hasten its demise’. 40 Other than this omission Anglo-
American’s submissions lacked any acknowledgment of its responsibility for human rights 
abuses perpetrated in its mines. To fill in the missing pieces, one has to turn to submissions 
made by trade unions that document the mining disasters, the role of the mine security during 
strikes, and the use of convict labour in furthering business interests and generating output, 
revenues and profit. 41  
 
Financial institutions were among the few private entities admitting that the economic sector 
was tied to apartheid. The submission from the Council of South African Banks acknowledged 
that apartheid was a political, social and economic system, which depended for its efficacy on 
all those three ‘pillars’, and that senior bank officials lent ‘credibility’ to apartheid 
governmental structures. 42 The submission highlighted:  
 
The banks were knowingly or unknowingly involved in the provision of banking 
services and the lending of money to the apartheid government and its 
agencies…Banks cannot exist otherwise than within the systems and structures of the 
country in which they operate. 43  
 
With respect to its role in human rights violations, the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
admitted that it was ‘an integral part of the system and part and parcel of the apartheid gross 
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violation of human rights’. 44 In its submission, the Land and Agricultural Bank of South 
Africa acknowledged participation in policies that often, as acts of omission, supported rural 
and agricultural apartheid. 45 One of South Africa’s former prime ministers, referring to the 
support financial corporations provided to the government at that time said that ‘each bank 
loan, each new investment [was] another brick in the wall of our continued existence’. 46  
 
The submissions from white businesses were contested by testimony from businesses and 
organisations in the black, Indian and Muslim communities, and the labour and antiapartheid 
movement. Submissions critical of business argued that apartheid was a system of exploitation 
that benefited capital. As the African National Congress (ANC) put it:  
 
Apartheid was associated with a highly unequal distribution of income, wealth and 
opportunity that largely corresponded to the racial structure of society…Historically 
privileged business as a whole must, therefore, accept a degree of co-responsibility for 
its role in sustaining the apartheid system of discrimination and oppression over many 
years.47  
 
While most critical submissions recognized that apartheid affected different categories of 
business differently, they pointed to the association between apartheid policies, racial injustice 
and South Africa’s racially based income distribution, and concluded that business was 
morally implicated in apartheid. 48 As the AAM Archives Committee concluded, ‘the speed 
with which the apartheid edifice then crumbled [after the withdrawal of international 
business]...is the final proof, if any were needed, of the way in which international business 
sustained apartheid’.49  
 
One of strongest statements came from Sampie Terreblanche, an Afrikaner academic and 
critic of the apartheid government. In his keynote speech at the TRC business hearings, he 
argued:  
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47 South Africa TRC report (n 8), ANC, Submission, 1-2. 
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The true importance of the symbiotic relationship between the white controlled state 
and racial capitalism was that the state was, over a period of more than 60 years, 
always prepared to promulgate legislation to keep black labour costs low and to 
suppress all kinds of black labour unrest with undue ferocity…Without a clear 
understanding of the systemic nature of the exploitation that has taken place, it would 
also not be possible for the beneficiaries (i.e. mainly whites) to make the necessary 
confession, to show the necessary repentance, to experience the necessary conversion 
and to be prepared to make the needed sacrifices. 50  
 
The TRC relied on exposing the truth as a basis for accountability for crimes committed 
during the apartheid era. 51 For perpetrators, ‘bringing the darker side of the past to the fore’ 
was described as a chance to acknowledge their responsibility as well as fulfilling the demand 
for accountability.52 The business hearing was intended as a site for contestation, and the 
opportunity to deliver truth and accountability for alleged corporate crimes committed during 
apartheid. In fact, the hearing can be seen to have provided corporations ‘with a subject 
position from which to speak and from which to represent its version of, and its position in, 
the past’.53  
 
The experience of the business hearings illustrates Leigh Payne’s warning that truth 
commissions can be used as instruments to control collective memory.54 The business hearings 
reflected the disparate versions of the past.55 The TRC report summarized these claims 
collectively: ‘the other position, argued mainly by business, claims that apartheid raised the 
costs of doing business, eroded South Africa’s skill base and undermined long-term 
productivity and growth. In this view, the impact of apartheid was to harm the economy’.56  
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Most of the white businesses tried to refute the structural contention that they were tied to the 
apartheid government and that they acted in complicity with, and profited from apartheid. 
They contended instead that businesses existed in a ‘political vacuum’.57 Some companies 
used the TRC as a forum from which they could launch complaints, claiming that they too 
were victims of apartheid. With no punitive incentive, Audrey Chapman argues, ‘white 
business tended to use the business and labour sector hearings more as public relation 
opportunity than as an exercise in truth telling and acknowledgment’.58  
 
The TRC did not assess whether the claims of businesses were, at least partially or for some 
business, true, or whether the apartheid system could have in some way affected some types of 
business or not; instead it adopted a generalised approach. The TRC did recognise that 
‘[C]learly not all businesses can be tarred with the same brush’, but by condemning ordinary 
business activities (the ‘third-order involvement detailed in the next section) it suggested that 
‘all who prospered under apartheid have something to answer for, in that they took advantage 
of a situation which depressed the earnings of black South Africans, whilst boosting their 
own’.59 It stated that: 
 
The current distribution of wealth (which is substantially concentrated in white hands) 
is a product of business activity that took place under an apartheid system that 
favoured whites. This acts as a counterbalance to statements by business that apartheid 
harmed them, a reminder that white business accumulated (sometimes vast amounts of) 
wealth in spite of this alleged harm.60 
 
The TRC’s Findings on Business 
The TRC’s final report found that the business sector had been ‘central to the economy that 
had maintained the South African state during the apartheid years’.61 The Commission found 
that some sectors of business were more involved with the apartheid regime than others, but 
that most businesses were culpable by virtue of having benefited from operating in a racially 
                                                
57 Lyons (n 8), 137; K Asmal, R Suresh Roberts (eds.), Reconciliation, Through Truth, A Reckoning of 
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structured environment. The TRC concluded: 
  
The degree to which business maintained the status quo varied from direct involvement 
in shaping government policies or engaging in activities directly associated with 
repressive functions to simply benefiting from operating in a racially structured society 
in which wages were low and workers were denied basic democratic rights.62  
 
The TRC thus shifted from a focus on individual perpetrators, to a systematic analysis that 
equated profitable activity with prospering under apartheid, and drew a link between 
benefiting from the apartheid’s system of racial privileges and having a moral culpability for 
it.63 The Commission found: 
 
Certain businesses, especially the mining industry, were involved in helping to design 
and implement apartheid policies. Other businesses benefitted from co-operating with 
the security structures of the former State. Most businesses benefitted from operating 
in a racially structured context.64  
 
Recognising that businesses were not a single homogenous category, the TRC’s final report 
identified three orders of involvement in the apartheid system.65 The businesses that were 
directly involved ‘with the state in the formulation of oppressive policies or practices’ were 
considered to be those of the first order.66 The commission concluded that business involved 
in this way ‘must be held responsible for the suffering that resulted’.67 The TRC focused on 
the mining industry, which worked with the government to shape discriminatory policies, such 
as the migrant labour system, to its own advantage.68 Companies that knew ‘that their products 
or services would be used for morally unacceptable purposes’ fell within those deemed to be 
of the second order of involvement in the apartheid system.69 This included the armaments 
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industry’s provision of equipment used to abuse human rights, and more indirect assistance, 
such as banks’ provision of covert credit cards for repressive security operations. For example, 
the TRC concluded, ‘[t]he banks played an instrumental role in prolonging apartheid from the 
time of the debt crisis in 1985 onwards’.70  
 
Finally, the Commission identified a ‘third order involvement’: ordinary business activities 
that benefited indirectly by virtue of operating within the racially structured context of 
apartheid. 71  Some of the business submissions grappled with the issue of third-order 
involvement by asking whether, by merely doing business under apartheid, they were 
supporting the system.72 The Textile Federation, for example, pointed that its only link with 
the state was the service of clothing contracts. 73 Third order involvement is the most 
problematic of the three orders because it proceeds beyond the bounds of intent and implies 
guilt by association. The Commission even asked, in some instances, ‘whether business had 
done enough to end [apartheid]’.74 Nicoli Nattrass argues, ‘the only way in which any business 
could have avoided condemnation by the TRC was to have disinvested entirely from the South 
African economy’.75 
 
The business hearings enabled the TRC to make an historical record of businesses’ complex 
role within apartheid. As Lyons put it: ‘The efforts of white businesses to expunge their crimes 
from history and, in that process, revise that history, had simply failed’.76 The findings of the 
TRC report on business discredited the position that white businesses did not benefit from 
apartheid legislation, and instead specifically affirmed the collusion and complicity of 
business with apartheid. Although the majority of South Africans knew this, as they had 
experienced it every day, the hearings helped to fill in the mechanisms crucial to the 
functioning of the apartheid state.77 The South Africa TRC, which did not have any judicial 
power, condemned business from a moral point of view for crimes of commission and 
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omission.78 In the course of the South African transition from apartheid the question of 
corporate accountability was approached from both moral and legal angles, allowing, as Nadia 
Bernaz argues, for a better and perhaps more balanced understanding of the truth.79  
 
The TRC’s Recommendations on Reparations 
The transitional justice process in South Africa, through the work of the TRC, is a good 
example of an attempt to link corporations and reparations, despite the associated political cost 
of doing so.80 The issue of reparations were a central feature of the TRC’s claim to delivering 
justice.81 One of the crucial tasks entrusted to the TRC was that of ‘restoring the human and 
civil dignity of…victims…by recommending reparations measures’.82 The TRC Act provided 
that reparations were to include ‘any form of compensation, ex gratia payment, restitution, 
rehabilitation and recognition’.83 The proposals formulated by the TRC distinguished four 
categories of reparations: community rehabilitation programmes; symbolic reparations 
measures (issuing of death certificates, exhumations reburials, and other ceremonies); 
administrative, legal and other institutional reforms; and individual reparations in the form of 
financial grants.84 The TRC adopted a constrained ‘closed list’ approach when it established 
the requirements for reparation eligibility, limited this to victims of ‘killing, abduction, torture 
or severe ill-treatment’.85 Approximately 17,000 of the approximately 33 million black South 
Africans who suffered from the injustices of apartheid were qualified for reparations.86 One of 
the Commissioners explained in this way such dilemma:  
 
The Act’s definition of a victim immediately excluded millions of South Africans who, 
while they may not have suffered a gross violation of human rights in terms of the Act, 
nevertheless suffered the daily violation of living under apartheid. Our first painful 
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step was thus to limit reparation recipients to those who had been found to have 
suffered a gross violation of human rights, as defined in the Act.87 
 
Eventually, the government provided only monetary compensation (no other forms of 
reparations) to the 17,000 victims with a one-off payment of R30,000 (about $4,000) each, 
totalling about $70 million, which fell short of the $360 million the TRC had requested. 88 
Corporations did not provide any reparations, and victims of corporate abuses, such as for 
example labour violations, were, as a consequence, not provided reparations. At the start of the 
business hearing, the TRC emphasised that acknowledgement and forgiveness was only part 
of the reconciliation process, and that this had to be followed by reparations, including from 
businesses. Desmond Tutu invited corporations to make donations to the President’s Fund 
intended for the public reparations scheme designed by the TRC to rehabilitate people affected 
by apartheid. 89 In its final report, the Commission stated that ‘business benefitted substantially 
during the apartheid era…and has, at the very least, a moral obligation to assist...through 
active reparative measures’.90 To give effect to this, the TRC suggested to the South African 
government several ways for extracting reparations payments from companies. These included: 
a wealth tax; a one-off levy on corporate and private income; a 1% ‘donation’ of the market 
capitalization by companies listed on the Johannesburg’s stock exchange; and retrospective 
surcharges on corporate profit.91 Yet nothing came out of these proposals.  
 
Limitations of the TRC in relation to Corporate Accountability and Reparations 
There is some consensus among scholars that the South African TRC did not do all it could to 
obtain effective reparations for victims and properly investigate corporate human rights 
abuses.92 The TRC can be seen as an embodiment of South Africa’s restorative justice 
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approach to transition, a path that was also chosen carefully to avoid the punitive ‘victors’ 
justice’ approach to corporate and other crimes.93 Recalling the principles developed by 
Declan Roche, a restorative justice process must be guided by the need to repair and heal a 
relationship, and is based on the participation of offenders and their reintegration back into 
society.94 In certain respects the business hearing can be seen as employing restorative justice 
principles described by Roche: ‘personalism’, reparation, reintegration, and participation.95 
First, the hearing was based on personalism and focused on the experience of the workers as 
well as labour law violations. Second, it was clearly presented as an opportunity to remedy 
harm, in that the TRC directly invited businesses to seek to ‘repair the wrong that accrues 
from whatever was done for which the person is contrite’.96 Third, as with the entire 
transitional justice process in South Africa, the focus of the hearing was on the reintegration of 
offenders.97 Finally, corporate involvement in human rights abuses was discussed in an open 
forum that included affected parties.  
 
In key aspects, however, the process did not fulfil the essential conditions that a model of 
restorative justice demands.98 Koska argues that the structure and organisation of the TRC was 
such that equal participation was never guaranteed due to the lack of the threat of 
prosecution.99 After companies failed to respond to the invitation for submission to the 
business hearing, the Commission acknowledged that the non-appearance of these 
corporations obstructed its investigation.100 It declined, however, to use its subpoena powers to 
compel businesses to appear and testify, and instead simply confirmed that those companies 
would not be called to attend the business hearing.101 The Commission struggled to elicit truth, 
compensation or redress for the crimes alleged to have been committed by corporations, 
notably in the mining sector. Reparations are a critical aspect of any restorative justice process 
and were a central feature of the TRCs claim to deliver justice.102 But the Commission failed 
to secure reparations for victims of corporate abuses.  
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The TRC lacked the power to order the payment of reparations; it was only empowered to 
make recommendations and remained reliant on the government to implement them 
subsequently.103 Although the government accepted many of the TRC recommendations it 
hesitated at imposing compulsory reparation payments, and condemned proposals for a wealth 
tax, believing these to be disincentives to remain invested in the South African economy.104 
Jaco Barnard-Naudé argues that ‘the transitional compromise forged by the constitutional 
court according to which amnesty would be give on condition that comprehensive reparations 
would follow was disowned’.105 He points out that the TRC ‘failed to compel the legislature to 
enact a law that…would have provided some relief for the suffering that occurred in the 
economic sphere’.106 No subject better encapsulates the economic and political dilemmas of 
transitional justice than the myriads of issues related to reparation.107 At the time that the TRC 
issued its final report in 2003, a post-Mandela presidency was already underway. The new 
administration was focused on reducing the country’s high unemployment rate, and on 
growing the nation’s GDP. The new administration determined that foreign direct investment 
was critical to these efforts, and, as a consequence, shied away from any actions that it deemed 
might have the effect of deterring investors.108 The death knell to the process came in April 
2003 when South African President Thabo Mbeki announced that the government would not 
implement the TRC recommendations regarding business reparations.109  
 
Corporations agreed with the government. They thought that ‘reparation was not the way to go 
[and] decided [that] the best way forward was to show that business was serious about 
transformation. [They] wanted to establish a project in which business could play a catalytic 
role to achieve agreed objectives’.110 Finally, corporations, with the support of the government, 
opted for a model of financial contributions to provide development to the country. It was 
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agreed to create a Business Trust so corporations would contribute to the country’s 
reconstruction and provide funds to affected communities, without naming those funds as 
reparations.111 The Business Trust ran from 1999 to 2011 and generated R1.2 billion of 
financial contributions from 140 companies, and additional government contributions.112 Clara 
Sandoval argues that although business engagement took place on a purely voluntary basis, the 
process still demonstrates that corporations can play an active role in reparations.113 The 
contributions, however, should not be understood as a form of compensation, given that they 
were not generated in response to the individual harm suffered by victims, and were not used 
to redress victims.114 Thus the Trust was not intended to provide reparations for those affected 
by corporate-related human rights violations, but was geared instead, towards promoting 
economic development by attracting foreign investment.115 Companies insisted that their 
contribution was referred to as ‘nation-building’, rather than ‘community reparations’.116  
 
The failure to address past abuses directly meant that the Trust did not meet a key component 
of a restorative justice process: that reparations target the perpetrator and repair the harm that 
was caused.117 Moreover, as argued by Paul Gready, the focus on economic growth concealed 
the relational aspect of economic inequality in apartheid South Africa as well as the obligation 
for beneficiaries, such as businesses, to repay those who were harmed.118 As a result, this 
approach paved the way for corporate social responsibility in South Africa, which focused on 
businesses’ contribution to economic development and assisting communities through social 
interventions, rather than remedying harms and addressing corporate accountability.119 For 
example, Koska argues that Anglo American was also able to use the Business Trust as a 
vehicle to promote its own corporate social responsibility agenda and enhance its reputation in 
South Africa.120 The failure of the TRC to extract acknowledgement and reparations from 
Anglo American meant that those affected were left without a remedy while the company was 
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awarded a special status in the rebuilt of post-apartheid South Africa.121 David Fig argues that 
the term ‘corporate social responsibility’ was then abandoned by most South African 
corporations in favour of the term ‘corporate social investment’, in order to divert attention 
from calls on business to redress the results of its historical contribution to the apartheid 
system.122  
 
Arguably, the TRC intended to punish businesses in a manner different from individuals. As 
one participant in the hearings noted, ‘[I]n making findings about business, the TRC adopted a 
very different approach to culpability and restitution from that it applied to perpetrators of 
gross human rights abuses’.123 Whereas apartheid agents (security policemen, members of 
death-squads) were granted amnesty in return for full disclosure and encouraged to seek 
reconciliation with victims, the TRC proposed that all businesses, regardless of their different 
levels of involvement, were to pay a flat tax as compensation for their gains during 
apartheid.124 In doing so, the TRC adopted a blanket approach to corporate involvement that 
equated any profitable activity with prospering under apartheid. In effect, all accumulated 
wealth was regarded by the TRC as equally deserving of punitive taxation.125 As Nattrass 
points out, ‘no attempt was made to make the proposed restitutive measures proportional to 
the different levels of involvement’.126 This blanket approach meant that corporations that had 
participated in a relatively benign manner were to be penalized to the same extent as those that 
had played a more active or even collaborative role. The TRC did not demand greater 
accountability from the more powerful players. By opting for blanket measures, the TRC 
effectively ‘placed small shops owners in the same group as Anglo-American or Armscor’, 
and proposed punishing them all for having operated in a racially structured environment.127 
As Simcock argues, ‘With respect to corporations, the combination of the TRC’s 
recommendations and the government’s actions has led to a somewhat perverse form of 
justice’.128 Cumulatively, the victims of corporate abuses during apartheid have yet to receive 
any form of reparations. 
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A justification of the ‘blanket approach’ approach of the TRC towards businesses is its focus 
on the systemic nature of their involvement. Terreblanche explains the importance of spelling 
out the systematic way in which apartheid benefited business:  
 
Without a clear understanding of the systemic nature of the exploitation that has taken 
place, it would also not be possible for the beneficiaries (i.e. mainly whites) to make 
the necessary confession, to show the necessary repentance, to experience the 
necessary conversion and to be prepared to make the needed sacrifices.129 
 
For Terreblanche, the ‘necessary sacrifices’ entailed the payment of a wealth tax on the 
grounds that it would be a ‘just form of taxation, because it would be levied on wealth 
accumulated during the period when the structures of white political supremacy and racial 
capitalism were in place’.130 This argument in favour of blanket culpability underpinned the 
TRC report’s condemnation of business for benefiting under apartheid, and its 
recommendations in favour of a wealth tax. Nattrass concludes: ‘The South Africa TRC seems 
to be the only truth commission that took seriously the idea that simply by virtue of operating 
within the context of a repressive regime, business should bear some accountability for it’.131 
 
Although the TRC had no judicial powers to penalise perpetrators for human rights violations, 
it could grant amnesties.132 Perpetrators who came forward and admitted their guilt received 
amnesty against prosecution.133 But the amnesty provisions were written for individual 
perpetrators, not collective entities.134 Whereas apartheid agents were granted amnesty in 
return for full disclosure and encouraged to seek reconciliation with their victims, the TRC 
proposed that wealth taxes be considered as appropriate restitution with regard to business. As 
Lyons points out, ‘while the TRC courageously tried to fulfil its mandate to examine systemic 
abuses, the statute had no built-in incentive, such as amnesty, to encourage business, or other 
sectors, to fully disclose the truth about their roles under apartheid’.135 Nor was there a penal 
alternative, such as the prospect or threat of a criminal prosecution, for failure to tell the truth 
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and seek amnesty.136 Without the incentive of amnesty or the threat of criminal prosecution, 
there was ‘nothing to hold over businesses’ heads’.137  
 
Arguably, the South Africa TRC missed the opportunity to elicit significant new information 
on the way in which business committed abuses during apartheid.138 The hearing did provide 
important insights into the manner in which apartheid reached into the business sector. But the 
analysis and findings are not extensive. Barnard-Naudé argues that the TRC treatment of the 
business sector can be understood as an exercise in forgetting ‘ahead of itself’.139 Read in 
isolation, the few pages that make up the TRC report account of the role of business in 
apartheid appear strong, he says.140 However, a closer look at the TRC treatment of the 
business sector reveals that it fails to paint an adequately vivid picture of business involvement 
in apartheid. The TRC report, for example, did not attempt an integrated analysis to address 
the complex power relationship of apartheid, including the consequences of job reservation, 
wages, unequal access to resources, and migrant labour.141 The report affirms that business 
supported and benefitted from apartheid, but it did not come to any overall conclusion as to 
whether the economic system was deliberately designed with the collusion of the business 
sector to produce white beneficiaries and black victims.  
 
Symptoms of the same inattention are reflected, Barnard-Naudé continues, in the TRC’s 
distinction between first, second and third order of involvement.142 He argues that the 
distinction masks human rights violations perpetrated in the economic sphere by representing 
them as mere involvements being more or less culpable than others, while the concept of 
responsibility is not open to evaluation of different degrees. The ‘invention’ of these 
categories on involvement ultimately worked against disclosure.143 The TRC understood big 
business as beneficiaries instead of perpetrators of apartheid.144 Business stressed that the TRC 
mandate was to investigate ‘gross violations of human rights’ during apartheid and took the 
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view that this required investigation of active, deliberate participation by individuals.145 As 
Terreblanche points out, the TRC instead of challenging this understanding, effectively 
endorsed it.146  
 
Koska also argues that the TRC lacked the independence and authority to formally sanction 
businesses found to have committed human rights violations, and in particular the egregious 
labour violations committed in the mining industry.147 In South Africa, the exploitation of 
labour provided by the majority black population became synonymous with apartheid and in 
1980 the UN described the apartheid system as a modern form of slavery.148 But international 
human rights instruments condemning apartheid were not invoked in the business hearings.149 
Mining companies built a compound system, which was compared to prisons and 
concentration camps, allegedly to restrict the free movement of the workers.150 Health and 
safety standards were not observed, especially for the majority of black workers, thus 
contributing to respiratory diseases, including tuberculosis, and a silicosis ‘epidemic’ within 
the gold mining industry.151 While the TRC was not focused on investigating business 
participation in human rights violations, the TRC Act could be read as including businesses 
within the scope of the Commission’s investigations.152 Section 4 empowered the TRC to 
facilitate, initiate or coordinate inquiries into systematic human rights violations.153 Included 
within the mandate, was the investigation into the ‘identity of all persons, authorities, 
institutions and organisations involved in such violations’.154 Some commentators argue that 
within the scope of its mandate, the TRC could have formally investigated allegations of 
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labour violations.155 The Commission, instead, chose to adopt a narrow definition of gross 
human rights violations and focused on isolated occurrences of physical violence. This choice 
had the effect of overlooking the responsibility of those who benefited from the system of 
apartheid.156 The TRC lacked independence, authority or the capacity to compel corporations 
to redress harms, and as a result, corporations were able to evade accountability.157 
 
Critics also point at the short time set aside for hearing submissions on the role of business. 
Only three days were allocated for the accounts of decades of complicity of business with the 
apartheid government. Terreblanche argued:   
 
In the end the TRC devoted only three days of its life span of two and a half years to 
public hearings on the role of business in the apartheid era. Not surprisingly, the 
hearings were conducted in a way that obscured the systemic character of apartheid, 
and offered business people an undeserved opportunity to clear themselves and their 
corporations of any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy of apartheid.158 
 
Some scholars further argue that the TRC was used as a platform for businesses to transition 
into post-apartheid South Africa without having to deliver either truth or reparations.159 For 
example, when Anglo American, one of South Africa’s largest multinational corporations, was 
questioned at the business hearing, it employed ‘amnesia’ and other tactics to craft its own 
narrative and control the truth-telling process.160 The business hearing claimed to be permeated 
with the spirit of reconciliation and corporations were directly invited to take responsibility 
and ask for forgiveness.161 For workers, represented by the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), reconciliation was based on the recognition that businesses were 
responsible for discriminatory labour practices, especially in the mines, and the exploitation of 
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resources.162 Members from COSATU made several references to their capacity to forgive on 
the condition that Anglo American took responsibility for labour violations in the mines.163 
Representatives from Anglo American accepted responsibility for their failure to support the 
desegregation of the industry, but they failed to respond to the specific allegations made by 
COSATU.164 As a result, reconciliation was ‘posited as the necessity for black South Africans 
to forgive, rather than Anglo American accepting blame for violations’.165  
 
The political and economic context in which the TRC was established limited the 
Commission’s capacity to exercise its authority over corporations. The TRC lacked the 
necessary independence from the political interests of the National Party or the African 
National Congress in order to be an effective arbitrator over major businesses connected to the 
dominant elites of the apartheid era.166 Because the TRC was reliant on the government to 
implement recommendations, it had no power to compel the corporations to act and remained 
powerless to achieve accountability and deliver reparations when the government did not 
implement any of the TRC’s recommendations concerning business.167 As a non-judicial 
commission dealing with a business sector, on which the new South African government was 
disproportionately dependent, the TRC had no leverage on its own.168 The ‘new’ position of 
business as a partner of government in the transformation controlled the process.169 The TRC’s 
approach to justice can be seen as the product of political and economic circumstances at the 
end of apartheid, and the transitional justice process arguably had little appetite for pursuing 
corporate accountability.170 These conditions came to define the Commission’s role in shaping 
the image of post-apartheid South Africa and limited its capacity to be an effective arbitrator 
                                                
162 Business Hearing (n 45), Sam Shilowa, NARSSA, 13 November 1997, Tape 11, 13:15. 
163 Ibid., Tape 11, 47:25. 
164 Ibid., Bobby Godsell, NARSSA, Tape 12, 1:08:04. 
165 South Africa TRC report (n 8), Vol 4, 36. 
166 H Van der Merwe, ‘What Survivors Say About Justice: An Analysis of the TRC Victim Hearings’ in H Van 
der Merwe and A Chapman (eds.), Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (University 
of Pennsylvania Press 2008), 23, 26; Koska (n 9), 44; K Asmal, L Asmal and R Roberts, Reconciliation Through 
Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid’s Criminal Governance (David Philip 1996), 156- 57. 
167 C Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice’ (2017) 21(4) 
Global Society 579; Koska (n 9), 44. 
168 Lyons (n 8), 159-60. 
169 Ibid.; H Marais, South Africa, Limits to Change, The Political Economy of the Transformation (Zed Books 
1998), 259.  
170 N Roht-Arriaza, ‘Why Was the Economic Dimension Missing for so Long in Transitional Justice? An 
Exploratory Essay’ in JP Bohoslavsky and H Verbitsky (eds.), The Economic Accomplices to the Argentine 
Dictatorship (Cambridge University Press 2005), 19. 
 
 
 166 
for corporate crimes.171 A major issue for South Africa remains the legacy of the TRC and its 
‘unfinished business’.172 The legacy of the complex power relationship of apartheid continues 
to afflict the post-apartheid society.173 
 
IV.2 Other Truth and Reconciliations Commission and Truth-seeking Bodies 
 
The South Africa TRC was the first truth commission to include findings related to business 
involvement in abuses and to recommend reparations from companies in its report. As such, 
despite the limitations listed above, it assumed an innovative mandate and provided important 
precedents. Later truth-seeking bodies, established in Liberia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, 
Argentina, and Brazil (analysed in the following sections), adopted a similar approach, 
although their recommendations have been, for the most part, ignored by the government.     
 
Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Liberia is a classic example of a country that suffers from the proverbial ‘resource curse’, as 
well as a case where resources perpetuated the conflict and continue to play into the risk of 
conflict recurrence.174 Part of the mandate of the Liberian TRC was to look at ‘economic 
crimes’, such as the plunder exploitation of natural resources, which allowed it to examine the 
role played by corporations.175 According to the TRC report, 
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An economic crime is any prohibited activity committed for the purpose of generating 
economic gain or that in fact generates economic gain by persons and actors whose 
economic activities contributed to gross human rights and/or humanitarian law 
violations in Liberia or that otherwise perpetuated armed conflict in Liberia, as well as 
those who benefited economically from armed conflict in Liberia. They include public 
and private persons, national and private corporations, and other business entities.176 
 
In particular, the report analysed crimes that occurred within the rubber, timber and mining 
sectors. 177 Resource control and mismanagement by government and multinational 
corporations played a major role in the Liberian civil conflict. Throughout the period of 
conflict between 1979 and 2003, examined by the TRC, these resources benefitted only a 
small elite group of Liberians, and selected companies.178 Control of natural resources served 
as a motivating factor in the war, and those resources funded the armed groups perpetrating 
the conflict, particularly Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Successive 
Liberian governments were either unwilling or unable to govern and manage critical economic 
sectors. As a result, the TRC found, warring factions gained effective control over the timber 
and mining sectors and unlawfully transferred authority to exploit the resources to individual 
and corporate actors that conducted business in an unregulated environment, and played a 
crucial role in contributing to the conflict in Liberia.179 In many instances joint corporate 
ventures were formed with perpetrators of grave human rights violations.180 The Commission 
also found evidence that security forces associated with mining companies committed grave 
violations of human rights.181 The TRC concluded that warring factions, government agencies, 
Liberian and foreign individuals, and corporate actors committed economic crimes in a 
widespread and systematic manner.182  
 
In particular, the report detailed the impact of illegal timber exploitation during the conflict. 
Timber is one of Liberia’s most significant natural resources and is a central source of 
government revenue. Between 1979 and 2003, timber comprised over 50% of the country’s 
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reported exports.183 The TRC found that the timber sector contributed to the conflict in Liberia 
in several ways. Political elites and warring factions used logging revenue to fund the armed 
conflict. Logging companies shipped, or facilitated the shipment of weapons and other 
military material to warring factions and utilized security forces that operated as militia units 
and that committed grave human rights abuses in Liberia.184  
 
In its final report published in 2009, the TRC recommended that the government conduct a 
concession review of the mining sector to discover the extent of money laundering, bribery 
and other economic crimes within it, to calculate tax arrears by corporations, to determine 
whether mineral companies complied with Liberian law, and to document corruption, 
illegality and mismanagement. 185  The report included a list of 26 individuals and 19 
corporations in the timber, maritime, rubber, petroleum and telecommunications sectors that 
allegedly committed ‘economic crimes’ (among them, the companies Firestone and Oriental 
and Royal Timber, and their president Guus Kouwenhoven, then prosecution in The 
Netherlands as discussed in Chapter III). 186  The Commission recommended that the 
government ‘aggressively pursue’ civil and criminal actions against them.187 Recognizing the 
problem of the limited fora for corporate accountability, the Commission recommended the 
inclusion of legal entities in the jurisdiction of a proposed ‘Extraordinary Criminal Court for 
Liberia’ and called upon other countries to apply universal jurisdiction to pursue corporate 
offenders.188 Finally, however, the government did not initiate any judicial case against those 
individuals and corporations. 
 
The commission did not explicitly link the human rights violations by corporations with an 
obligation to provide reparations.189 But it called on the government to establish a Reparations 
Trust Fund to compensate victims.190 The Commission suggested that the Fund could obtain 
sources through four ways. First, recovering tax arrears from timber, mining, petroleum and 
telecommunications companies that evaded tax liability under the Taylor regime. Second, 
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obtaining funds from ‘economic criminals’ sentenced by Liberian courts to pay restitution or 
other fees.191 To that end, the TRC recommended that the government of Liberia ‘aggressively 
seek restitution from individuals and corporate actors that perpetrated economic crimes.’192 
Third, as an alternative to prosecution, the commission suggested that perpetrators of 
economic crimes could apply to the Liberia National Human Rights Commission for the 
purpose of making restitution ‘of the full sum of all gains from their engagement in such 
economic crimes’.193 Forth, the Commission recommended that the government ‘aggressively 
seek to trace, identify and freeze assets of those individuals and entities that committed 
economic crimes in Liberia’ and to use both criminal confiscation laws in Liberia and civil 
forfeiture laws in the countries where stolen assets are located to recover funds to be 
repatriated to Liberia.194 To freeze assets the TRC also encouraged the government to utilize 
processes established by the UN Convention Against Corruption and recommended that any 
funds frozen under UN sanctions not be released until the new government had the 
opportunity to collect tax arrears.195 The Convention codifies norms on the recovery of ill-
gotten assets and against large-scale corruption.196 These norms apply not only to individual 
dictators with ill-gotten assets or leaders of armed groups who may be implicated in pillage; 
they also explicitly cover banks and financial institutions and the profits that are the products 
of human rights violations or international crimes.197 Often private companies directly or 
indirectly take advantage of a conflict to exploit resources and illegitimately accumulate 
assets.198 Arguably, if those actors are found responsible, it is legitimate for a transitional 
government to attempt to trace and confiscate their assets to fund reparations programmes.199 
For example, the reparation programme in the Philippines is being funded using $200 million 
out of the $680 million recovered from the Marcos family’s assets in Switzerland.200  
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In the end, the government of Liberia, as in South Africa, did not implement the TRC 
recommendations regarding reparations programmes. The government rejected legislation that 
would have given it the power to freeze assets.201 The course of the transition in Liberia is 
another relevant example of the challenge in balancing the need for justice and the need to 
attract foreign investment in a post-conflict society. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberian president 
and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, became known as a hero of Liberia’s post-conflict 
recovery for successfully rebuilding a country destroyed by decades of conflict. ‘Liberia’s 
leading lady’ succeeded in bringing high levels of aid and foreign investment into the country. 
Yet Johnson Sirleaf was also the target of many critical voices within Liberia. The Liberian 
TRC recommended that she be barred from office for her role in supporting war criminal 
Charles Taylor. In 2012, days after Johnson Sirleaf was elected for a second term as Liberia’s 
president, the New York Times published an op-ed by two Liberian land rights campaigners, 
Silas Siakor and Rachel Knight.202 They claimed, ‘Mrs. Johnson Sirleaf’s government may 
now be sowing the seeds of future conflict by handing over huge tracts of land to foreign 
investors and dispossessing rural Liberians’.203 Between 2006 and 2011, Sirleaf had granted 
more than a third of Liberia’s land to private investors for logging, mining and agro-industrial 
enterprises.204 These concessions to foreign investments displaced thousands of people at a 
time when violent local-level land disputes were still widespread throughout Liberia.205 Given 
the role that resource control played in the Liberian conflict, addressing abuses within those 
sectors was arguably critical to breaking down norms of impunity and achieving a sustainable 
transition. But as Siakor and Knight pointed out, policy in Liberia was geared toward 
attracting foreign investment rather than responding to Liberians’ need of justice.206 
 
East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation  
The mandate of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor 
(Commissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacão - CAVR) included looking into the 
‘context, causes, antecedents, motives and perspectives’ that led to human rights violations 
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that took place in the context of the political conflicts between 1974 and 1999.207 As part of 
this mandate, CAVR examined the role in human rights violations committed by a number of 
actors in East Timor and Indonesia, including ‘members of opposition groups, political parties, 
militias, corporations and other individuals’.208 The commission found that human rights 
violations did not occur only as a consequence of military operations but were ‘intertwined 
with private and corporate interests,’ including the Indonesian military’s partnerships with 
business in the coffee, timber, and oil sectors.209 
 
Coffee has been East Timor’s single most important source of tax revenue, foreign exchange 
and local cash income since the late 19th century. A single company, Sociedade Agrícola 
Pátria e Trabalho (SAPT), dominated the production and export of plantation crops under 
Portuguese administration.210 Although founded as a private venture, SAPT behaved as if it 
were a state company by virtue of its association with the governor. Using the authority and 
resources of the state, SAPT seized the most productive land for coffee, and instituted a 
programme of forced cultivation, overseen by the military. Later rebellions against or inability 
to pay the poll tax were punished by forced labour on coffee plantations.211 State proxies had 
special arrangements with the Indonesian military, which gave them control of the coffee 
production and trade, in return for supplying ‘off-budget’ funds for military operations. CAVR 
found that revenues from the coffee industry ‘financed the military campaign in East Timor as 
well the military’s…repression of the local population’.212 In addition to control of coffee, the 
military was also involved in the looting of East Timor’s natural resources including 
sandalwood, timber and oil.213 The commission found that the private sector, including British 
and French arms companies who supplied arms to the regime, profited from commercial 
relations with Indonesia under the Suharto government. 214  By shedding light on the 
responsibilities of the private sector, CAVR was able to establish a more truthful account of 
the conflicts in East Timor.215  
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CAVR made a direct link between the violations corporations committed or aided and abetted, 
and their obligations to provide reparation.216  The Commission noted that corporations that 
‘profited from war and benefitted from the occupation’ had a legal obligation to provide 
reparations to victims.217 It referred specifically to corporations that profited from the sale of 
weapons, and corporations that ‘supported the illegal occupation of Timor-Leste and thus 
indirectly allowed violations to take place.’ 218  The Commission recommended that the 
reparation scheme be jointly funded by the state, privately owned Indonesian business, and 
multinational corporations.219 Like in South Africa and Liberia, however, little progress was 
made in implementing the programme and a draft law on compensation to victims awaits 
enactment by the parliament. 
 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The Sierra Leone TRC also constituted an important attempt to deal with the root causes of 
conflict or repression and the role of different actors. In accordance with the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act, the TRC was mandated ‘to create an impartial historical 
record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to 
the armed conflict’ from 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement’.220 To that end, it 
was to look into ‘the causes, nature and extent of the violations…[and] the context in which 
the violations…occurred’, as well as into the role played by different actors in the conflict.221 
At the beginning of its work, the Sierra Leone TRC considered that ‘perpetrators may be both 
natural persons and corporate bodies, such as transnational companies or corporations’ and 
that its mandate was not ‘limited to violations committed by States or governments.’222 In its 
final report Witness to Truth the Commission found that the conflict happened because of the 
‘endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced 
most people to a state of poverty.’223 The TRC found that ‘successive political elites plundered 
                                                
216 Ibid., Part 11: ‘Recommendations’, 42. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid., 34. 
219 Ibid., 4, 42. See also, Sandoval and Surfleet (n 79), 104-05.  
220 Parliament of Sierra Leone, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act (2000), Supplement to the Sierra Leone 
Gazette Vol. CXXX, No. 9, Sect 6(1). 
221 Ibid. 
222 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth (2004) [Sierra Leone TRC, Witness to 
Truth], Vol 2, Ch 2, para. 13. 
223 Ibid. 
 
 
 173 
the nation’s assets, including its mineral riches at the expenses of the national good’.224 It 
looked at the role of mineral resources, in particular diamonds, in fuelling the conflict.225  
 
William Schabas argued that a ‘useful contribution’ of the commission’s report was to 
‘debunk some of the myths of the conflict’.226 One of these myths was related to the role of 
‘conflict diamonds’. The prevailing view among external observers, journalists and NGOs was 
that diamonds were at the root of the war in Sierra Leone.227 The Commission concluded 
otherwise, noting that the rebel groups did not focus on controlling the diamondiferous regions 
until the final years of the conflict.228 Because diamonds were central to the country’s 
economy, they were inevitably a factor in conflict, but their role was largely overstated. 
Indeed, for much of the conflict, diamond smuggling remained under the control of the corrupt 
Freetown elite, where it had always been.229 The commission found it important to emphasize, 
however, that this did not feature highly in the early years of the conflict, ultimately 
concluding that while diamonds helped to fuel and sustain the conflict, plunder was not the 
driving factor that precipitated the RUF’s initial brutal campaign.230  
 
The TRC recommended specific reforms of the country’s mining sector including 
transparency, protection against corruption, certification of diamonds, and investment of 
diamond revenue in rural development.231 It recommended the establishment of a rough 
diamond chain-of-custody system, which eventually developed into the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme, a global regulatory framework for tracking the diamond trade to ensure 
that diamonds were not acquired illicitly.232 The Commission also proposed that ‘the revenue 
generated from mineral resources’, in addition to ‘seized assets from convicted persons’ who 
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‘profited from the conflict’, would be used to fund reparations programmes. 233  This 
recommendation was not implemented. 
 
UN Experts Panel on the Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
In addition to TRCs, UN-mandated investigations have also looked at the exploitation of 
natural resources by different actors, including companies. In 2012, the UN Security Council 
established a Panel of Experts to look into on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 234  The Panel identified three distinct ‘elite 
networks’ - powerful groups consisting of political and military elites and businesspeople, 
engaged in natural exploitation activities in three different areas controlled by the government 
of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.235 The Panel compiled an extensive list of business 
enterprises and individuals involved in the commercial activities of the three elite networks 
active in the DRC.236 It found that 157 corporations were directly or indirectly involved in 
illegal exploitation of natural resources, which enabled rebel groups to buy arms and commit 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.237 By adding to the revenues of the elite networks, 
directly or indirectly, those companies and individuals contributed to the conflict and to 
human rights abuses. 
 
In particular, in the area controlled by the government of the DRC, an elite network of 
Congolese and Zimbabwean government officials and private businesspeople exploited key 
mineral resources.238 According to the Panel, this network transferred ownership of at least $5 
billion of assets from the state mining sector to private companies under its control.239 The 
Panel found that the richest and most readily exploitable of the publicly owned mineral assets 
of the DRC were moved into joint ventures controlled by the network’s private companies.240 
‘These transactions, which are controlled through secret contracts and off-shore private 
companies, amount to a multi-billion-dollar corporate theft of the country’s mineral assets’, 
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the Panel concluded.241 Some 30 businesspeople, politicians and military officers were the 
main beneficiaries of the arrangements. The Panel found that several joint venture mining 
companies had strong links with the military supply companies that facilitate their operations 
in the DRC, and that diamond revenues were used to pay for arms purchases for the armed 
groups.242 In particular, the armed conflict between members of the Hema and Lendu clans 
stem, in part, from attempts by powerful Hema businessmen and politicians to increase the 
benefits they derived from the commercial activities of the elite network through their front 
companies, the Victoria Group and Trinity Investment, in the Ituri area.243  
 
The Panel recommended that the UN Security Council consider imposing restrictions on those 
business enterprises and individuals involved in illegal exploitation of natural resources, 
including barring them from accessing banking facilities and other financial institutions and 
from receiving funding or establishing a partnership or other commercial relations with 
international financial institutions.244 It recommended reforms of the mining and forestry 
sectors, including the review of all concessions and contracts signed during the wars, and the 
monitoring by specialized industry organizations of commodities from conflict areas.245  
 
In 2003, after the publication of the Panel’s report, the Security Council released a document 
containing the reactions to the report. 246  According to it, the international business 
community…acknowledged that companies could not avoid their responsibility in a country 
suffering from conflict such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Investors and 
financiers took a keen interest in the activities of corporations in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo with which they were dealing. Companies themselves commented that their 
responsibilities extended further that they had previously acknowledged. Supply chains of raw 
materials, in particular came into sharp focus and prompted some of those named to reassess 
their activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. 247     
 
The wording of this statement is vague and generic and it is clear that in reality companies and 
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investors did not commit to any concrete action. The Security Council initiative indeed had a 
limited effect in bringing about accountability for corporate exploitation.248 International 
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose 
focus in the DRC, as in other in post conflict countries, is on securing foreign investments, 
have been unwilling to review and renegotiate contracts in the DRC, despite evidence of 
unaccountability, for fear of scaring off western investors.249 Companies involved were not 
investigated and the people of the DRC, who suffered the impact of the exploitation, were not 
provided with any form of remedy.     
 
Brazil National Truth Commission 
In 2012, Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff established a National Truth Commission (NTC) 
to investigate abuses during the 1964-1985 dictatorship.250 The Brazilian Secretary of Justice 
urged the NTC to also ‘investigate the corporations that financed the dictatorship’.251 A few 
months later, the NTC announced the creation of a task force to investigate the role of 
companies and businesspeople during the repression.252 The commission reported a pattern of 
violence and repression against workers and unions, including cases of arbitrary arrests, 
extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances committed by the regime, in some cases with 
the collusion of companies.253 The commission reported a process of ‘militarization’ of the 
factories, based on surveillance and found documents showing that a number of companies, 
including Volkswagen, Ford, Toyota and Mercedes-Benz, helped the military to identify and 
repress suspected ‘subversives’ and union activists by monitoring workers, passing on 
information about them and handing them to the Department of Political and Social Order 
(DOPS), a police intelligence agency.254 Of particular importance was the discovery in São 
Paulo state’s archives, of a document that researchers called ‘the black lists’ - with the names 
and home addresses of workers dismissed for political reasons – which was put together by 
DOPS with information provided by the companies.255  
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Further, investigations by the NTC are shedding light on how public works made or supported 
by the regime led to human rights violations, including the death and disappearance of farmers, 
and indigenous people.256 In both cases, there is a clear connection between the economic 
policy of the regime, private actors (corporations, lenders and businesspeople) that exploited 
economic opportunities created by the regime, and human rights violations that occurred - not 
only deaths and disappearances, but also corruption and destruction of natural resources.257 
Arguably, in carrying out such investigations, the NTC is better fulfilling its goals of historical 
accountability, and may also open new possibilities for civil and criminal accountability 
against perpetrators and their economic accomplices.258 Scholars have also called for the NTC 
to specifically address the issue of financial complicity, something within its power.259 The 
NTC has the mandate to recommend changes in the institutional design of financial 
institutions, both in terms of regulatory measures to be enforced over private actors and the 
articulation of new standards and policies to be complied with by state banks and 
enterprises.260  
 
On the Horizon: New Truth Commission in Argentina 
The truth and justice process in Argentina began in 1982 with the trial of the military junta and 
the investigations on the disappearances of persons by CONADEP.261 Later innovative uses of 
transitional justice mechanisms have started to link corporations to the abuses committed by 
the dictatorship during Argentina’s Dirty War. As detailed in Chapter III, a number of national 
and multinational corporations now face criminal prosecutions and civil claims in Argentinian 
and US courts over their alleged involvement in human rights violations during the 
dictatorship. This new wave of justice calls in Argentina has also led to the establishment of 
further truth-seeking initiatives on corporate complicity.  
 
In December 2015, one week before leaving office the then-President of Argentina, Cristina 
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Fernández de Kirchner signed a bill into law, mandating the establishment of a new truth 
commission. 262  If established, the commission would also be tasked with investigating 
‘economic complicity’: more specifically, the role and responsibility of businesses for 
violations that occurred during the dictatorship.263 In debating and passing the bill, congress 
based the decision to create such commission on evidence about the participation and 
collaboration of domestic and multinational companies with the dictatorship, and in response 
to the claim that they had benefited directly from military action. The aim of the commission 
is not to ‘let the events that occurred as a result of a coup to be diluted over time’.264 As the 
bill creating the commission concludes, ‘investigating and elaborating on the economic and 
financial involvement with the dictatorship will help the process of rebuilding the nation’.265 
Business leaders from the Argentine Industrial Union and the Argentine Association of 
Businesses, however, oppose the measure, saying the initiative was ‘aimed at stigmatizing 
business leaders’.266 The new government under Mauricio Macri is debating whether to move 
forward with the commission arguing that it does not want to be ‘used as a tool against 
business’.267 
 
A group of UN-mandated holders of special procedures, including Pablo de Greiff and Juan 
Pablo Bohoslavsky, endorsed the draft law citing the ‘need to respect human rights and the 
rule of law applies to both public and private actors’.268 They added, 
 
The creation of such a commission represents a great opportunity to find out the truth 
and promote accountability for past violations committed with the complicity or active 
participation of the business sector…It is time to ensure accountability for corporations 
and transnational companies directly or indirectly responsible for violations of human 
rights.269  
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The Commission had been originally suggested in the book by Verbitsky and Bohoslavsky, 
Cuentas Pendientes, which argued that the dictatorship could not have existed or carried out 
the repression without corporations’ direct and indirect involvement, and advocated the 
establishment of a truth commission to specifically investigate corporate and financial support 
of the dictatorship.270 In their work the authors argued that clarifying the role played by 
economic actors, and in particular investigating the financial contributions to the junta was 
essential to understanding the dictatorship.271 Evidence about complicity and collusion with 
the junta can also contribute to the on-going trials described in Chapter III, and toward the 
overall understanding of the patterns of the ‘system crimes’272 committed, and the structural 
nature of the junta’s operations as a collective movement, in a similar way that the South 
African TRC contributed to the understanding of apartheid as a ‘system’. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Truth-seeking initiatives established after the governance transitions in South Africa, Liberia, 
East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Brazil have increasingly sought to use their mandate to 
scrutinise the role and responsibility of corporations and other economic actors in facilitating 
gross violations by oppressive regimes. In their final reports, each of these commissions has 
included recommendations for the government that specifically sought to offer redress for 
victims of corporate abuses. The hearings they conducted have evidenced corporate 
responsibility for rights violations, defined the procedural and substantive dimension of the 
right to reparations for victims of corporate abuses, introduced innovative recommendations 
that business entities should contribute to such reparations, and recommended the recovery of 
assets to assist in the payment of reparations.273 Four positive aspects distinguish truth 
processes with such mandate.  
 
First, examining the role that corporations played in past abuses allows for the establishment 
of a more complete and holistic narrative of the violations that occurred, and facilitates a more 
thorough comprehension of the dynamics that contributed to the conflict or repression. The 
purpose of any truth-seeking initiative is to document and explain pervasive patterns of abuse, 
                                                
270 Bohoslavsky and Verbitsky (n 169). 
271 Ibid. 
272 Bohoslavsky and Opgenhaffen (n 44), 197.  
273 Darcy (n 4), 10, 54. 
 
 
 180 
and to address the root causes of conflict in order to paint a broader portrait of culpability.274 
By examining the role of corporations in past abuses, truth commissions have been able to 
narrate a story about the atrocities that took place that is more representative of the multi-
causal origins of the conflict or repression.275 For example, despite the limitations of the 
process analysed above, the South Africa TRC succeeded in creating an historical record of 
the complex role played by businesses during, and sometimes in conjunction with, the 
apartheid regime. Truth commissions in Liberia, East Timor and Sierra Leone and UN-
mandated investigations in the DRC have also helped to understand the specific role of natural 
resources in the maintenance of authoritarian regimes and the facilitation of armed conflicts.276  
 
A second contribution of truth commissions has been the attempt and ability to counter 
corporate impunity. Truth-seeking initiatives often do not have judicial powers, but their 
findings can nonetheless serve to initiate subsequent judicial proceedings. TRCs in Liberia and 
East Timor for example, have named specific companies, and these often provide the only 
official account of the nature and scale of corporate abuses. By reflecting on the relationship 
between these violations and the responsibilities of companies, they provide a more 
comprehensive account of corporate actions, including data on the wealth they amassed, the 
resources available for reparations and the kind of punishments or measures of forgiveness 
that society should impose or can afford. Once the truth is established in this manner other 
outcomes are also left open to possibility. Hayner explains that a stated intention of most truth 
commissions has been to contribute to justice in the courts; many have forwarded their files to 
the relevant authorities and have recommended prosecution.277 For example, in its final report 
the South Africa’s TRC submitted that there were legal grounds for instituting claims for 
reparations against banks and other corporations. As discussed in Chapter III, dissatisfaction 
on the part of apartheid victims with the compensation awarded by the South African 
government, and the meagre contribution of companies, resulted in the Apartheid Reparations 
litigation filed in the United States.278 The lawsuit was seen as a logical continuation to the 
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incomplete work of the TRC in holding corporations accountable.279 Also of note, as a result 
of the Brazil commission’s findings, some of the workers named in the documents have 
indicated they may pursue civil lawsuits or other legal action, ask reparations for lost wages, 
or seek an apology.280  
 
A third distinct contribution of truth commissions lies in recognizing the links between the 
behaviour of corporations and human rights violations, which may have a potential deterrent 
effect on future corporate behaviour in countries that continue to suffer oppressive regimes. As 
a corollary it has to be emphasized that any failures to address the economic factors that 
contribute to a repressive government constitute a dangerous historical blindness.281 The risk 
is that same factors will emerge again, resulting in the recurrence of violations. Arguably a 
fuller historical record, one that includes corporate involvement, can help ensuring a country 
in transition will not be left in a position where it could repeat past violations. Moreover, in 
line with Nelson Camilo Sanchez, who argues that truth commissions should pursue 
‘transformative reparations’ that address the circumstances of affected communities, truth 
commissions can recommend non-monetary measures for corporations - for instance, an 
improving in working conditions.282 Finally, if it is determined that corporations should be 
held accountable for human rights violations that occurred during an oppressive regime, this 
would likely provide an additional source of funding for reparations to victims and their 
families. 
 
Truth commissions’ recommendations for corporations to finance reparations programmes 
while simultaneously addressing corporate accountability have been, however, largely ignored 
by the governments, mostly for fear of falling foul of investors at a time of transition. Truth 
commissions usually only have the power to recommend reparations; they do not have the 
power to directly compel the payment of them, and the task of making demands for and 
collecting reparations usually falls to government.283 Accordingly, governments have rarely 
implemented TRCs’ recommendations concerning reparations, and the contributions of 
                                                                                                                                                    
Letnar Černič (n 193), 337, 344; E Daly, ‘Reparations in South Africa: A Cautionary Tale’ 33 (2003) U Mem L 
Rev 367, 383-87.  
279 Abrahams, ‘The TRC’s Unfinished Business’ (n 186), 34, 35. 
280 Reuters, ‘The “Black list”: Documents suggest foreign automakers aided Brazil’s dictators’ 5 August 2014.  
281 Bohoslavsky and Opgenhaffen (n 44), 197-201. 
282 Sanchez (n 198), 119. 
283 Darcy (n 4), 43-46; Hayner (n 4), 251; T Antkowiak, ‘Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human 
Rights Experience’ (2002) 23 Mich J Intl L 977, 1002. 
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businesses accused of collusion in oppression has been far less than the commissions have 
proposed.284 In the end, none of the recommendations for prosecution or reparation concerning 
corporate involvement in abuses recommended by the TRCs in South Africa, Liberia, and East 
Timor was followed by the respective governments. While there are no normative obstacles to 
expanding the focus of truth seeking initiatives to include corporate actors, there remain 
economic, practical and political reasons for this struggle. As a consequence despite their best 
efforts in this direction, truth commissions have struggled to secure accountability and 
affective remedies.285 
 
Truth commissions typically face short deadlines, tight budgets, and low institutional capacity 
and, as a result, they may have to give priority to the most serious violations, which may not 
involve corporate actors.286 Moreover, addressing questions of corporate complicity may 
require interdisciplinary multi-faceted investigations and triangulation information from the 
state, financial institutions, and corporations, which demands not only specialized personnel, 
but also a robust infrastructure that truth commissions do not usually have. Even if a truth 
commission was properly equipped and staffed, powerful interest groups could politically 
block this kind of investigation. A typical parliamentary negotiation for the establishment of a 
truth commission involves both victims and members of the former regime. Adding the 
interests of businesspeople and corporations to the mix could make it harder to approve a truth 
commission, or to make it work after the approval.287 This type of situation, for example, may 
block the path of the Argentina’s commission on economic complicity. Those who may have 
benefited from corporate operations and remain influential in governmental and commercial 
interests in contemporary Argentina may effectively obstruct commission operations if they 
believe this would endanger their economic interests.288 As described above, the South Africa, 
Liberia, and the East Timor’s TRCs all attributed responsibility to corporations and 
recommended for businesses to pay reparations, but the respective governments lacked the 
political will to implement the commissions’ proposals.289  
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Remedy for corporate human rights violations in transitional justice contexts can be mandated 
by international and national judicial processes or recommended by truth commissions. This 
chapter and the previous have discussed the limitations of such processes due to a number of 
normative, political, and economic reasons. Remedies can however also be achieved through 
reparations programmes established at the administrative level, an issue which the next 
chapter examines in detail.   
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V. ADMINISTRATIVE REPARATION PROGRAMMES 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have analysed two types of remedies available to victims of corporate 
abuses in transitional justice contexts: judicial processes - at the international (Chapter I), 
regional (Chapter II), and domestic levels (Chapter III) – and truth-seeking initiatives (Chapter 
IV). This chapter discusses another form of remedy, administrative reparations programmes – 
i.e. reparations programmes created by legislation for whole classes of victims rather than in 
response to individual cases.  
 
While reparations programmes often target the most serious forms of civil and political rights 
violations, some reparations programmes have paid attention to a broader band of rights 
violations.1 In Brazil, for example, reparations were paid to workers that had to abandon their 
jobs due to political persecution, especially after the 1979 Amnesty law when the labour 
unions joined the struggle against the dictatorship.2 The Argentinian government passed a 
number of laws and decrees to provide reparations for victims of human rights abuses, 
including payment of compensation for lost labour time.3 In most cases, however, the attention 
has centred primarily or exclusively on making only the state accountable.4 The responsibility 
of corporations to provide reparations has not been given adequate consideration.5 In theory, 
corporations could provide any of the five recognised forms of reparations (restitution, 
                                                
1 An early effort to link impunity and reparation for economic, social and cultural rights, albeit not explicitly in a 
transitional justice context, was UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Final 
Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights), UN. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8, 1997. See also, L Magarrell, ‘Reparations for Massive or 
Widespread Human Rights Violations: Sorting out Claims for Reparations and the Struggle for Social Justice’ 
(2003) 22 Windsor YB Access Just 91-94; R Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War 
(Polity Press 2002); Z Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice’ (2008) 
2 Intl J Trans Just 266, 285. 
2 JP Bohoslavsky and MD Torelly, ‘Financial Complicity: The Brazilian Dictatorship Under the “Macroscope” in 
DN Sharp (ed.), Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (Springer Science Business Media 2014), 256; I 
Cano and P Galvão Ferreira, ‘The Reparations Program in Brazil’ in P de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of 
Reparations (OUP 2006), 102; Magarrell (n 1), 91.  
3 JP Bohoslavsky and V Opgenhaffen, ‘The Past and Present of Corporate Complicity: Financing the Argentinean 
Dictatorship’ (2010) 23 Harvard Human Rights J 157, 197-201. 
4 C Sandoval and G Surfleet, ‘Corporations and Redress in Transitional Justice Processes’ in S Michalowski, 
Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice (Routledge 2014), 93, 96.  
5 Ibid., 93. 
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compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition6) in isolation or in 
combination. In practice, in the case of corporations there is a tendency to prefer compensation 
to other forms of reparations. 7 In international law the preferred form of reparation both in 
state practice and in the theory is restitution; only when this is not possible may other forms of 
reparations be awarded.8 In 1928, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled in the 
Chorzów Factory case that restitution was the preferred remedy for correcting illegal 
governmental takings of property.9 
  
Restitution refers to measures that restore the victim to the original situation before the 
violations occurred, including the return of property and land. The concept of restitution has 
long been accepted as an important judicial remedy in international law. The particular remedy 
of restitution stems from the broader right to an effective remedy for violations of human 
rights.10 International law approaches restitution generally through the lens of infringements of 
law due to what are defined as wrongful acts or omissions attributable to states through the 
application of the law of state responsibility.11 Restitution is also a key element of the remedial 
measures envisaged under international criminal law.12 While corporations do not have a 
specific obligation to provide restitution under international law, they may be forced to 
provide such restitution under the national law of a country. This is because victims of human 
rights violations, including corporate related abuses, have an enforceable right to have the 
violation remedied, repaired and reversed.13  
 
                                                
6 UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ [Basic Principles], Arts 19-23. 
7 Sandoval and Surfleet (n 4), 109. 
8 Permanent Court of Justice, Chórzow Factory (Indemnity) case (Germany v. Poland), 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, 
Judgment of 13 September 1928), 47. See also, FL Kirgis, ‘Restitution as a Remedy in US Courts for Violations 
of International Law’ (2001) 95(2) AJIL 343. 
9 Chórzow Factory (n 8), 47.  
10 See, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Art 8; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (CCPR), Art 2; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), Art 6; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT), Art 11; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Art 39. 
11 For example, a legal opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee has asserted that restitution is required 
for any violation of an international obligation: Inter-American Juridical Committee, Legal Opinion on the 
Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, OAS Doc. CJI/RES.II-15/92, para. 10 (1992). 
12 eg, Rome Statute, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 17 July 1998, Art 75(1); Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (11 February 1994), Art 105. 
13 UNHCR, Inter-Office Memorandum No. 104/2001, 28 November 2001, Field Office Memorandum No. 
101/2001, 28 November 2001. 
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It is on these foundations that the subsequent concepts on land restitution to those deprived of 
it during period of conflict or repression, have been built.14 The Basic Principles on the Right 
to Remedy and Reparations state that restitution includes ‘return to one’s place of residence’ 
and ‘return of property’ and ‘should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original 
situation’ before the violations occurred.15 These points were further refined in the UN 
Principles on Housing and Property Restitution (the Pinheiro Principles). 16 They constitute 
evidence for the preference towards restitution as an appropriate and justifiable remedy for 
violations of international law, in particular those violations involving the illegal confiscation 
of housing, property, and land.17 As such, administrative reparations programmes can in 
certain circumstances provide the restitution of property and land from corporations. 18 This 
chapter looks at administrative reparation programmes dealing with a particular type of 
reparation, land restitution, which can include the restitution of land taken for economic 
reasons during an armed conflict or time of repression.  
 
There are a number of reasons for the focus on land restitution: land acquisition is often a key 
driver of conflict; land confiscation, forced evictions and population displacement are 
common during conflict; land disputes are a key aspect that countries in transition need to 
address; land is, in most cases, the most important asset that victims seek back; corporations 
are often involved in land confiscation either directly or in complicity with the state; land 
rights abuses are some of the most widespread corporate human rights abuses; and innovative 
reparation programmes have tried to deal with victims’ grievance in this area. This chapter 
focuses on efforts to return land that was taken for economic projects in transitional countries 
in three different regions (Colombia, Myanmar, and South Africa). The analysis presented 
here is intended to show that, despite challenges, innovative reparations programmes 
involving the responsibilities of business have been implemented and that despite difficulties, 
                                                
14  UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (2005) [Pinheiro principles]. The right of return can be found in Article 13(2) of the 
UDHR and Article 12(4) of the ICCPR. See also, D Fitzpatrick and A Fishman, ‘Land Policy and Transitional 
Justice after Armed Conflicts’ in Sharp (n 2), 263, 274; RC Williams, ‘Post-Conflict Property Restitution and 
Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Implications for International Standard-Setting and Practice’ (2005) 
37 NYU J Intl L Policy 448; G Paglione, ‘Individual Property Restitution: From Deng to Pinheiro -and the 
Challenges Ahead’ (2008) 20 Intl J Refugee L 393; E Rosand, ‘The Right to Return under International Law 
Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?’ (1998) 19 Michigan J Intl L 1128. 
15 Basic Principles (n 6), Art 18. 
16 Pinheiro principles (n 14). 
17 Fitzpatrick and Fishman (n 4), 276. 
18 J Goebertus, ‘Palma de Aceite y Desplazamiento Forzado en la Zona Bananera’ (2008) 67 Colombia 
Internacional 152. 
 
 
 187 
this remains one of the most interesting avenues for remedy.      
 
V.1 Land Restitution Programmes  
 
The question of land is a complex and deeply interconnected one. Its realisation remains 
challenging, and among the most sensitive topics in most transitional countries. Land access is 
often a key cause of conflict, and the conflict then exacerbates the problem, including as a 
result of population displacement and ‘land grabbing’ by political elites, with corporations 
often benefitting directly and indirectly from land seizures. 19 During the conflict in Colombia, 
for example, land titles and property rights were transferred directly from the population to 
corporations.20 During the conflict in Myanmar the military government as well as state-
owned and private companies confiscated millions of acres of land from hundreds of 
thousands of people.21 The next sections compare experiences in Colombia, Myanmar, and 
South Africa, which suggest that the restitution of land unlawfully taken by companies during 
a time of conflict or repression offers an important form of corporate accountability and 
redress to victims, but it is met by a number of normative and practical challenges, especially 
in post-conflict countries where land tenure is generally insecure and customary rights are not 
legally recognised. 
 
Colombia’s Victims and Land Restitution Law 
In Colombia, the issue of land has been a central part of the armed conflict since it started in 
the 1960s. Historically a highly unequal society, the concentration of land in the hands of a 
few has increased dramatically in the course of the conflict.22 During the armed conflict, 
warring factions forcefully displaced almost six million people from large tracts of land in 
                                                
19 C Huggins, ‘Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and… Land Tenure Reform?’ (2009) Oxford Transitional Justice 
Research Working Paper Series, 3 and ‘Linking Broad Constellations of Ideas: Transitional Justice, Land Tenure 
Reform and Development’ in P de Greiff and R Duthie, Transitional Justice and Development: Making 
Connections (Social Science Research Council 2009) 332, 333; Fitzpatrick and Fishman (n 4), 263-67; R Duthie, 
‘Transitional Justice and Displacement’ (2011) 5(2) Intl J Trans Just 245; B Atuahene, ‘Property Rights and the 
Demands of Transformation’ (2010) Michigan J Intl L 31 and ‘Property and Transitional Justice’ (2010) UCLA L 
Rev Discourse 58. 
20 T Van Ho, ‘Is it Already Too Late for Colombia’s Land Restitution Process? The Impact of International 
Investment Law on Transitional Justice Initiatives’ (2016) 5(1) Intl Human Rights L Rev 60. 
21 I Pietropaoli, ‘Corporate Accountability and Transitional Justice in Myanmar’ (7 March 2016) JusticeInfo; 
Amnesty International, Open for Business? Corporate Crime and Abuses at Myanmar’s Copper Mine (AI 10 
February 2015); Global Witness, Guns, Cronies and Crops (GW 26 March 2015); FIDH, Land of Sorrow: 
Human Rights Violations at Mandalay’s Myotha Industrial Park (FIDH 27 September 2107). 
22 KA O Lid and J García-Godos, ‘Land Restitution in the Colombian Transitional Justice Process’ (2010) 28 
Nordic J Hum Rts 262, 263. 
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mainly rural areas, which were taken over by guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug traffickers, and by 
companies. 23  The forced displacement of populations alongside subsequent corporate 
occupation was a common occurrence.24 There are serious allegations and some compelling 
evidence to suggest that corporations have been complicit in the forced displacements in two 
ways: first, by directly paying for militants to displace people in order to gain access to land, 25 
and secondly, by purchasing land from armed actors after a displacement, without any attempt 
to compensate those who were originally displaced from it. 26 This is a part of what is often 
referred to as the phenomenon of the ‘para-economy’ in Colombia - the informal economic 
network that has benefitted directly in their business from political and paramilitary 
violence.27 Mining and agriculture companies, in particular, have been accused to rely on 
paramilitary groups to help expand and secure their operations. 28  Indeed, population 
displacement is largely concentrated in areas where mining and agro-industries activities are 
widespread.29 The involvement of palm oil companies in the Colombian conflict provides a 
good example of the grey area between legality and illegality in which companies exploit 
conflict to benefit economically.30 In the Urubá and other regions in Colombia, palm oil 
companies that legally bought land from which communities and individuals have been 
displaced by conflict continue to have direct links with the paramilitaries.31 Several of these 
companies are owned by paramilitaries operating under aliases, which acts as a further 
economic drain in that the economic activity generated is not fed back into the formal 
economy, and is instead used to further undermine the security climate of the state.32  
 
The Colombian government has embarked on an innovative restitution and reparations 
                                                
23 Ibid., 272, 282-83; N Summers, ‘Colombia’s Victims’ Law: Transitional Justice in a Time of Violent Conflict?’ 
(2012) 25(1) Harvard Human Rights J 219, 222; AM Ibañez and CE Velez, ‘Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: 
Micro Determinants and Welfare Losses of Displacement in Colombia’ (2008) 36 World Development 659, 661.   
24 F Thomson, ‘The Agrarian Question and Violence in Colombia: Conflict and Development’ (2011) 11(3) J 
Agrarian Change 321, 347.   
25 C Espinosa, ‘The Constitutional Protection of IDPs in Colombia,’ in RA Rivadeneira (ed.), Judicial Protection 
of Internally Displaced Persons: The Colombian Experience (Brookings Institution 2009), 3.   
26 Thomson (n 24), 347.   
27 VL Franco and JD Restrepo, ‘Empresarios Palmeros, Poderes de Facto y Despojo de Tierras en el Bajo Atrato’ 
in M Romero Vidal (ed.), La Economía de los Paramilitares (Debate 2011), 269, 317. 
28 Ibid., 280. 
29 Summers (n 23), 222; Ibanez and Velez (n 23), 661; AM Ibañez and JC Muñoz, ‘The Persistence of Land 
Concentration in Colombia: What Happened Between 2000 and 2010?’ in M Bergsmo and others (eds.), 
Distributive Justice n Transitions (FICHL 2010), 279, 306-07. 
30 NC Sanchez, ‘Corporate Accountability, Reparations and Distributive Justice in Post Conflict Societies’ in 
Michalowski (n 4), 114, 118. 
31 Goebertus (n 18). 
32 Franco and Restrepo (n 27), 286. 
 
 
 189 
programme aimed at ‘integral reparations’, under which some corporations may be forced to 
turn over land and titles to land that were obtained during the conflict.33 Transitional justice 
processes started in Colombia in 2005 with the approval of the Justice and Peace Law.34 The 
Victims and Land Restitution Law (Victims’ Law), passed in 2011, is intended, in part, to 
redress the widespread forced displacements stemming from the conflict.35 Envisaged as a 
component of the reparations programme, restitution of land is considered by the government 
to partly contribute to a sustainable solution of the land issue, and by extension, of the 
Colombian armed conflict.36 The Victims’ Law aims to facilitate truth, justice, and integral 
reparations for victims, with a ‘guarantee of no repetition’.37 The law defines as ‘victims’ 
people, or their family members, who suffered grave violations of human rights or of 
international humanitarian law in the context of the internal armed conflict from 1 January 
1985.38 It states that the objective of reparations is to contribute to repositioning (recuperar) 
victims as citizens in the full exercise of their rights and duties.39 Most significantly, the 
Victim’s Law declares a right of restitution for those who have been dispossessed of their land 
or who have been forced to abandon it.40  
 
The heart of the law lies in the scheme for land restitution.41 The Victims’ Law establishes a 
clear, context-specific, and extensive right to land restitution.42 Because the problem of forced 
displacement is widespread, the law was specifically designed to provide an easy and 
accessible remedy for victims.43 The legal and actual return of the land that was dispossessed 
remains a key goal to the attempt to gain transitional justice; only where it is not possible to 
meet this goal (for example, because of continued lack of security), then equivalent land, or 
                                                
33 Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras (Victims and Land Restitution Law), no 1448 (10 June 2011) 
[Victims Law]. See also, Van Ho (n 20), 62; O Lid and García-Godos (n 22), 277, 287.  
34 Justice and Peace Law, no 975 (2005). See also, KA O Lid and J García-Godos, ‘Transitional Justice and 
Victims’ Rights before the End of a Conflict: The Unusual Case of Colombia (2010) 42(3) J Latin American 
Studies 487. 
35 Victims Law (n 33). See also, Summers (n 23), 220; DL Attanasio and NC Sánchez, ‘Return within the Bounds 
of the Pinheiro Principles: The Colombian Land Restitution Experience’ (2012) 11 Washington Univ Global 
Studies L Rev 1, 2. 
36 O Lid and García-Godos (n 22), 265 
37 Victims Law (n 33), Art 1. See also, Summers (n 23), 225; O Lid and García-Godos, ‘Transitional Justice and 
Victims’ Rights before the End of a Conflict’ (n 34). 
38 Victims Law (n 33), Art 3.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid., Arts 71-72. 
41 Ibid. It applies to land lost after 1 January 1991. See also, P Martínez Cortés, ‘Ley De Víctimas y Restitución 
de Tierras en Colombia en Contexto’ (2003) FDCL and Transnational Institute. 
42 Victims Law (n 33), Art 75.  
43 Ibid., Art 77(3)(4). See also, Summers (n 23), 223, 227-28; Van Ho (n 20), 70. 
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compensation for the loss, is to be provided.44 Importantly, the law shifts legal presumptions 
and the burden of proof regarding land ownership distinctly in favour of victims.45 As Roht-
Arriaza points out, one of the most interesting aspects of the law is the way it establishes the 
necessary causal link to dispossession.46 Rather than making the claimant prove that they fit 
within the definition, the law reverses the burden of proof with the use of presumptions.47  
 
The Law includes a presumption that land transfers were illegal if they were entered into as a 
business or sales contract between the victim and any individual ‘convicted of membership, 
collaboration or financing of armed groups’.48 It also establishes a presumption of illegality if 
the transfer was the result of a business transaction stipulated at less than half of its value, or 
where the transaction was made in areas of widespread violence, massive displacement, or 
grave violations of human rights, in areas where land became increasingly concentrated or 
where crop production significantly changed, or where the leadership of the contracting 
community business or farming cooperatives changed after the displacement.49 Anyone who 
possesses land, which is ordered to be restituted through this process, ‘will have [his] 
possession declared void as if it never occurred’.50 If a subsequent owner has purchased the 
land in ‘good faith’, he can oppose the restitution process and receive compensation for his 
loss.51 As Nicole Summers notes, ‘[t]he inversion of the burden of proof is widely considered a 
major achievement of the Victims’ Law and one that will significantly advance the right to 
restitution’.52  
 
The law also adopts a series of measures to address corporate involvement in displacement.53 
It attempts to regulate corporate purchases of land and also to hold businesses accountable for 
contributing to the displacement.54 First, the Victims’ Law stipulates that corporations may be 
held financially liable for their involvement in the conflict.55 Judges in individual reparations 
                                                
44 Victims Law (n 33), Art 72. 
45 Ibid., Arts 77-78. 
46 N Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in Sharp (n 2), 109, 129. 
47 Victims Law (n 33), Art 78.  
48 Ibid., Art 77(1). See also, Attanasio and Sánchez (n 35), 24. 
49 Victims Law (n 33), Art 77. 
50 Ibid., Art 99. See also, Summers (n 23), 230. 
51 Attanasio and Sánchez (n 35), 24. 
52 Summers (n 23), 229. 
53 Victims Law (n 33), Arts 98, 178. 
54 N Summers, ‘Recent Developments: Colombia’s Victims’ law: Transitional Justice in a Time of Violent 
Conflict?’, (2012) 25(1) Harvard Human Rights Journal at 232 
55 Summers (n 23), 232. 
 
 
 191 
cases can require businesses, when found responsible for ‘contributing to victimization’, to 
make payments to the Victims’ Reparations Fund.56 The Justice and Peace Law established 
the fund in 2005 as a financing mechanism for victims’ reparations, including restitution and 
civil damages.57 Until the Victims’ Law was passed, judges were only allowed to mandate 
payments from paramilitary groups.58 Under the new law, judges may declare that companies 
bear partial responsibility for displacement or other damages and, accordingly, may impose 
financial penalties on them.59  
 
Second, the law bans all sales of land that has been restituted for the two-year period post-
restitution, and requires judicial authorization of all contracts for the use of this land.60 For 
corporations who acquired such land or acquired licenses to use the land, the law may lead to 
these purchases or licenses being voided, even if courts previously recognized that they 
entailed land rights.61 The provision applies specifically to businesses that wish to continue 
large agro-industrial projects on previously purchased or leased land. To be considered for 
authorization, companies wishing to re-contract must prove that they acted in good faith when 
creating the original contract.62 If corporations fail to prove good faith, the agro-industrial 
project will be turned over to the government, and profits will be put towards local victims’ 
reparations programmes.63 
 
One of the most controversial provisions of the law concerns such areas where the 
dispossessed lands have been turned into agribusiness projects. While displacements due to 
military considerations are relatively easily reversed (once military operations have ended one 
could expect the civilian population to return to their place of origin), large-scale projects 
make irreparable changes to the areas where they are developed.64 Transformation of the use 
of land, from subsistence farming to vast monocultures makes the reversal practically 
impossible. If these lands are to provide acceptable social-economic conditions for the 
                                                
56 Ibid. 
57 Justice and Peace Law (n 34), Art 54. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Victims Law (n 33), Art 177. 
60 Ibid., Arts 99, 101.  
61  Van Ho (n 20), 70. 
62 Victims Law (n 33), Arts 99, 207. See also, MJ Guembe and H Olea, ‘No Justice, No Peace: Discussion of a 
Legal Framework Regarding the Demobilization of Non-State Armed Groups’ in N Roht-Arriaza and J 
Mariezcurrena (eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (Cambridge 
University Press 2006), 120. 
63 Victims Law (n 33). 
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displaced peoples of Colombia a mere restitution may not be sufficient.65 Some stakeholders 
support a restitution policy that focuses on correcting the illegal dispossession and clarifying 
land titles and individual rights to property, which would serve to boost the land market and 
allow for rural development policies that modernize agricultural production, fundamentally 
based on large, corporate ownership.66 Arguably, a better approach is one of a restitution 
policy that meets the requirements of recognition and redistribution, advancing the interest of 
peasant, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities.67  
 
Some scholars propose the notion of ‘transformative reparations’ as a more adequate 
perspective from which to conceive reparations to victims of the Colombian armed conflict, 
and particularly to victims of land dispossession.68 For example, Nelson Camilo Sánchez 
suggests a strategy to restore illegally accumulated assets and to redistribute wealth that 
private actors accumulated during the conflict in Colombia.69 This strategy is part of a 
theoretical elaboration of the concept of transformative reparations in an effort to combine the 
dominant concept of reparations backed on corrective justice with the concept of distributive 
justice.70 This model differentiates the degree of responsibility of the actor that obtained the 
wealth into three levels: high, medium and low.71  
 
The ‘high responsibility’ category refers to where an actor has direct responsibility for 
violations perpetrated: these are essentially a category that focuses on companies that directly 
committed illegal acts to obtain economic benefits or financed armed groups to obtain 
commercial advantages. For example, Drummond allegedly paid paramilitary group to 
violently resolve labour disputes.72 Direct responsibility cases can be dealt with through 
mechanisms of corrective justice, namely criminal and civil judgments - primarily using 
                                                
65 MP Saffon and R Uprimny-Yepes, ‘Reparations for Land Dispossession and Distributive Justice in Colombia’, 
Selected Briefs from the Seminar ‘Land Reform and Distributive Justice in the Settlement of Internal Armed 
Conflicts’, Bogotá (5-6 June 2009); Roht-Arriaza (n 46), 129, 131; R Uprimny-Yepes and NC Sánchez, ‘Los 
dilemas de la restitución de tierras en Colombia’ (2010) 12(2) Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos 305, 325; O Lid 
and García-Godos (n 22), 268  
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67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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72 See Chapter III.2. 
 
 
 193 
existing tort mechanisms on the basis of the principle of integral reparation, which requires 
that victims receive full reparations or complete restitution.73 As discussed, the Victims’ Law 
stipulates that money used to compensate victims should partially come from business that 
have financed paramilitaries relative to the extent to which the conflict was exacerbated by the 
business financial support.74  
 
The category labelled as ‘medium responsibility’ refers to those with indirect responsibility: 
companies that conducted business with the knowledge that the conflict helped its commercial 
success, but who did not directly participate or support violations. For example, as discussed 
in Chapter III, Chiquita while did not directly commit violent actions had a clear supportive 
link with paramilitary groups.75 Indirect responsibility cases are more complex to deal with 
since they have to address the responsibility of companies that are known to have acted 
illegally, but against which the available evidence is insufficient for judicial proceedings. 
Sanchez argues that it is possible to design a mechanism applying both the principles of 
corrective and distributive justice.76 During the conflict, cultivable land was transferred 
through the forced displacement of people, and companies in various sectors acquired much of 
such land at derisory prices.77 A way to reverse such a large-scale dispossession could be to 
introduce a flexible evidence mechanism that allows land restitution without requiring victims 
to prove intent. 78  For example, as discussed, the Victims’ Law establishes a judicial 
presumption that people that transferred property in an area of generalised violence did so 
because of the violence – they are not required to prove the nature of this violence or threat of 
violence.79 This approach allows the reversing or annulling of certain legal transaction based 
on the idea that all land in prescribed areas affected by the violence ought to be considered 
abandoned land (res derelicta) because of the violence, and as a corollary this ferments the 
assumption that companies who acquired such land participated in bad faith in such 
displacement. 
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Finally, the category of ‘low responsibility’ refers to cases in which the company developed a 
successful business in Colombia, but where there was no causal nexus between the company’s 
profits and the human rights violations that occurred.80 The cases of many Colombian banks 
may exemplify low degrees of responsibility. In such cases, where there is insufficient 
evidence to establish any degree of responsibility, Sanchez argues that the ethical and legal 
justifications for requiring those companies to contribute to the transitional justice programme 
is not corrective justice, but distributive justice based on the principle of solidarity with public 
burdens.81 Distributive justice provides a duty on society to assist individual members in 
proportion to the individual needs, contribution and responsibility, the resources available to 
the society, and the society’s responsibility to the common good.82 For example, banks could 
be required to forgive loans of displaced peoples, or provide debt relief.83  
 
To implement the Victims Law, however, the state would need to prevent companies from 
accessing, using, or benefiting from the restituted land. The resulting financial impact on the 
corporation raises concerns under international investment law.84 As Tara Van Ho points out, 
‘the potential effect [of the restitution] on multinational corporations raises the potential that 
international investment law’s prohibition on expropriation without compensation could be 
used to stymie the implementation of the Victims’ Law’.85  
 
Colombia is party to 18 investment treaties or trade agreements with investment protections.86 
Companies are protected by these treaties if they have an ‘investment’ - Colombia’s 
investment treaties refer to ‘any asset’ in the country.87 This means that both the property to be 
restituted under the Victims’ Law and the licenses granted to companies are considered 
‘investments’ under Colombia’s international investment law commitments.88 As discussed, 
the Victims’ Law requires the state to nullify transfers of property in certain cases. Despite the 
legitimate public purpose inherent in this law, the transfer of property may give rise to a 
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violation of international investment law’s prohibition on expropriation, Van Ho argues.89 
Most investment treaties provide foreign investors with a right to disregard domestic judicial 
processes and seek immediate protection before ad hoc arbitral panels.90 As a result, the threat 
of international investment law complaints may force Colombia to either opt out of applying 
the law to foreign corporations, or to pay those corporations millions for violating investment 
law protections.91 States like Colombia, facing potentially widespread claims, may choose to 
limit transitional justice initiatives that impact foreign investors, or to exempt foreign investors 
from the impact of those initiatives, despite the negative impact this would have on home-
grown Colombian capital and investment. This can exacerbate tensions within a community as 
the exemption of foreign corporations from transitional justice’s reach may be seen as 
rewarding corporations with benefits received through complicity in human rights violations, 
while punishing investments generated through savings and profit generation in Colombia.92 
 
South Africa’s Land Restitution Programme 
During the colonial and apartheid-era in South Africa, a series of laws progressively 
dispossessed millions of people.93 By 1990, only 13% of the land was reserved for occupation 
by black South Africans and all productive agricultural land was in the hands of white 
farmers.94 The South Africa TRC called for some manner of restitution to take place. It 
proposed that ‘consideration be given to the most appropriate ways in which to provide 
restitution for those who have suffered’.95 When negotiations on the interim constitution got 
underway in 1993 the protection of property became one of the most contentious issues.96 The 
National Party government, the last government under the apartheid system, supported by the 
business lobby, insisted that such protection be provided for, and initially resisted the 
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inclusion of any provision authorising restitution.97 A compromise was reached at the end of 
the negotiation which was reflected in Section 28 of the Interim Constitution, which provided 
for a right ‘to acquire and hold rights in property’ and a concomitant duty on the state to pay 
compensation in the event of expropriation.98 In this way, contrary to the case of Colombia, 
the beneficiaries of the right to restitution were not given a right against the current owners to 
demand the return of land, but rather a right against the state.99  
 
In 1994, the first post-apartheid ANC government passed the Restitution of Land Act to restore 
land rights of individuals, households, and communities who were dispossessed due to racial 
discriminatory policies that had been adopted since the Natives’ Land Act passed in 1913.100 
Settling restitution claims, however, proved extremely complex and time consuming.101 Early 
evidence indicated that most restored farms were not producing – possibly due to the time that 
had passed and that people often got alternative land over their original land. To avoid the land 
becoming unproductive, to ‘maintain food supplies and… to ensure that the transition is as 
smooth as possible’,102 the government urged people to enter into ‘strategic partnerships’ with 
the former agribusiness landholders, where the communities were encouraged to lease the land 
back to the former owners in exchange for a share of the profits, without being able to live on 
or work the land as they did prior to dispossession.103 In the end, only about 1.5 million of the 
80 million hectares of ‘white agricultural land’ were reallocated, while $562 million were 
spent on buying alternative land, and a further $475 million was spent on cash compensation - 
all with public funds.104 The ambitious goal to redistribute 30% of white-owned agricultural 
land (estimated to be 67% of the country) to black South Africans was not met.105 One of the 
few studies of how the money was spent in South Africa found that the amount dispensed was 
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too small and was mostly used to pay off debts and meet immediate expenses.106 As a 
consequence, despite the reconciliation process and its vaunted and celebrated goals, land 
ownership in South Africa today remains highly unbalanced and unequal.  
 
Land Restitution Efforts in Myanmar  
Since independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, Myanmar’s military committed 
widespread and systematic human rights violations, including war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and engaged in the world’s longest civil war with ethnic armed groups, still 
unresolved today.107 The armed conflict is centred on ethnic groups’ demands for autonomy, 
but is fuelled by competition over land and natural resources, which are primarily located in 
conflict-afflicted ethnic areas. 108  In 2011, Myanmar began its transition to peace and 
democracy, which culminated in the first democratic elections in 2015 and the victory of 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) 
party.109 These reforms resulted in Western governments’ lifting of the economic sanctions 
that were put in place since the 1990s, and this oversaw an immediate and dramatic rise in 
foreign investment. 110 Since the reform process began, civil society organizations have 
increasingly called upon to provide redress for corporate human rights abuses, particularly in 
relation to land grabs and forced relocation.111 
 
Land acquisition and confiscation and resultant forced displacement in Myanmar, both prior to 
and during the reform process, have been carried out for a number of reasons. These include 
military settlements and public infrastructure projects, as well as the establishment of agro-
industrial plantations by private entities, large industrial development projects, special 
economic zones, and hotel zones. Studies indicate that national and multinational companies, 
often in collusion with the military and the government, were responsible of at least 20% of 
land confiscation cases.112 For example, a report by Global Witness documented large areas of 
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land taken from ethnic minority farmers for commercial rubber plantations.113 It notes that by 
2013, 5.3 million acres of land in Myanmar was leased out to investors for commercial 
agriculture, most without the consent of the owners.114 Most acts of land confiscation followed 
a similar process where legal procedures were not followed, compensation was not provided 
and those affected were not consulted and forcibly evicted.115 An example of this is visible in 
the scenario of the Monywa copper mine, operated by a Chinese company in partnership with 
a military-owned company. A 2015 report by Amnesty International found that, since the 
Monywa project’s inception in 1976, thousands of people have been forcibly evicted by the 
government with the knowledge, and in some cases the participation, of foreign companies.116  
 
Despite the formation of several non-judicial committees and commissions, government 
efforts to address land-related issues have been slow, incomplete, and marred by confusion 
and a lack of coordination.117 In 2012, the parliament established the Farmland Investigation 
Commission (FIC), a body tasked with investigating reports of land confiscation and making 
recommendations for the restitution of land. From September 2013 to January 2016, the FIC 
submitted to the President’s Office 18 reports that investigated past cases of land confiscation 
by various actors in a wide range of economic sectors.118 The FIC received over 26,000 
complaints from alleged individual and community victims of land confiscation - of these, as 
of early 2016, it investigated some 13,000 cases.119 The FIC, however, did not have the power 
to implement its findings or to refer cases to courts or the relevant government bodies for 
action. When the FIC and the Land Utilization Management Central Committee - which had 
been established to implement the FIC’s recommendations - were dissolved in 2016, they left 
behind thousands of un-investigated cases.120  
 
In May 2016, the President’s Office formed the Central Review Committee on Confiscated 
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Farmlands and Other Lands (CRCCF), which currently deals with cases of land 
confiscation.121  The CRCCF set the unrealistic goal of settling all land dispute cases within 
the first six months of its mandate (i.e. by November 2016).122 The process of land restitution 
has been slow, filled with allegations of corruption, with thousands of cases still to be 
investigated. As of April 2017, the CRCCF had a backlog of 10,891 cases to investigate, 
including 6,707 that it had inherited from the FIC.123 Only 2,057 cases, or about 19%, had 
been settled and the land was returned to the original land users.124 According to one estimate, 
the military and local and regional governments returned about 400,000 acres of land.125 
Corporations, however, have not yet returned confiscated land, except in a few cases, which 
remain rare, are largely ad hoc in nature, and are driven more by attempts at improving 
company reputations rather than securing the rights of victims.126  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed efforts in three countries (Colombia, South Africa and Myanmar) 
that have emerged form conflict or repression to restitute land – including land that was 
acquired or confiscated for economic investment. Of the three, the Colombia’s Victims Law 
represents the best practice. Partly this is due to the difference type of ‘transitions’ in the three 
countries, which are hard to compare. Colombia is emerging from an internal armed conflict. 
South Africa ended the apartheid regime. And in Myanmar, despite the 2015 democratic 
elections, the transition to peace and democracy is far from complete - the military still holds 
25% of seats in Parliament and important ministerial positions, and the prosecution of the 
Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority, reached peaks of crimes against humanity and genocide 
allegations in 2017.127 Arguably, it is easier to return land that was confiscated by armed 
groups after the conflict is over (in Colombia) than land that was allocated by a repressive 
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regime (in South Africa) or land that was confiscated by a military government that still holds 
power (in Myanmar). However, from the point of view of victims of land confiscation, their 
demands to restitution are similar. 
 
While in Colombia the Victims’ Law addressed the responsibility of companies, the 
transitional legal arrangements put in place in South Africa shielded individuals and 
businesses responsible for human rights violations and instead guaranteed the protection of 
existing land titles.128 The cost of repairing injuries was placed on the shoulders of the post 
apartheid state only, to be dispensed through public funds, and in that sense through a cost 
borne by the whole of society rather than those most responsible for the violations.129 All 
transactions had to be financed with public funds and actual land transfers were based on the 
‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle. A question that ought to have been addressed, but that 
was avoided, was whether those who benefitted from dispossession - individuals and corporate 
owners who obtained land cheaply from the previous government and may have developed it 
with cheap labour - had any responsibility in the restitution process. In this sense South 
Africa’s restitution programme recognized the victims of land dispossession, but it did not 
address the responsibility of the beneficiaries.130 
 
In Myanmar, the NLD-led government has failed to make significant progress towards the 
fulfilment of the party’s election promises with regard to land rights. In its ‘Election 
Manifesto,’ published ahead of the November 2015 general election, the NLD vowed to 
ensure the return to farmers of ‘illegally-lost land’ and the payment of compensation.131 The 
document also promised the party would work towards defending farmers against ‘illegal land 
confiscation practices’ and amending the existing land laws ‘that are not appropriate for the 
present era.’132 Despite this stated commitment to resolve the country’s land disputes, land 
confiscation has continued under the NLD-led administration, and military-owned and ‘crony’ 
companies still control the economy.133  Protests against land confiscation are increasingly 
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common.134 
 
The NLD-led administration has also failed to implement the National Law Use Policy 
(NLUP), which was adopted by the previous government in January 2016 in order to 
harmonize land use management and protect farmers’ rights.135 While the NLUP is not a 
legally binding instrument, it referred to human rights standards with regard to land 
acquisition and recognized traditional land ownership and shifting cultivation regimes.136 This 
is important because in Myanmar approximately half of the land is occupied or subject to 
shifting cultivation according to traditional farming practices, but it could be classified as 
‘vacant, fallow, or virgin’, and therefore subject to acquisition under the 2012 Vacant, Fallow 
and Virgin Lands Management Law.137 This law, enacted after the beginning of the reform 
process, gives the government the right to repossess lands classed as ‘vacant, fallow and virgin’ 
for the implementation of infrastructure projects or special projects required in the ‘interest of 
the state.’138 The law establishes a Central Committee that can lease to local and joint venture 
investors for up to 30 years land that the state considers as being not in use.139 The law does 
not set out any procedures to challenge or seek a judicial review of measures that authorize 
land confiscation, but it punishes with prison terms of up to three years anyone found guilty of 
trespassing, obstructing the implementation of business, or who ‘fails to leave’ vacant, fallow, 
and virgin land.140 These provisions can be used to take legal action against protestors who 
seek remedy for the confiscation of their land.141 In short, not only land restitution rights are 
not addressed, but the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Law allows for an easy and ‘legal’ 
confiscation for economic investment of additional land, which is currently used by farmers 
who lack any formal title (Myanmar does not recognise customary land rights), but have 
nevertheless cultivated such land for generations.       
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CONCLUSION 
 
This research shows that innovative use of litigation, truth-seeking and reparations 
programmes in transitional justice countries across the world have addressed, even if still only 
in a marginal way, corporate accountability for human rights abuses and crimes under 
international law and have attempted to provide redress for victims. Sporadic victories for 
victims of business-related human rights abuses have occurred. But for the most part victims 
face major obstacles to achieve corporate accountability, and corporations involved in 
violations often enjoy impunity. Put simply, if corporations have committed human rights 
violations or crimes under international laws during a time of conflict or repression, either 
directly or in complicity with the states or with individuals, then they should be held 
accountable and victims should be repaired.1 Addressing the corporations’ responsibility and 
providing reparations to the victims are not a voluntary pursuit by the state, which has the 
obligation to bring those alleged to have committed human rights abuses and crimes to justice 
within their domestic criminal justice systems and to repair the harm suffered by victims. 
There are, however, complex legal, political, and practical obstacles to this seemly fair 
concept. Some of these problems, common to all victims of corporate abuses, are accentuated 
in transitional justice contexts due to the prevalence of weak rule of law, dysfunctional judicial 
systems, corruption, and logistical difficulties. 
 
This research has sought to answer how remedies for corporate human rights abuses and 
crimes under international law can be achieved in transitional justice contexts. It has done so 
by analysing how different mechanisms available to victims of corporate abuses in transitional 
justice contexts across history and across countries have, or failed to, achieved corporate 
accountability, and provided appropriate reparations to victims of corporate abuses. The 
analysis has focused on three types of processes, which constitute the core of transitional 
justice: i) judicial mechanisms at the international, regional and national level; ii) truth-
seeking initiative; and iii) administrative reparations programmes.     
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The post-World War II trials, analysed in Chapter I, have helped to understand the role that 
business enterprises play in times of conflict or repression, to develop criteria of responsibility, 
and there is evidence that criminal charges against corporations were considered entirely 
permissible.2 Corporations, however, were not prosecuted as legal entities per se.  More than 
five decades later, a proposal for a restricted form of corporate criminal liability in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court failed.3 At present, the only business actors capable 
of being prosecuted before the ICC are individual businesspeople, although so far the court 
has not done so.  An expansion of the ICC jurisdiction to include corporations may in theory 
happen in the future, but this is currently unlikely. The new OTP focus on thematic 
prosecutions on crimes committed by means of natural resources exploitation and land 
confiscation may expand the remit of the ICC to address crimes where corporations are often 
involved, but how this may result in corporate accountability remains to be seen. Even if 
corporations were in the future accepted as subjects of the ICC, and even considering the focus 
of the OTP over natural resources exploitation and land grabs, corporations remain unlikely to 
become the primary focus of an ICC prosecutor. The contextual element of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity and the specific intent required for genocide limit the scope of 
application of international crimes at least in practical terms. Thus, while international 
criminal law could address crimes attributable to corporations, it would intervene only in 
extraordinary circumstances.4 Businesspeople and corporations would rarely meet the criteria 
for ICC prosecution as in most cases they are not among those masterminding international 
crimes, but they, for the most part, rather benefit from a given situation and exploit the 
financial opportunities. Therefore the responsibility of corporations for their involvement in 
international crimes has been of marginal interest in international prosecution efforts.5 This is 
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arguably a necessary limitation of international criminal law that remains unlikely to be 
overcome. For these reasons, international criminal law does not currently offer an effective 
avenue to seek remedy for corporate human rights abuses in transitional justice contexts.   
 
The regional systems are rarely mentioned in the scholarship on business and human rights or 
on transitional justice. But Chapter II demonstrates that regional systems have, and could 
further, indirectly provide remedies for victims of corporate abuses and shape national 
reparation programmes in transitional justice contexts by examining complaints against states 
for failing to prevent, investigate or redress human rights violations related to corporate 
activities.6 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in particular, has provided important 
contributions to the analysis of evidence of corporate abuses and the provision of remedy and 
reparations for victims, including in transitional justice contexts.7 A decision of the African 
Commission of August 2017 ordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo to investigate the 
role of an Anvil Mining in a village massacre during the 1998 civil war also provides 
innovative precedents in this area that could grow into more meaningful and effective quests.8 
As such, the regional systems can offer a complementary avenue for victims that have failed to 
obtain justice and reparations at the national level. This is particularly important in transitional 
justice contexts where national litigation is rarely an effective option. But their effectiveness is 
mined by a number of limitations. Proceedings are extremely lengthy as the case against Anvil 
Mining demonstrates. And, ultimately, the national governments have to implement the 
recommendations of the regional systems. To date they have done so only to a limited extend.  
 
Civil claims and prosecutions against companies for violations committed in times of conflict 
or repression have been attempted in a number of countries, as detailed in Chapter III, but they 
are still the exception, and have rarely been successful in establishing corporate accountability 
and providing redress for victims.9 There are obstacles both in the host and the home state. 
Systematic flaws in the domestic regulation and the judicial system due to lacks of 
institutional capacity and resources are likely to occur in the host states in a transitional 
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Alb L Rev 579, 604. 
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context, and often as a result victims are not in a position to bring claims against companies in 
their countries, where the abuses have occurred. The political instability in post-conflict and 
transitional contexts adds to the challenge. Home states remain equally reluctant to hold 
multinational companies accountable. Attempts to achieve legal accountability of corporations 
through extraterritorial jurisdiction face serious obstacles as the complicated history of the 
South Africa Apartheid Litigation and the narrowing of the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in Kiobel demonstrate.10 Most human rights lawsuits against corporations are 
dismissed on procedural grounds in the early stages of litigation.11 Many have dragged for 
years or even decades after the violations allegedly occurred, questioning weather even a 
decision on the merits could ever provide real accountability and redress.12 To date, the few 
cases that have survived legal procedural challenges, and have not been dismissed, have been 
settled before trial.13 No case against a corporation alleging violation of human rights or 
crimes under international law has been decided on the merits yet. Few businessmen have 
been convicted for crimes under international law, but currently no criminal cases alleging 
criminal responsibility of corporations for human rights violations or crimes under 
international law has resulted in a conviction (although this is currently being attempted in 
France and a few other countries).14   
 
As part of their mandate, some truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), listed in Chapter 
IV, have investigated the different actors involved in the past conflict or repression, including 
corporations. As such, they have played a unique role in establishing an official record of 
corporations’ involvement in past abuses. TRCs have named specific companies, published 
data on the wealth they amassed, and recommended prosecutions. For example, the South 
Africa TRC recognised the role of business to maintain the status quo of the apartheid 
society.15 It submitted that there were legal grounds for instituting claims for reparations 
                                                
10 C Abrahams, ‘Lessons from the South African Experience’ in S Michalowski (ed.), Corporate Accountability 
in the Context of Transitional Justice (Routledge 2013), 153. 
11 eg, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), In re Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster at 
Bhopal, 634 F. Supp 842, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also, S Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human 
Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing 2004); K Gallagher, ‘Civil Litigation and Transnational Business: An Alien 
Tort Statute Primer’ (2010) 8 J Intl Criminal Just 745, 751-53; R Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation against 
Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the United 
States’ (2011) 3(1) City Univ Hong Kong L Rev 1. See Chapter III.2.  
12 eg, ExxonMobil. See Chapter III.2.  
13 eg, Talisman, Shell (in Kiobel), Chiquita, Drummond, Total. See Chapter III.2. 
14 French courts are currently investigating Amesys, Qosmos, and LafargeHolcim for complicity with the regimes 
in Libya and Syria. See Chapter III.1. 
15 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Final Report (1998), Vol 4, Ch 2. 
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against corporations (which finally resulted in the Apartheid Litigation filed in the United 
States)16 and recommended business to provide reparations. The Liberian TRC concluded that 
corporate actors across different sectors were involved in human rights violations.17Truth 
commissions’ recommendations to finance reparations programmes and simultaneously 
address corporate have been, however, largely ignored by the governments. Truth 
commissions usually only have the power to recommend reparations; they do not have the 
power to directly pay them, and the task of making reparations usually falls to government.18 
In the end, none of the recommendations for prosecution or reparation concerning corporate 
involvement in abuses recommended by the TRCs in South Africa, Liberia, and East Timor 
was followed by the respective governments.  
 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter V, administrative reparation programmes can provide a 
variety of measures for violations related to business activities, for whole classes of victims 
rather than in response to individualized justice sought through the courts. New administrative 
programmes in relation to the redress for victims of corporate abuses have been attempted in 
the area of restitution, in particular land restitution. Colombia, for example, is attempting an 
innovative land restitution programme, under which some companies may be forced to return 
land obtained during the conflict.19 
 
This research contributes to the literature on transitional justice, international human rights 
law, and business and human rights in six ways: i) by linking transitional justice and corporate 
accountability and their goals; ii) by arguing that transitional justice cannot be ‘holistic’ if it 
overlooks corporate accountability; iii) by showing that the transitional justice ‘toolbox’ can 
offer unique remedies for corporate human rights violations committed during times of 
conflict or violence; iv) by comparing different transitional justice mechanisms and their 
complementarities in calibrating corporate roles in gross human rights violations and seeking 
remedies; v) by understanding how the financing of reparations can be made by corporations 
                                                
16 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). See also, M Swart, ‘The 
Khulumani Litigation: Complementing the Work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ 
(2011) 16 Tilburg Law Review, 30. 
17 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report, 30 June 2009, Vol 3. 
18 T Antkowiak, ‘Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience’ (2002) 23 Mich J Intl L 
977, 1002. 
19 Government of Colombia, Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras (Victims and Land Restitution Law), no 
1448 (10 June 2011). See Chapter V.1. 
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based on a ‘polluter pays’ type principle; vi) by emphasising the ‘power versus justice’ 
dilemmas of societies in transition.   
    
First, as both fields of transitional justice and corporate accountability are expanding they may, 
arguably, converge. In the words of Ruben Carranza: 
 
There is now more pluralism and transitional justice has evolved from being narrowly 
focused on physical integrity violations to recognizing that armed conflict, political 
violence and repression cannot be de-linked from their economic and social causes and 
consequences. The way taken by transitional justice to get to where it is now might be 
a helpful map for those working on corporate accountability.20 
 
Both transitional justice and corporate accountability approaches are developing continually. 
Transitional justice has moved away from a narrow focus on the most serious civil and 
political rights violations committed by state actors, to include also economic, social and 
cultural rights, to then explore ‘economic violence’ such as corruption and exploitation of 
natural resources, to finally consider also the role of economic actors.21 The case of Argentina 
is emblematic: in 1983 CONADEP was mandated to investigate only cases of enforces 
disappearances during the dictatorship; in 2015 the government passed a bill establishing 
another truth commission, mandated to investigate the complicity of corporations and financial 
institutions in the repression.22 When Latin American countries emerging from military 
dictatorships began their pursuit of transitional justice, they were not concerned with holding 
corporations accountable; they were concerned with finding a balance between prosecuting 
individual perpetrators and responding to demands for truth and reparations.23 But later, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia among other countries have started to seek the truth about 
                                                
20 R Carranza, ‘Transitional Justice, Corporate Responsibility and Learning from the Global South’ 28 April 2015 
<http://jamesgstewart.com/transitional-justice-corporate-responsibility-and-learning-from-the-global-
south/?subscribe=success#blog_subscription-2> (accessed 10 September 2017). 
21 J Cavallaro and S Albuja, ‘The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth Commissions in Latin America and 
Beyond’ in K McEvoy and L McGregor (eds.), Transitional Justice from Below, Grassroots Activism and the 
Struggle for Change (Hart 2008), 122; Elena Andreevska, ‘Transitional Justice and Democratic Change: Key 
Concepts’ (2013) 20 Lex et Scientia Intl J 54, 55; M Mutua, ‘What Is the Future of Transitional Justice?’ (2015) 
9 Intl J Trans Just 1; R Duthie, ‘Transitional Justice, Development, and Economic Violence’ in ND Sharp (ed.), 
Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (Springer 2014), 165, 168. 
22 Government of Argentina, Ley de creación de la Comision Bicameral de la Verdad, la Memoria, la Justicia, la 
Reparación y el Fortalecimiento de las Instituciones de la Democracia, Law no. 27217, 3 December 2015. See 
Chapter IV.2. 
23 Carranza (n 20). 
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economic crimes and the links between businesses and perpetrators of human rights violations 
during the conflict and dictatorships.24  
 
Simultaneously to the expansion of transitional justice, the business and human rights field is 
also developing. While international human rights treaties impose obligations only on states, it 
is now accepted that corporations do have responsibilities. The international legal framework 
has evolved accordingly with the adoption, for example, of the Guiding Principles in 2011.25 
A draft of an international treaty on business and human rights, currently under negotiation at 
the UN, will be presented at the third section of the intergovernmental working group in 
October 2017.26 The proposed treaty may provide what is still lacking: a proper enforcement 
mechanism to address the current accountability gap.  
 
Although the path has not been a linear and smooth one, criminal and civil litigation alleging 
corporate involvement in past abuses in both the home and host countries is being incessantly 
pursued. Currently, impunity is still the norm and cases resulting in corporate accountability 
are few and far between, but the progress is in the direction of more accountability, not less. 
Business enterprises involved in human rights abuses or international crimes are, and will 
continue to be, pursued in domestic jurisdictions. Victims and their representatives across 
jurisdictions are challenging normative and practical obstacles, and fighting to develop 
standards for imposing liability upon corporations for their human rights abuses.27  
 
Second, bringing the economic perpetrators or accomplices that made many of the violations 
possible into the orbit of transitional justice would provide for a more complete and holistic 
justice. Transitional justice aims to achieve justice, to establish an account of the truth about 
the past, to provide reparations for victims and their families. Corporate accountability 
mechanisms share some of the same aims – to provide justice for victims of corporate abuses, 
to provide them with access to justice and remedy. Transitional justice is intended to address 
                                                
24 See Chapter IV.2. 
25 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework, annexed to Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 
2011) 
26 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights, 26 June 2014, Res 26/1. 
27 MB Taylor, RC Thompson and A Ramasastry, Overcoming Obstacles to Justice: Improving Access to Judicial 
Remedies for Business Involvement in Grave Human Rights Abuses (Fafo 2010). 
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past abuses, and corporations are often tied up with these abuses. As the field of transitional 
justice and corporate accountability are continually evolving, and converging, future 
approaches should give greater attention to the accountability of companies responsible of past 
violations. 
 
Corporate accountability is part of a broader debate within transitional justice and international 
criminal law about how economic crimes should be addressed.28 It has become impossible to 
overlook the reality that in an increasing number of conflicts, alongside atrocities perpetrated 
by state actors on civilians, a pattern of war economies has emerged, particularly around the 
exploitation of natural and mineral resources. The way in which war is fought, supplied and 
financed is more complicated than ever and there is a concomitant need for transitional justice 
to adapt to these modern realities. Arguably, the transitional justice focus on business 
enterprises operating in regions affected by armed conflict and instability, and their potential 
involvement in, or contribution to, human rights abuses and crimes under international law is 
going to increase. Corruption and other economic crimes, land confiscation and natural 
resources exploitation, and corporate accountability are all part of a broader set of grievances 
that many in the field of transitional justice simply regarded as background, but did not 
consider inherent to the work of prosecutors, truth commissions, or reparations programmes. 
That is changing, as this research has shown.  
 
Third, the most serious corporate abuses happen in times of conflict and it is precisely 
transitional justice with its ‘toolbox’ that offer the most interesting avenues for corporate 
accountability. In a ‘non-conflict’ situation corporate accountability is generally limited by the 
legal obstacles at the national level and the lack of personality under international human 
rights law. In a transitional justice contexts there are other available processes to establish 
corporate accountability and redress for victims, namely truth commissions and reparations 
measures. Disputes related to access to land provide the clearest example of the convergence 
of the two fields.  
 
                                                
28 ND Sharp, ‘Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a Positive-Peace Paradigm for 
Transitional Justice’ (2012) 35 Fordham Intl L J 780; R Duthie, ‘Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to 
Transitional Justice’ (2008) 2 Intl J Trans Just 292; P Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond (Routledge 2007); K Andrieu, ‘Dealing 
With A “New” Grievance: Should Anticorruption Be Part of the Transitional Justice Agenda?’ (2012) J 11(4) 
Human Rights 537. 
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Land grabs and forced displacement often occur outside the context of armed conflict - 
millions of people have been displaced, often without compensation, by dams, extractive 
projects, palm oil plantations, large infrastructure and other ‘development’ projects. In this 
sense, the line between conflict- and repression-related violations and the ‘normal’ 
development process is blurry. One such case is Kenya. Successive waves of land 
dispossession and transfer lie at the heart of Kenya’s ethnic and political tensions. Disputed 
access to land is often cited as one of the key structural causes of violence in the country.29 
The question is whether the forced dispossession of the traditional lands in Kenya is part of a 
transitional justice narrative connected to forced dispossession for political gain, or of a 
resource privatization narrative connected to economic investment. In other words, whether or 
not this is a ‘transitional’ violation that can be redressed using the mechanisms of transitional 
justice. Unlike the South African or Colombian cases, here the dispossession was not in the 
service of a violent political or military campaign, but simply a result of greed, and misplaced 
development objectives. From a victim’s point of view, however, the effect on the 
dispossessed is similar, as is the denial of remedy and corporate accountability.   
 
In a case of land confiscation by a company, directly or in complicity with the government, in 
a ‘non-conflict’ situation (i.e. for natural resources extraction, large infrastructure projects, or 
agribusiness activities), corporate accountability and remedies can only be attempted through 
litigation in the host country and possibly in the host country is the company is a multinational. 
For ‘ordinary’ land expropriations or dispossessions, justice and remedy are supposed to 
happen as a matter of due process. If the same land confiscation happened in a conflict 
situation, transitional justice offers other options: truth commissions can recommend the 
restitution of land and the prosecution of companies; reparations measures, like in Colombia, 
can force companies to return land; and there could be a possibility of the ICC Prosecutor’s 
Office examining the case to verify if an international crime has been committed by means of 
such land confiscation. What makes transitional justice processes programmes feasible is 
precisely that they are ‘transitional,’ that is, exceptional.  
 
Fourth, transitional justice offers tools for human rights advocates that have adopted a ‘hybrid’ 
approach to promoting corporate accountability and use both transnational litigation and non-
                                                
29 N Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in Sharp (n 35), 131; C Huggins, 
‘Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and… Land Tenure Reform?’ (29 July 2009) Oxford Transitional Justice 
Research Working Paper Series, 1-2. 
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judicial mechanisms. Courts are clearly critical for setting standards of legal obligation and 
through litigation it is possible to secure financial damages for victims of corporate abuses.30 
But pursuing individual cases through courts tends to be an incomplete way of addressing the 
scale of the challenge represented by the victims in post-conflict settings.  
 
Courts only have the capacity to attend to a limited number of cases, and rely heavily on 
victims being able to come forward and articulate their claims before the legal system. The 
scale of the challenge and the difficulties associated with access to justice for all make this a 
piecemeal effort at best. In addition, compensation achieved through tort litigation is limited to 
a narrow number of victims, who qualify as plaintiffs under procedural rules. Decisions, as 
outcome of a legal process, may be of considerable importance for those applicant victims, but 
would not have an effect on other victims, who may have also suffered similar violations. 
Judicial reparations can work well in contexts where human rights violations are the exception 
rather than the rule, and as a consequence the number of victims is limited, the specific human 
rights violations are easy to establish, and the evidence to prove is not too problematic.  
 
In transitional justice contexts where governments seek to repair massive violations of human 
rights to a large number of victims, administrative reparations programmes may be a better-
suited mechanism for redressing harm.31 They offer reparation to broader categories of victims, 
instead of just the plaintiffs in a legal case, thus preventing unequal treatment of victims for 
reparations, and can be implemented through faster procedures with more flexible evidentiary 
standards.32 While not usually able to respond to the variables of each individual case, a 
reparations programme can create generally descriptive classes of victims or their surviving 
family members who, given similar circumstances, can be treated alike. When implemented 
well, such programmes can have a much broader reach than court-ordered redress, both in 
terms of the numbers who find some reparation and also in terms of the holistic nature of the 
measures undertaken.33 While the state is responsible to implement them, administrative 
reparation programmes may result from recommendations made by TRCs and even by the 
                                                
30 E Harper, ‘Delivering Justice in the Wake of Mass Violence: New Approaches in Transitional Justice’ (2005) 
10 J Conflict Security Law 149; SR Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ 
(2001), 111 Yale L J 443, 446-448, 461-475; B Stephens, ‘The Amorality of Profit’ (2002), 20 Berkeley J Intl L 
45, 46-48. 
31 UN OHCHR, Rule of Law Tools for Post-conflict States: Reparations Programmes (2008). 
32 Ibid. 
33 International Center for Transitional Justice, Reparations in Theory and Practice (ICTJ 2007), 3-4.  
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regional systems. Such recommendations might include the responsibility of business to 
contribute to reparations programmes, an avenue that would need to be pursued with greater 
vigour if societies are to achieve the full benefits of a transitional justice journey. 
Administrative programmes and civil litigations are anyway, not always mutually exclusive 
options. The Peruvian TRC formulated an interesting position in this respect: receiving 
benefits from the reparations plan does not leave without effect civil lawsuits against the state, 
but should not interrupt or impede penal cases against perpetrators.34 This approach preserves 
victims’ access to judicial avenues, while protecting the stability of the reparations 
programme.35  
 
Fifth, corporations found responsible of past abuses can finance reparations programmes. 
Different countries have adopted different models for the financing of reparations.36 But for 
the most part, states have paid for reparations even when non-state actors committed violations, 
on the basis of that the state failed to protect and ensure rights. For example, transitional 
justice developments in Brazil had initially focused on an ‘abstract model’ of accountability 
whereby the state as a whole assumed responsibility for the violations carried out by 
government officials, but avoiding investigation or prosecution of the individual or corporate 
perpetrators and accomplices.37 Corporate responsibility to achieve reparation is difficult to 
address within the binding legal framework because many situations of corporate abuses lack 
an adequate legal-factual link that establishes responsibility. Consequently, the state assumed 
the responsibility of providing reparations through a programme of moral and economic 
redress to the victims, without looking for specific individual or corporate accountability.38 
While this may be legally correct, normally a much wider range of actors would be expected 
to bear responsibility for endemic and long-lasting systems of oppression.39  
 
All reparations programmes face two fundamental and related questions: first, clearly 
articulating the parameters of who ought to be considered a ‘victim’, and second, how to select 
                                                
34 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación de Perú, Final Report, 28 August 2003.  
35 L Magarrell and G Guillerot, Memorias de un Proceso Inacabado: las Reparaciones en Perú (ICTJ 2006). 
36 S Darcy, ‘Truth Commissions, the European Union and Reparations from Business’ in F Medjouba (ed.), 
Building Peace in Post-conflict Situations (BIICL 2011), 47.  
37 JP Bohoslavsky and MD Torelly, ‘Financial Complicity: The Brazilian Dictatorship Under the “Macroscope” 
in DN Sharp (ed.), Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (Springer 2014), 249. 
38 Ibid., 252. 
39 E Schmid, ‘War Crimes Related to Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 71(3) 
Heidelberg J Intl L 540. 
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the human rights violations from among the many that occurred, that would and ought to 
trigger reparations. For a reparations programme to make sure that every victim is a 
beneficiary it would have to extend benefits to all the victims of all the violations that may 
have taken place during the conflict or repression. No programme has achieved such 
comprehensiveness and it is hard to foresee how this could be reasonably achieved. Generally, 
reparations, both through courts and through administrative programmes, have been limited to 
monetary compensation for violations of what are perceived as core rights to physical integrity: 
killings, forced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention, to the survivors or to the 
families of the victims of those violations.40 This is the case of early reparations, for example 
in Chile and Argentina.41 The South Africa’s TRC also adopted a constrained ‘closed list’ 
approach when it established the requirements for reparation eligibility.42  
 
That reparation programmes have concentrated on these types of violations is not unjustified. 
The states where reparations are needed are generally poor, with many competing challenges 
and few resources. The number of victims and survivors may run to the tens or hundreds of 
thousands, with varied needs. When the resources available for reparations are scarce, choices 
have to be made and, arguably, it makes sense to concentrate on what are perceived to be the 
most serious crimes. Conversely, attempting to provide reparations for too broad a category of 
violations would be prohibitively expensive, and would also risk turning reparations into a 
‘theory of everything’.43 As Roht-Arriaza puts it, ‘Reparations are…a limited category of 
responses to harm.’44 No programme has, however, explained why the victims of some 
violations were eligible for reparations and others not. As a consequence of this omission, 
most programmes have ignored types of violations that perhaps ought to have been included. 
In particular, only few reparation programmes have addressed rights violations mostly 
associated with business activities, such as land expropriation without compensation and 
forced displacement. In this sense, only certain victims became fully part of the process of 
reconciliation, and wider accountability for the economic structure that supported past 
                                                
40 P Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa and Beyond (Routledge 2011). 
41 Government of Argentina, Presidential decree number 70 of 1991; Law 24.043 of 1991; Law 24.411 of 1994. 
Government of Chile, Law 19.123 of 1992. See also, CH Acuña, ‘Transitional Justice in Argentina and Chile. A 
Never Ending Story’ in J Elster (ed.), Reparation and Retribution in the Transition to Democracy (Columbia 
University Press 2006), 206, 215-16. 
42 Government of South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995), Sect 1(1)(xix)(a), 
1(1)(ix). 
43 N Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in Sharp in Sharp (n 37), 110. 
44 Ibid., 114. 
 
 
 214 
violations may be lost.45 Overall, administrative programmes in transitional justice contexts 
have often overlooked the role of corporations in reparations programmes both from the point 
of view of the victims (the harms suffered by victims of corporate abuses have rarely been 
fully repaired) and the perpetrators (corporate actors responsible of violations have rarely paid 
reparations). The responsibility of companies to provide reparations has, as a consequence, not 
been given adequate consideration.       
 
Finally, the investment and economic activity that a corporation (especially a multinational 
corporation) could bring may be more appealing to a post-conflict state than the need to 
redress its citizens for violations committed by the company. Transitional governments, often 
reliant on revenues generated by corporate entities, have a vested interest in not investigating 
or prosecuting corporations. In addition, as a rule, it is the political or the military elites that 
change first. As a result, situations of transition after conflicts and repression have often lead 
to the prosecution of political elites. By contrast, industry and business constitute a continuum 
in most societies, which may explain why there is often no drive for a determined legal 
remedy for these cases. Countries in transition are often in state of economic collapse and 
corporations are seen as critical for economic progress. As a result, even if economic actors 
have substantially contributed to the systemic injustice, they may not be held accountable, in a 
tacit promise to contribute to the economic recovery. This tendency can be observed in the 
post-World War II cases, as well as later in the South African truth and reconciliation process 
and the initial position of the South African government towards claims of the Apartheid 
Litigation.46 It can also explains the lack of political will by the part of governments in 
implementing TRCs recommendations regarding business. Those who may have benefited 
from corporate operations and remain influential in government may obstruct commissions’ 
operations if they believe it endangers their economic interests. For instance, the South Africa, 
Liberia, and East Timor’s TRCs all attributed responsibility to corporations and recommended 
for businesses to pay reparations, but the respective governments lacked the political will to 
implement the commissions’ proposals. So far in the battle between economic power and 
justice the former has won.    
  
                                                
45 R Meister, ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood’ (2002) 16(2) Ethics Intl Affairs 91, 95; M 
Humphrey, The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror to Trauma (Routledge 2002), 121. 
46 See Chapter I.1 and III.2. 
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